Essays on economic development: pre-independent Algeria at the beginning of the 1900s by Maravall Buckwalter, Laura
TESIS DOCTORAL
Essays on Economic Development:
Pre-Independent Algeria at the
Beginning of the 1900s
Autor:
Laura Maravall Buckwalter
Directores:
Markus Lampe
Joan R. Rosés
Tutor:
James Simpson
DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Getafe, Junio 2017

TESIS DOCTORAL
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
PRE-INDEPENDENT ALGERIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1900s
Autor: Laura Maravall Buckwalter
Directores: Markus Lampe y Joan R. Rosés
Tutor: James Simpson
Firma del Tribunal Calificador:
Firma
Presidente: Giovanni Federico
Vocal: Ewout Frankema
Secretario: Alfonso Herranz Loncán
Getafe, 20 de julio de 2017

Contents
List of Tables 7
List of Figures 9
Chapter 1 Introduction 15
Chapter 2 The Crowding-Out of Small Family Farm Settlers 37
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Land Concentration and Rural Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 The Process of Land Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 The Indigenous Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5 Data and Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Chapter 3 Factor Endowments and Farm Structure: A Regional Approach 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 New World Conditions in an Old World Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 Farm Size Restrictions: “Older” vs. “Frontier” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4 The Factor Endowments: A Comparative Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Chapter 4 Build It and They Will Come? 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 The Railroad in French Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 Data and Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Chapter 5 Conclusion 111
A Appendix: Chapter 2 115
5
6 Contents
B Appendix: Chapter 3 123
C Appendix: Chapter 4 127
D Appendix: General 139
D.1 Main Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
D.2 Variable Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
D.3 Maps and Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
D.4 Trade and Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
D.5 Spatial Aggregation and Changes in Administrative Names . . . . . . . . . . . 159
References 165
List of Tables
1.1 Summary of domain properties, by category of land or method of acquisition, bound
over to colonization, Constantine 1830-1851 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.1 European rural population, French Algeria 1872-1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Settler and indigenous land tenancy per district, Const. in 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 49
2.3 Determinants of European agricultural population, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 55
2.4 Determinants of European agricultural land concentration, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 59
3.1 Wheat acreage and total production, grain exporting countries 1885-1914 . . . . . 66
3.2 Total rural population densities per district, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . 67
3.3 Factor prices and quantities: t-test on mean differences, Const. 1904/5 and 1913/14 77
3.4 Mechanization, Const. 1904/5 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Comparative analysis: Oued Athmenia, Aïn Taghrout, and Oum El Bouaghi, 1904/05 81
4.1 Base diff-in-diff: settler population density, Const. 1884 and 1892 . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2 Base diff-in-diff: settler population density, Const. 1884 and 1897 . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 Base diff-in-diff: indigenous population density, Const. 1884 and 1892 . . . . . . . 106
4.4 Base diff-in-diff: indigenous population density, Const. 1884 and 1897 . . . . . . . 106
A.1 Summary statistics in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.2 Pair-wise correlation matrix in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.3 Number of settlers and year of creation of settlement centers in Constantine . . . . 118
A.4 Determinants of European agricultural population, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 119
A.5 Determinants of European agricultural population, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 120
A.6 Determinants of European agricultural population, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 121
A.7 Determinants of European agricultural population, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . 122
B.1 Summary statistics in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Pair-wise correlation matrix in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
C.1 Summary statistics in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7
8 List of Tables
C.2 Pair-wise correlation matrix in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C.3 Summary statistics of elevation and t-test mean difference between treated and
control groups in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C.4 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on settler population density, Const. 1884-1892132
C.5 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on indigenous population density, Const.
1884-1892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
C.6 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on settler population density, Const. 1884-1897133
C.7 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on indigenous population density, Const.
1884-1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
C.8 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on settler population density (indden<2), Const.
1884-1892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
C.9 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on indigenous population density (indden<2),
Const. 1884-1892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
C.10 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on settler population density (indden<2), Const.
1884-1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
C.11 Diff-in-diff: effects of railway access on indigenous population density (indden<2),
Const. 1884-1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
C.12 Diff-in-diff (IV): effects of railway access on settler and indigenous population
density, Const. 1884-1892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
C.13 Diff-in-diff (IV): effects of railway access on settler and indigenous population
density, Const. 1884-1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
C.14 Diff-in-diff: effect of railway access on settler and indigenous population density,
economic activity redistribution, Const. 1884-1892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C.15 Diff-in-diff: effect of railway access on settler and indigenous population density,
economic activity redistribution, Const. 1884-1897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
D.1 Population density in square kilometres: S. Africa, S. Rhodesia, Kenya, and N. Algeria153
D.2 Summary statistics in Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
D.3 List of localities of communes or municipalities that changed names . . . . . . . . 164
List of Figures
1.1 Map of French occupation in Algeria after 1830 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Light density at night in year 2013 and average property size in 1913/14, Constantine 21
1.3 Terms of trade and wine and wheat prices, French Algeria 1870-1913 . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Cultivated area of wine and wheat, French Algeria 1875-1913 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Export basket and price index, French Algeria 1873-1913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Production of wine and wheat per hectare, French Algeria 1875-1913 . . . . . . . 27
1.7 Export diversification, French Algeria 1896-1926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 Map of Constantine at the beginning of the 1900s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1 Total rural indigenous and settler population, French Algeria 1872-1936 . . . . . . 39
2.2 European rural population and property size distribution, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 42
2.3 European property size and year of creation of settlement centers per municipality,
Const. in 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Density of settlement centers and year of creation of settlement centers, Const.
1904/13 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5 Share of owners, holdings size, share of leaders, and size of Private Gross Income,
Const. 1895-1915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Year of creation of a settlement center and crop suitability per municipality, Const.
1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Total wheat acreage, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Algeria, 1885-1914 . . . . 63
3.2 Total wheat acreage in hectares per municipality, Const. 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Indigenous and European plow (photo) in French Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Property size and year of creation of settlement centers, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 73
3.5 Share of properties (per size and district) and average property size density (per
period of settlement), Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Share of settler-owned small properties, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . 74
3.7 Share and extension of the wheat-cultivated area and viticulture by year of creation
of settlement centers, Const. 1904/5 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
9
10 List of Figures
3.8 Indigenous rural population per suitable hectare, Const. 1904/05 . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.9 Mules-to-oxen ratio (settler owned), Const. 1904/05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1 Total rural indigenous and settler population, French Algeria 1872-1936 . . . . . . 89
4.2 Map of Constantine in the 1900s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Selected regional sample: full and restricted, Const. 1884 and 1897 . . . . . . . . . 100
A.1 Box plot of the average property size (by year of settlement), Const. in 1904/05 and
1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B.1 Winter cereal yields, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.2 Indigenous wages per day, Const. 1904/05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.3 Indigenous labor per day, Const. 1904/05 and 1913/14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
C.1 Mean and confidence intervals of settler population density (by treated and control
groups), Const. 1884 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
C.2 Mean and confidence intervals of indigenous population density (by treated and
control groups), Const. 1884 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
C.3 Box plot of settler population density (by treated and control groups), Const. 1884 130
C.4 Box plot of indigenous population density (by treated and control groups), Const. 1884130
C.5 Map of railway instrumental lines in Constantine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C.6 Picture of the railway in French Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
D.1 Colonial administrative boundaries in Constantine overlapped to current aerial image 148
D.2 Example of a part Constantine’s digitized map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
D.3 Zoom-in Constantine’s digitized map: douars from 1863 sénatus-consulte . . . . . 149
D.4 Total population estimates, French Algeria 1872-1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
D.5 Total indigenous and settler population, French Algeria 1872-1936 . . . . . . . . . 156
D.6 Natural population growth rates, French Algeria 1872-1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
D.7 Muslim and total population growth, Algeria 1872-1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
D.8 Aggregating current municipalities into 1949 boundaries in Constantine . . . . . . 159
List of Abbreviations
ANOM Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer
ANOM-iREL Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer-Instruments de Recherche en Ligne
ASF Annuaire Statistique de la France
CBG Compagnie de Bône-Guelma
CCFA Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Algériens
CCO Carte de la Colonisation Officielle
CEA Compagnie de l’Est Algérien
CEPC Carte des Étapes de la Province de Constantine
CI Commune Indigènes
CM Commune Mixte
CPE Commune de Plein Exercice
CVC Carte des Voies de Communication
DdC Dictionnaire des Communes, Villes et Villages de l’Algérie
GGA Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie
INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística
SA Statistique Agricole
SGA Statistique Général de l’Algérie
TdCF Tableau du Commerce de la France
TGdC Tableau Général ... des Communes
11

Acknowledgments
My deepest appreciation is extended to Prof. Markus Lampe who guided and encouraged me throughout
the trials and tribulations of writing a doctoral thesis. As my mentor in research and teaching, he never
failed to provide me with unlimited advice and insightful comments. I owe him a special thanks as he
made it possible for me to travel to the colonial archives in Aix-en-Provence and conferences.
This endeavor would furthermore have been impossible without the counsel of Prof. Joan Rosés,
a brilliant source of original ideas and invaluable suggestions. I have also been extremely fortunate to
have Prof. James Simpson as a third supervisor who, despite taking on my project later in time, was
of enormous support and through his wisdom helped me understand that – in the words of Dwight D.
Eisenhower – “farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil and you’re a thousand miles from
the corn field.”
Working in the Department of Economic History, at the Carlos III University, has been an extraordinary
opportunity. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Jordi Domènech, who encouraged this project from the
beginning. It is a pleasure to thank Professors Juan Carmona, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Antonio
Tena-Junguito, and Pablo Martinelli, who generously offered their support and feedback on my progress.
My sincere thanks go to Professors Andreas Resch and Paul Sharp for their comments and revisions to
the final draft. Discussions with Fernando Maravall have been illuminating, and I am in debt to him
for his patience. I am grateful to José María Jerez, Leopoldo Ceballos, Óscar Fanjul, Hamid Dahma,
Federico Steinberg, and Juan José Dolado for their kindness and generosity. I express gratitude to my
fellow doctoral students for their helpful advice and friendship, with special mention to Sandra López,
Maricia Fischer-Souan, Wilfried Kisling, and Beatriz Álvarez.
My research would have been hopeless without the Carlos III four-year Research Training Scholarship
(PIF) and the Mobility Grant that allowed me to visit the London School of Economics. I appreciate the
financial support I received to present my research at the Economic History Society Annual Conference,
the European Graduate School for Training in Economic and Social Historical Research, the African
Economic History Network, and a seminar at Vienna University of Economics and Business.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Shelley Buckwalter and Agustín Maravall, who have inspired
and heartened me throughout the whole process, and to Juan Badosa who, with his passion and profound
knowledge of northern Africa, motivated me from the beginning. I am grateful to my sisters, Isabel and
Natalia, who always are my source of unconditional support. Finally, I thank Manuel Molina, as he makes
my path happier in every sense – wherever it might lead.
13

Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic theory argues that factor endowments – i.e., the relative intensities of land, labor,
and capital – together with institutional factors – such as the enforcement of property rights
and technological innovation – explain the causes and constraints of economic growth and
development. However, the underlying mechanisms are still unclear, and the numerous models
built to account for economic development provide results that are frequently far from reality.
In economic history the understanding as to how all these factors, namely factor endowments
(such as the land-to-labor ratio) and institutions of different kinds, forged prosperity (or poverty)
across countries is often traced back to colonialism and agriculture. Thus, the analysis of historic
cases during the colonial years, illustrating the way crops, agricultural techniques, and farm
sizes adapted to the new environments generated by rural settlement, can contribute to the
understanding of economic growth and development.
This thesis examines rural settlement in the department of Constantine in French Algeria at
the turn of the twentieth century, shedding light onto the mechanisms through which its agrarian
structure was altered. Historians argue that the Algerian economy was transformed during French
colonization. With the arrival of the French in the 1830s, the colonial administration aimed to
establish a settler rural society based on smallholdings and family farms. Instead, it resulted in a
speculative cash crop production colony based on relatively large estates devoted mainly to the
cultivation of wheat and wine. It is frequently argued that colonialism forged a dual economy
between an Algerian or indigenous “traditional” subsistence rural sector and a settler “modern”
export-led one. Additionally, the progressive tendency towards large cash crop estates led to the
“crowding out” or decline of smallholding settlers. Thus, on the eve of Independence in 1962,
the country was not only endowed with high levels of land inequality and a dual economy and
society, but it became clear that the colonial administration had failed to achieve what it had
initially hoped for: a smallholding family farm type of settler economy.
Examining rural settlement in Constantine helps identify the variables that are commonly
regarded in economic history as the main forces explaining regional differences in long-term
economic growth and development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dell, 2010; Diamond, 1999; Enger-
15
16 Chapter 1. Introduction
man and Sokoloff, 2002; Frankema, 2010). There is no clear-cut answer as to which are the
most significant determinants, and the interdependency between them further complicates the
analysis. Some argue that the predictive power of the regional differences resides in the direct
effect that geographic factors have on production functions (Diamond, 1999), while others rely
on pre-colonial determinants, such as agricultural transitions and ethnic institutions (Galor and
Moav, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). However, there is a growing amount of
literature providing overwhelming evidence on the impact of colonial settlement on long-term
inequality and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Easterly, 2007; Easterly and Levine, 2016;
Putterman and Weil, 2010).
Nevertheless, the channels through which settlement affects long-term economic development
are also unclear. Some find that the interaction between geographic variables and settlement
changed the economy by altering the modes of production (Austin, 2008; Fenske, 2014; Mosley,
1983). Others argue that it was more based on institutions through colonial taxes and land
policies (Frankema, 2011; Huillery, 2014). Alternative hypotheses claim that the major colonial
institutional forces were channeled via the transfer of human capital (Cogneau and Moradi, 2014;
Glaeser et al., 2004), the infrastructure density (Donaldson, 2010; Jedwab and Moradi, 2016),
or the legal origin (La Porta et al., 2008).1 It has also been argued that colonial institutions
were not exogenous and were ultimately shaped by the local factor endowments – such as the
geographic conditions or the quantities of productions factors – encountered in the colonized
regions (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Easterly, 2007; Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2002). Controlling for all these mechanisms and isolating a specific one can be
confusing, particularly when aggregating many countries together in the empirical framework.
In addition, many of these studies tend to explain long-term differences using an explanatory
variable at a fixed point in time (e.g., population density or degree of urbanization in the year
1500) as a proxy to “settlement.” As Frankema et al. (2014, p. 4) explain, this approach neglects
changes within the process itself, and colonial settlement must not be regarded as an “event
[. . . ] at a given point in time,” rather it must be studied as a process that experienced significant
changes throughout the colonial years. Indeed, extensive research on economic development
builds on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001, p. 1369) argument that “Europeans
adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with very different associated
institutions” to explain long-term economic growth and income distribution.2 However, only a
few scholars have taken into account that Europeans adopted different colonial land appropriation
and redistribution policies within a colony itself, depending on the region being occupied and
the timing of settlement. The data available for Constantine provides an opportunity to study
1Legal origin refers to the legal systems such as the British common law, French civil law, and German and
Scandinavian civil law.
2For instance, “settler economies” (e.g., Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe), which were characterized by
intensive European settlement and major land transfers from indigenous populations to settlers, are related to higher
land inequality and lower potential for growth, as opposed to “peasant export” economies (i.e., Ghana and Uganda),
where local populations were less affected by land policies and smallholders were able to participate in exports
(Bowden et al., 2008; Haas, 2017).
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how settlers responded, according to their timing of settlement, to differences in land-market
institutions, relative factors of production, and infrastructures, thus contributing to the debates
regarding the colonial effects on long-term development.
Furthermore, much of the literature tends to consider Africa as a whole, excluding relevant
inter-country heterogeneities that should be included in the assessment of the impact of coloniza-
tion on growth (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002). Indeed, Algeria has been situated inaccurately in
comparative studies, leading to what Austin (2008, p. 998) defines as “compression of history.”
For instance, the author points out this weakness in Acemoglu et al. (2001), whose research de-
sign categorizes all African countries as “non-settler colonies,” without taking into consideration
that:
[. . . ] the division between colonies with and without European settlement operated within
Africa itself, creating – or perhaps being part of – a different kind of historical path than that
taken by the non-settler economies of the continent.
Others have improved accuracy by limiting comparison to the North African region or to
similar settler colonies (Elkins and Pedersen, 2005; Huillery, 2014; Lützelschwab, 2013; Mosley,
1983). In general, French Algeria is regarded as a settler economy that, particularly in relation to
its long-run economic performance, should be included into a “somewhat different type of settler
colonialism that emerged in Africa over the 19th Century and early 20th Centuries” (Lloyd
and Metzer, 2013, p. 2).3 It was characterized by having a settler population smaller in size to
the indigenous one, and a mètropole endowed with a significant economic, political, and often
military power, that maintained the colony’s dependence on it.4 In comparative studies, Algeria
is usually positioned together with Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, and South Africa (Lloyd and
Metzer, 2013; Lützelschwab, 2013; Osterhammel and Frisch, 1997). Scholars find that these
countries share three characteristics that allow for comparison: the relative share of land owned
by settlers, the dependence of settlers on the availability of indigenous labor, and the role of the
state representing settlers and determining access to land and labor (Lützelschwab, 2013).
However, Algeria stands out from the rest because it was “geographically, politically and
economically” nearest to the “mother country” (Good, 1976, p. 598), and it experienced,
together with South Africa, the highest growth and share of settler population relative to the
total population (Lützelschwab, 2000). In addition, the land appropriation process was mostly
undertaken after conquest, entailing a complex procedure where native traditional land norms
and titles were intertwined with innovative French administrative measures (Lützelschwab,
2000). Finally, in contrast to the other settler economies, it was considered as an integral part
3As explained by Lloyd and Metzer (2013, p. 2) there are also the “Neo-Europe” or “modern” type of settler
economies of the late 18th and 19th centuries such as the New World colonies (e.g. the United States, Canada or
Australia), and the “older” type more prevalent in the 18th century.
4This type of settler economy is explained by the existence of four important agents: “an imperial métropole
where sovereignty formally resides, a local administration charged with maintaining order and authority, an
indigenous population significant enough in size and tenacity to make its presence felt, and an often demanding and
well-connected settler community” (Elkins and Pedersen, 2005, p. 4).
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of France, and thus enjoyed a preferential trade policy that guaranteed a market demand that
fully absorbed its agricultural exports, at a particular moment in history when many countries
returned to protectionist policies as a response to New World grain competition after the 1870s.
Hence, analyzing a different case of a settler economy can provide new insights into the effects
of colonialism on agrarian structures.
With historic data, primary and secondary literature, and quantitative empirical methods,
this study identifies the colonial forces explaining regional differences in population densities
and rural land concentration (i.e., more land in fewer hands). The structure is as follows. The
next sections describe the international framework, discussing the factors that pushed Algeria
to specialize in cereal and wine production, and provide an overview of Constantine’s regional
characteristics and settlement process. Chapter 2 examines how land-market institutions affected
land concentration, ultimately explaining the lower density levels of family farm settlers. Chapter
3 analyzes how “first nature” geographic variables – such as land aridity – and the relative
factor endowments – specifically the arable land-to-labor ratio – influence economic activity by
shaping agricultural innovation and land concentration. Finally, Chapter 4 examines whether the
railway infrastructure built without thorough planning in remote regions affected the settler and
indigenous Algerian population density levels.
19
Figure 1.1: Map of French occupation in Algeria after 1830
Source: Yacono (1993, p. 262). Original source: Guernier, E. (1946) Algérie et Sahara, Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime,
tome 1, Paris.
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Outline of the Current Situation and Importance of Research
In this context, it is necessary to explain why I focus on agriculture. The study of Algeria’s
colonization could easily be included in numerous growth and development policy debates in
economic history. For instance, I could have examined the effects of trade integration as French
policy facilitated exports and accelerated growth by implementing a “tariff assimilation” policy
(Ageron, 1991; Girault, 1916), or, alternatively, I could have focused on the legacy and effects of
the transfer of French institutions as these were adapted to Algeria.5 Thus, why agriculture?
Agriculture represents a significant share of the Algerian economy: its contribution to GDP
in 2014 was estimated to be over 10 percent, in contrast to an average of 6 percent for the Middle
East and North Africa, and a 3.9 percent world average.6 However, as Daoudi and Colin (2016)
explain, since the 1970s, agricultural production has struggled to meet a growing domestic food
demand caused by persistent population growth and improved standards of living (brought about
by the industrial and service sector). Water resources are negligible and the proportion of arable
land reported in 2014 was only 2 percent of the total surface area (2,381,740 square kilometers).7
To increase agricultural production and guarantee food security, the Algerian government
currently seeks to boost small farming, diversify agricultural production, expand cultivation in
arid regions (the steppes and Sahara Desert), and invest in infrastructure (Daoudi and Colin,
2016). Indeed, since Independence in 1962, most governmental plans have aimed at redistributing
land, enhancing rural production, and decreasing food insecurity by implementing measures
such as modifying land ownership, expanding cultivation, and improving infrastructures (Laoubi
and Yamao, 2012).8 Yet, as Laoubi and Yamao (2012) argue, the majority of governmental plans
implemented after independence have actually failed to enhance agricultural production.
Some of the origins of the obstacles encountered by post-colonial Algeria to fulfill these
goals can be traced back to the colonial years. For instance, a central issue addressed in this
thesis (mainly in Chapters 2 and 3) is the evolution of landownership which, according to Laoubi
and Yamao (2012), is at present a major constraint to Algerian agricultural development. After
Independence the Algerian government undertook the “most considered and ambitious” land
reform among the Maghreb countries (Smith, 1975, p. 260),9 and, since then, it has engaged in
numerous agricultural development plans targeting land redistribution. Thus, and in line with
Binswanger et al. (1995), the increasing consensus on the relevance of land redistribution policies
5Specifically, colonial representation in French Parliament, centralized direct government, and the idea of
applying the same laws to all citizens without considering “differences in size, distance from France, social
organization, religious patterns, economic development, etc.” (Lewis, 1962, p. 131).
6The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2017). Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), retrieved from
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=DZA.
7Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2017). Land use and agricultural area, retrieved
from http://www.fao.org.
8“Autogestation” policy (1962-1970), “Agrarian Revolution” policy (1971-1979), transition to market economy
(1980-1986), new farm restructuring (1987-1999), and the National Agricultural and Rural Development Program
(2000. . . ).
9Countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia also undertook post-Independence land reforms.
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highlights the necessity to examine the origins of land concentration.
Figure 1.2: Light density at night in year 2013 and average property size in 1913/14 in Constantine
The dashed line is the trend line for the year 1913/14. Average size per property is the European average property size in
hectares per municipality in the year 1913/14. Light density at night displays lights from cities, towns, and other sites with
persistent lighting, including gas flares in the year 2013. For detail on the construction of variables see Appendix D. Source:
SA (1913/14) and NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center.
According to Griffin (1976), who participated in Algeria’s post-Independence agricultural
planning in 1963, rural areas in developing countries are usually endowed with societal structures
that impede redistribution of resources and hinder growth. High levels of land concentration –
which in the case of Algeria originated during the colonial years – correspond to fragmented rural
labor markets. These are characterized by low wages, very small holdings, high land rents, and
underutilization of land. Furthermore, the majority of the landless (or quasi-landless) population
loses bargaining power, and therefore inequality is consolidated, economic growth decreases,
and inefficiency is generated. As an illustration, in line with this argument, Figure 1.2 suggests
that the current economic activity (proxied by light density at night) in the regions endowed with
larger properties in the past has lagged behind.10
Thus, given that family farming (or individually run) is found to boost local economies,
contribute to production diversification, and provide sustainable agriculture (Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, 2014), it is comprehensible that, since its arrival to
Algeria, the French government prioritized the establishment of a peasant, family farm economy
and that, even today, the Algerian government encourages family farming. The government
has also undertaken additional measures that link as well to the colonial origins of the current
10Using light density at night as a proxy to economic activity is a standard procedure used in research. Given the
lack of current economic activity data at a municipal level (corresponding to the 1900s boundaries), and in line with
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), I have used the light density at night in 2013. See Appendix D for further
detail on construction. In addition, the pairwise correlation between the night light density and alternative variables
accounting for colonialism (for both the years 1904/5 and 1913/14) is significant at a one percent confidence level:
i. a -0.31 (N=198) with the average year of creation of a settlement center and, ii. a 0.21 (N=198) with the road
network density.
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agrarian structure. For instance, it seeks to increase agricultural diversification, which indeed
originated during the colonial years. A number of variables, such as the French tariff assimilation
policy, international cereal prices, and the phylloxera vineyard aphid pushed settlers to specialize
solely in cereal and wine production. Furthermore, past and present governmental policies show
interesting similarities; for example, at present the government aims at expanding cultivation
in arid regions that, during the colonial years, was also a key policy to the development of the
cereal export-led sector and large landholdings.11 This does not imply that colonialism was
the sole determinant of agrarian structural problems, but it does highlight the importance of
understanding the past in order to provide useful lessons for future policy making.
The International Trade Context
In line with the Old World market, and in contrast to New World settler economies such as the
United States, Canada, or Australia, pre-colonial commercial relations were strong in Algeria.
The Greeks and Phoenicians had already established trading towns on the North African coast
around the seventh century B.C., and the trade between France and Algeria dated back to the
Middle Ages (Bennoune, 2002). These commercial links were reinforced by a geographical
proximity and a political union that established Algeria as an integral part of France. Thus, the
colony took advantage of its trade privileges with France and specialized mainly in cereal and
wine production.
Indeed, the colonial years deepened Algeria’s pattern of export specialization. After the fall in
international grain prices in the 1870s, cereal farmers in the grain exporting countries – in order
to be competitive in world markets – could either minimize the costs of production or change
to a more attractive crop.12 In Algeria, a large number of French farmers turned to viticulture.
This positioned the country within the New World type of wine producers that, in contrast to the
Old World, were characterized by modern wineries that benefited from technological progress
and produced economies of scale (Simpson, 2011b). However, many of the Algerian farmers
decided to stick to cereal cultivation. They finally became competitive after the mid-1890s
as a result of French protective tariffs (that increased grain prices), French wine production
recovery (decreasing wine prices), new agricultural practices and, as described by Offer (1991),
the worldwide grain demand’s outpacing of the supply (particularly since empty lands were
fully colonized). Hence, although certainly other factors – i.e. the settlement process and type
11Similarly, in particular after 1983, the Algerian government has undertaken several plans to boost land
development in the steppe and Sahara. For instance, in the 1983 Law (Accès à la propriété foncière agricole par
la mise en valeur) the State granted “a private property right to any farmer who develops previously undeveloped
public land in the Sahara or the steppe (former arch land)” (Daoudi and Colin, 2016, p. 5).
12As explained by Offer (1991), grain was the strategic commodity of the nineteenth century and it allowed
classifying the world into two categories: wheat-importing countries, such as Great Britain, and wheat-exporting
ones, such as Russia. A strategic commodity is defined by the author as “an article of trade whose denial can
affect the well-being or even the survival of a great power. It does not have to dominate the balance of trade. Like
petroleum today, it only has to form a link in the cycle of production and to have no adequate substitutes” (p. 83).
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of colonial administration, the higher domestic demand caused by a growing population, the
improved infrastructure network, and the development of an industrial agriculture – also help
to explain the expansion of trade, the evolution of French and world market prices strongly
determined the selection of the cultivated crop.
The international prices were determined in a trade environment that was changing rapidly
during the years analyzed. Western European countries joined Britain in moving toward a
free-trade regime during the 1850s and 1860s, leading to lower European average tariffs and a
higher number of multilateral pro-trade deals (Federico, 2012; Tena-Junguito et al., 2012). The
higher trade flows were favored by the transport revolution, a higher GDP growth rate associated
to changes in demand patterns, and a relatively peaceful international environment (Williamson,
2011). Yet these trends in European markets were soon to be affected in the 1870s by the
incoming grain flows from the new frontiers in Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Russia (Offer,
1991; O’Rourke and Williamson, 2001). The higher grain supply pushed European landowners’
agricultural incomes downward so numerous countries returned to protectionism; France, which
had initiated the path toward free trade with the Cobden-Chevalier treaty during the Second
Empire, was one of them. This shift towards protectionism responded to mainly to rural French
producers who demanded a higher level of protection in the 1880s, specifically on foreign grain
and animals. These protectionist interests, mirrored in the 1885 and 1887 laws, finally triumphed
in the Méline tariff law of January 11, 1892.
This shift towards protectionism went hand-in-hand with the French colonial tariff assimi-
lation regime that secured a reciprocal and balanced commercial relation between France and
Algeria and guaranteed an “absolute freedom of duties” (Girault, 1916, p. 262).13 Indeed, the
Méline tariff simultaneously established the assimilation policy given that, as Girault (1916,
p. 82-83) explains, “the beaten free-trade party could not preserve commercial liberty in the
colonies when it was incapable of maintaining it in France.”14 The assimilation policy had
various effects. On the one side, in addition to the national sentiment attached to the colony,
the French benefited from the extension of their internal market and their exports accounted for
approximately 90 percent of Algerian imports. The same tariff regime in Algeria, on the other
hand, simplified formalities (e.g. tariff classifications) and allowed producers to profit from the
higher wine, wheat, and cattle prices generated by the French protectionist policies. Furthermore,
although Algerian consumers paid prices as high as the ones found in France, they experienced
relatively lower costs of living.15 Overall, around 80 percent of Algeria’s trade was free of duties
13With some minor exception due to indirect internal taxes. The policy of assimilation became one of the
principal pillars of French colonial administration . It aimed to transform Algeria into an extension of French
territory with direct rule from Paris. This policy established “the doctrine that the conqueror’s civilization should be
taught to the people of the conquered territories” (Leonard, 1962, p. 536), expecting to adapt French production
methods, culture, and administration to Algeria. This policy became strongest in the 1870s and it is considered to
have failed around the turn of the twentieth century (Lewis, 1962; Ageron, 1968).
14Although it is considered that the tariff assimilation policy began to manifest after 1883, the 1892 law is
regarded as the ending point of the French liberal policies as it increased rights over both agricultural and industrial
products. For instance, by 1894 the wheat tax had increased up to 32 percent (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2001).
15As a counterfactual, Girault (1916) explains that if Algeria had been provided tariff autonomy, then the loss
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and the French market was sufficient to absorb Algeria’s main agricultural products (Girault,
1916).
Algeria was the first colony to experience the assimilation policy and, in contrast to other
French colonies like the Antilles or New Caledonia, the policy behaved as a tariff union with
France.16 The market integration set by this policy linked agricultural production to cereal and
wine prices in France. These, as shown in Figure 1.3, followed opposite trends during the second
half of the 1870s: while grain prices dropped as a result of the overseas grain inflows coming
into European markets, wine prices became lucrative because of its lower production caused
by the phylloxera vineyard aphid in Europe. Thus, in the 1880s the area devoted to viticulture
grew significantly as opposed to cereal, which remained stagnant until 1900 (see Figure 1.4).
These trends are visible in the following quote by the British Consul-General Playfair in the
1886 Algerian Trade and Finance report:17
It seems impossible for any country at the present day to compete successfully with India in
the production of wheat, so it is hardly surprising that no great progress in agriculture, pure
and simple, can be reported. The hopes of the colony are now centred in vines, and immense
efforts are being made to protect it from the ravages of the much dreaded phylloxera [. . . ].
Nevertheless the situation reversed at the turn of the century. In the 1880s wine became less
profitable as production recovered in France, while cereal began to be competitive by the end of
the 1890s, thanks to the newly introduced agricultural techniques (in more detail in Chapter 3)
and French protectionism (Ageron, 1991; Mollard, 1950; Yacono, 1993; Lützelschwab, 2000).
This reversal is reflected in the following quote from the trade report by the British Vice-Consul
Scratchley for the year 1900 regarding the Constantine region:18
The yield was generally satisfactory. In barley the crop was sufficient to enable the producers
to dispose 23,600 tons for shipment to France. Wheat to the amount of 12,000 tons was also
shipped. [. . . ] The question of how to get rid of wines is becoming serious in Algeria. The
vineyards in France are now all replanted, and the probabilities are that the yield will be
sufficient to supply the wants of a country.
Overall, based on Amin’s (1966) estimates, between 1850 and 1910 the net annual cereal
production growth rate was of 1.7 percent, while wine production experienced an annual 3 percent
growth rate from the 1880s until 1910. Figure 1.6 displays the wine and wheat production per
hectare between 1875 and First World War. During this period, both products ranked as the
experienced by the Algerian consumer because of the increase in French prices would have been greater than the
gains obtained from cheaper foreign imported products.
16However, it is not a complete tariff union as each of the countries keeps the revenue from customs and
navigation duties obtained at the frontier.
17Foreign Office. 1888. Annual Series. No. 249. Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance.
France. Report for the year 1886 on the commerce, navigation, and agriculture of Algeria. p. 9.
18No. 2710 Annual Series. Diplomatic and Consular Reports. France. Report of 1900 on the trade of Algeria.
Reference to previous report, Annual Series No. 2472. p. 31.
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Figure 1.3: Terms of Trade (ToT) and wine and wheat prices, French Algeria 1870-1913
This graph is based on Simpson (2011a) and Meloni and Swinnen (2014). The prices are deflated with Consumer Price Index
(1914=100) from Mitchell (1994). The source for prices is Insee (1935). Terms of trade is the price of exports (free on board)
divided by an import price index (cost, insurance, and freight); this series is courtesy of Tena-Junguito, A., and Federico, G.,
2016. “World trade, 1800-1938: a new data-set,” Working Papers 0093, European Historical Economics Society (EHES). See
Appendix D for more detail on sources.
Figure 1.4: Cultivated area of wine and wheat in hectares, French Algeria 1875-1913
The series Wheat_MA5 displays the 5-year moving average of the Wheat series. The figures refer to the cultivated area during
the crop year ending the year indicated. The value for 1881 was interpolated for both production and area cultivated. Source:
ASF, 1930. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
most important exports of Algeria in terms of their value within French statistical yearbooks.
The export data obtained from these yearbooks and the output estimates reported in Mitchell
(1994) suggest that the exported share of the total wine production passed from 40 percent in
1887, to 80 percent in 1899, and 70 percent in 1909, while the share of the cereal exports over
the total production ranged between 10 to 15 percent. Based on Amin’s (1966) estimates, the
exported proportion of all the agricultural and mining production in 1880 was 33 percent and
rose to 40 percent in 1910. Figure 1.5, which demonstrates the evolution of a representative
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basket of real exports per capita,19 per settler,20 and the corresponding price index,21 shows the
persistent growth rate achieved by the real exports per settler at the end of the 1880s.
These figure were accompanied by a change in the terms of trade trend at the turn of the
century as reflected in Figure 1.3. French colonial records display the highest trade figures after
the 1890s and were characterized by a change in the composition of the export basket. This
is reflected in Figure 1.7, where the darker regions that account for wine and cereal related
products show a turning point towards a lower diversification after the 1900s which,22 according
to Ageron (1991), “condemned” the country’s economic development:
Given over to cash crops for wholesale export, to the point at which 50 percent of the
country’s exports earnings came from wine and its related products, agricultural colonization
enriched European Algeria but lost all colonial justification. It restricted the growth of
French population while competing in the market with metropolitan producers. Algerians
themselves criticized it for sacrificing food-crops and condemning the country to the risks of
monoculture (Ageron, 1991, p. 62)
Figure 1.5: Export basket and price index, 1873-1913
The price index accounts for the prices of the principal exports (cereal, wine, and livestock) weighted by their share over total
exports. These are import values after the evaluations of the Commission at customs. Source: Insee (1930), Insee (1966), and
Mitchell (1994). See Section “Trade and Population” in Appendix D for detail on methodology and sources used to obtain real
exports per capita, real exports per settler, and the price index.
19That is, the total real exports divided by the sum of the settler and indigenous population (proxied by the
Muslim and non-Muslim population).
20That is, the total real exports divided by the settler population (proxied by the non-Muslim population).
21The price index is constructed using the prices (base 1902=1) of the three principal exported products (wine,
wheat, and livestock) and weighs them according to their annual total export share. The exports series have been
obtained from numerous Annuaire Statistique de la France and Mitchell (1994), and are calculated dividing the
amount of total exports by the price index. Ultimately, dividing real exports by both the total population series and
the number of settlers shows the per capita trends. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
22The categorization of products in the original source (ASF) is more complicated than the one shown in
Figure 1.7, but exceeds the reach of this dissertation and therefore shall not be examined in greater depth.
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Figure 1.6: Production of wine and wheat per hectare, French Algeria 1875-1913
The series Wheat_MA5 is the 5-year moving average of the Wheat series. Wine_MA5 displays the 5-year moving average of the
Wine series. Source: Insee (1930). The production values correspond to the crop year ending in the year indicated. See Section
“Trade and Population” in Appendix D for detail on methodology and sources used to obtain the real exports per capita, real
exports per settler, and the price index.
Figure 1.7: Export diversification, French Algeria 1896-1926
For convenience, each export category aggregates more complicated disaggregated groups. The cereal category excludes wheat.
See Section “Trade and Population” in Appendix D for detail on methodology and sources used to obtain the real exports per
capita, real exports per settler, and the price index.
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An Overview of Constantine
Algeria’s topographical regions change significantly from north to south, shifting from coastal
mountains with river valleys in the north, through the interior Tell Atlas mountains and the
High Plateaux steppes, to the Saharan Tell mountain system that limits the Sahara desert in
the south. This study analyzes Constantine, a former French department (between 1848 and
1962) situated in the northeastern part of the country, and described as hillier, colder, rainier, and
with soils enriched with potassium and phosphates.23 The fertility provided by these minerals
permitted the specialization of many holdings in cereal cultivation. However, climate variability
and strong regional differences in soils – changing from fertile river valleys in the coastal regions
of Béjaïa (formerly Bougie) and Annaba (Bône), to extensive grasslands in the High Plateaux in
the proximities of Sétif, and arid and rocky regions towards the Sahara – have traditionally led
populations to combine diverse agricultural lifestyles (McDougall, 2017).
Recently, in his book “A History of Algeria,” McDougall (2017) explains that, during
the Ottoman Regency (i.e., 1515 to 1830), “the region’s [in Constantine’s] optimum ecology
[. . . ] relied on extensive agriculture with a light plough on large, open fields – where they
were available – combined with livestock-raising, with flocks of herds being moved seasonally
by populations who often combined settled agriculture with a degree of mobile pastoralism.”
According to the author, prior to French settlement, about 90 percent of Algerian society was
rural and agricultural and pastoral production generated a surplus that was collected by the state.
What is more, “cereal culture supported by the soils and rainfall of the eastern region, along with
intensive agriculture in the well-watered mountains, has historically supported higher population
levels – up to half of the country’s total population – and a greater agricultural surplus than
other areas.”24 This was particularly the case in the Kabylia region, a densely populated historic
region situated in the coastal Tell Atlas mountains and mostly inhabited by Berbers (Kateb, 2001;
McDougall, 2017).
The land tenure system during the Ottoman Regency was complex,25 mainly because commu-
nal interests and usufructuary rights played an important role. The most fertile land was owned
by the state (known as beylik) and part of it was assigned – usually in exchange for provisions
or military and civil service – to government officials (apanage), and part to sharecroppers
23For aerial photography see D.1 in Appendix D.
24For further detail on the Algerian economy, society, and institutions established prior to French occupation,
see Bennoune (2002); McDougall (2017); Yacono (1993); Ruedy (1967); Nouschi (1961).
25For simplification and in line with most authors, I describe the three main categories mostly cited in the
literature. For further detail I recommend Ruedy (1967) in general, and Nouschi (1961) for Constantine. However,
the existent literature on Algerian land tenure prior to French colonialism is confusing and the definitions of land
tenures often do not coincide between authors.
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Figure1.8:MapofConstantineatthebeginningofthe1900s
IntheoriginalmaptheAlgerianvilagesarereportedas“Bordj,Vilagesindigènes”andEuropeansetlementsareclassiﬁedas
“Centresdecolonisation”and“Fermes,Hameaux.”TheregionsaredotediftheKabyliaorBerber-speakingpopulationdensity
overthenumberofowned-hectaresisabovethevalueofonein1904/05.Theroadsinclude“Routesnationales,”“Chemins
deGrandeCommunication,”and“Cheminsd’intérêtcommun.”Sources:SA(1904/05),Busson(1898),andANOM-iREL;
Maps:CEPC(1883)andCVC(1902);GISdata:CGIAR-CSI(2006).Formoredetailonspatialaggregation,sources,andthe
constructionofvariablesseeAppendixD.
(kh¯amis¯at),26tribes(azl),27andcorvées(tuw¯iza).28Withinthebeylikland,someauthorshave
alsoincludedthehabousland,whichwasinalienablelandassignedtoanorganizationrelatedto
charity,religious,orcivicworks;however,itwasnotextensiveandwasmostlylimitedtourban
areas(Ruedy,1967).Thetribalarshland–theonemosttargetedbythecolonialadministration
–wascommunalyheldandtransmitedbylineage,althougheachfamilyunithadaccessto
individualplotsofland(dependingonthefamily’sinheritanceandthenumberofmalelaborers
26Thetraditionalindigenoussectorwasmostlyfarmedundersmallandholdingsthatwereusualysub-rented
tosharecroppersknownasmétayerorkhammès.Theycultivatedthelandinexchangeforone-ﬁfthoftheﬁnal
production.Thisratiowascalculatedbasedonthenumberofinputsprovidedbythesharecropperforproduction
(usualyitwasonlylaborandthelandownerprovidedtheremainingﬁve:land,water,seeds,animalpower,and
labor(Grifﬁn,1976).
27Theazlwasextensivelandcultivatedbytribesinexchangeforaregularpaymentandwasparticularlyrelevant
inConstantine.Bennoune(2002,p.21)explainsthatthetribeformed“thebasicsocio-politicalandeconomicunit,
wassub-dividedstructuralyintoseveralagnaticlineages,composedofnumerousinterelatednuclearorextended
corporatefamilies.Apatriarchwastheundisputedheadofeveryhousehold.Thesizeofthetribevariedfroma
smalclusterofhamletsdotingoneortwomountainslopestoanimmenseunitoccupyingawideregion”(the
originalsourceis:Hart,D.(1972),ThetribeinmodernMorocco:twocasestudies,inArabsandBerbers,Gelner
andMicaud,LexingtonBooks,1972)
28Thiswasaformofunpaidlaborwhichthegovernor(bey)reliedonforcultivation.
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in the family).29 Finally, milk land – regarded by the French as the equivalent to European private
property – could be privately sold (although sales were uncommon and required numerous legal
formalities) and was enclosed by stone walls, hillsides, or hedges. This type of land was mostly
located in the Kabylia and linked to intensive agriculture (e.g., arboriculture and vegetables).30
Thus, the existent land property structure in Algeria was complex and required the colonial ad-
ministration to undertake a series of institutional measures in order to increase its public domain.
The first measures focused on land appropriation, while the following ones (in particular, after
the 1860s) aimed at privatizing property and establishing a land market. Chapter 2 focuses on the
the latter, describing the “legal” measures in the form of property decrees and laws – specifically,
the 1863 sénatus-consulte, the 1873 Warnier law, and the “little” sénatus-consulte of 1887 –
developed by the colonial administration to encourage private property transactions between
Algerians and settlers. For example, the 1863 sénatus consulte law, in order to disintegrate tribal
areas and divide them into territorial units known as douars, delimited and registered indigenous
properties and provided legal land titles in accordance to French law (Bellahsene, 2006, p. 169)
(see Figure D.3 in Appendix D).31
However, prior to these measures and soon after conquest,32 the French colonial administra-
tion seized land in various ways. As described by Ruedy (2005), it first declared itself to be the
owner by right of conquest of beylik lands and their dependencies, appropriating by 1851 around
158,000 hectares. By the 1850s it had seized 17,414 hectares of habous lands and, as a form
of retaliation on indigenous insurrections and regime opponents, it “sequestered” up to 49.007
hectares of tribal land (makhzan and arsh).33 It confiscated land considered to be uncultivated
and by 1851 it had appropriated 52,274 hectares declared as vacant (as many owners left the
lands after war and others were unable to verify their property titles). Finally, in the 1850s, the
colonial administration, with no legal basis, provided land to settlers by means of dispossessing
and circumscribing tribes to restricted areas (Lützelschwab, 2013). This policy was known as
cantonnement and it appropriated a total of 63,901 hectares by 1851 (Ruedy, 2005). In addition,
the failure of “the last massive armed revolt” in the Kabylia in 1871 provided the public domain
a major source of land in the eastern part of Algeria, confiscating up to 574,000 hectares by 1875
29Ruedy (1967, p. 11) explains that arsh land was “one of the most delicate and controversial problems
encountered by the French in Algeria.” The occupying tribes had no right to transfer ownership and did not own
property titles, but they did possess “(1) the right to occupy and cultivate the lands; (2) the right to enjoy its fruits;
and (3) the right to transmit it to direct male heirs. As long as the occupant remained on the land and paid the khara¯j
[a colonial tax], he could not legally be evicted.” This land was frequently mistaken for collective property but
“each family cultivated a fixed parcel in its own right and could pass it on, as we have seen, to heirs in the direct
male line. The periodic redistribution of lands characteristic of true collective ownership was not resorted to.” Only
Mawa¯t lands were similar to collective property and these were devoted mainly to pasture.
30However, part of the Milk was also communally held, particularly the cereal growing and pasture land sections.
31The douars were municipally self-governing territorial units. Each one had a council of notables named djêema
formed by 6 to 16 members (not elected up until 1919) and it was presided by a Caïd who was appointed by the
French government and proposed by the colonial administrators of its corresponding commune mixte (Sivak, 2008).
32The 17th of July of 1830 a Comité des Domaines was established to regulate property records and set the legal
means to develop a land market (Sivak, 2008, p. 68).
33Sequestration was a type of circumstantial, massive expropriation which became a systematic method used by
the administration to obtain land (Bellahsene, 2006, p. 283).
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(Ruedy, 2005, p. 76).34 Table 1.1 displays the land categories and appropriation methods used
by the French state in Constantine.
Table 1.1: Summary of domain properties, by category of land or method of acquisition, bound over to
colonization (1830-1851) in hectares
Constantine Beylik Sequest. Habous Expropr. Cantonnement Vacant Exchange Heirless Misc. Total
Arsh Makhzan
Bône 161 4,142 266 329 977 5,875
Bougie 44 109 4 157
Constantine 35,372 1,162 4,627 2,195 303 43,659
Guelma 11,463 781 1 12,245
La Calle 97 97
Philippeville 27,782 16,000 43,782
Sétif 680 680
Total 75,599 1,271 8,773 266 2,976 632 978 106,495
Source: Ruedy (1967, p. 100).
Following this, in order to become the rightful owner of a plot of land, a settler had to apply
through the colonial administration. This brings us to an explanation that is key to understand
the settlement process in Algeria:
Until 1871, the state, master of an ever-expanding public domain in rural properties, was the
principal intermediary in transferring Algerian land to Europeans; from the 1870s onward,
changes in land legislation facilitated direct acquisition from Algerians and made this as
important vehicle as the domain transfer (Ruedy, 2005, p. 70).
The year 1870 therefore marks the shift between two colonial administrations with very
different land policies: from a military one that strictly regulated settlement, to a civil one that
favored regional expansion. Thus, as a matter of convenience and to simplify the empirical
framework in this dissertation, I will refer to the regions settled prior the 1870s as “older,” and
the ones settled after as “frontier.”
However, despite the different land policies, both administrations shared the same land
settlement strategy: the creation of centres de peuplement – also known as “settlement centers,”
“population centers,” or “colonization centers” indistinctly – where settlers would live and
cultivate their lands. As explained by Bellahsene (2006),35 a settlement center was a territorial
unit founded solely for rural settlement. It was the final project per se, and was not initially
intended to become a town or a village devoted to commercial exchange, nor endowed with
relevant administrative and economic functions. According to the author, this foundational “rural”
idea – that is, that economic activity evolved entirely around agricultural production – changed
34The Kabylia revolt was explained by many factors but the most significant, or at least the most frequently cited
one by historians, is the widespread Algerian discontent resulting from successive years of crop failures, drought,
and epidemics, together with the arrival in 1870 of the new colonial civil administration that favored regional
expansion of settlement.
35In his dissertation “La colonisation en Algérie: Processus et procédures de création des centres de peuplement.
Institutions, intervenants et outils” the author studies the process and procedure of creation of the population centers
in detail.
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into a more “urban” type in 1919, when official colonization had ended, the cultivable land
was exhausted, and the transport infrastructure had developed. Yet, before the end of official
colonization, territorial expansion by means of establishing new centers was prioritized over
the enlargement of centers already built. In addition, the plots granted were conditional to their
cultivation; for instance, as Sessions (2015, p. 249) describes,
The foundational decree of September 1836 required that each concessionaire build a
house, enclose his land with a protective ditch or hedge, and clear and sow one-third of the
arable land each year until the entire concession had been “cultivated,” meaning the natural
meadowland had been cleared and occupied no more than a quarter of the concession’s total
area. The concessionaire was obliged to plant fifty trees per hectare, to drain any wetlands,
and to allow the public works department to extract sand and stone from uncultivated areas.
If the grantee agreed to make additional expenditures on buildings and other improvement
beyond these minimum requirements, the three-lot limit could be suspended. Only upon
completion of these contractual requirements did the concession become definitive.
The basic structure of a settlement center was a “colonization perimeter” circumscribing
a village in the center, designed exclusively to provide accommodation for families, and the
to-be-cultivated plots of land were located at a maximum of one-hour distance from the village.36
It was a permanent accommodation for settlers that also functioned as an instrument to secure
land and consolidate colonialism, particularly in the areas where the majority of population
was indigenous. Overall, as Bellahsene (2006) describes, although the program was initiated
in the 1840s, the real boom began at the beginning of the 1870s with the arrival of the civil
administration, creating around 474 centers on 705,196 hectares (out of which more than 50
percent was obtained from the Kabylia insurrection in the 1870s).
French colonialism had severe effects on the Algerian population, particularly given that the
colonial administration targeted the internal structures of rural populations with measures such
as cantonnement, the creation of settlement centers, the privatization of collectively held and
communal lands, and the design and implementation of territorial units known as douars (Kateb,
2001). Overall, the Algerian population experienced strong declines after French occupation,
in particular during les années terribles in the 1860s as a result of economic and demographic
crises caused by epidemics (cholera twice, typhus, and smallpox), drought, famine, and the major
rebellion in the Kabylia region (Yacono, 1993, p. 169). It achieved positive and steady growth
rates only after the insurrection in the 1870s. The conflict affected around three quarters of
Constantine’s indigenous population and had ruined many small rural owners (fellahs) (Nouschi,
1961). However, although the 1870s also marked the beginning of a period of relative calm, the
Algerian population experienced the start of an economic model that led to a deterioration of
the Algerian economy, particularly in the rural areas: “due to the increase in tax burden [. . . ], to
36This corresponds to a maximum of 5 kilometers, assuming an average walking speed of 5 km per hour.
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steady and catastrophic loss of land, and to insertion of native agriculture into a market economy
dominated by the Europeans” (Ruedy, 2005, p. 94).
Sources and spatial dataset construction
Note on Terminology
There is no settled consensus on the correct terminology used to refer to local population in
Algeria prior to French colonialism.37 The colonial statistical sources that I have used in this
study tend to categorize the population groups in “Europeans” and “indigènes.” However, in
the case of Algeria, the word “indigenous” recalls the pejorative term “indigènes” while in
English the word “native” is also quite fraught as it replicates colonial vocabulary. In addition,
the term “Algerian” may also cause confusion as many settlers called themselves “Algerians”
after decades of settlement; as Albert Camus stated in a press conference in 1958, “the Algerian
French are likewise, and in the strongest meaning of the word, natives.”38 Finally, the colonial
demographic statistics often report the data classifying the population in “non-Muslims” and
“Muslims.” Good (1961, p. 3) explains that the non-Muslim group includes “French citizens
born in Algeria or elsewhere in the French Union, Algerian Jews (established there since Roman
times and recognized as French citizens since the Crémieux decrees of 1870), naturalized and
alien immigrants from other European countries (notably Spain, Italy, Malta, Turkey), and those
Moslems who, having renounced their special status, are no longer subject to Koranic law. The
Moslems [. . . ] include two main linguistic groups, in the proportion of one to four. The smaller
group speaks Berber, an ancient language without a written alphabet. The other speaks Arabic.”39
It has been suggested that I categorize the groups in “Algerians” on the one hand, and “French
Algerians,”“settlers,” or “Europeans” on the other hand. Yet, in my opinion, in this dissertation –
which contains a relevant part of quantitative and comparative analysis – using this terminology
is confusing. Thus, I will mostly use for simplification the term “indigenous” when referring to
the populations already located in Algeria prior to French settlement; however, when the context
seems clear enough, I will use the term “Algerians.” In addition, to simplify, I will consider the
“Muslim” group, when available, as a proxy to the “indigenous” or “Algerians.” With respect to
the “settler” population, I will use “Europeans” or “French Algerians” indistinctly and, when
necessary, it will be proxied with the “non-Muslim” population.
37I am grateful to Peter Von Sivers and James McDougall for their helpful suggestions regarding the terminology
to be used.
38I found this quote in D. Prochaska’s introduction to his book “Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône,
1870-1920” published in 1990.
39Good (1961) categorizes both groups based on the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
and the Ministere de la France d’Outre Mer. Service des Statistiques d’Outre-Mer. Les recensements demographiques
dans les pays d’outre-mer (etude methodologique). Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique d’Outre-Mer, Supplement Serie
Etudes, No. 35, Jan. 1957. Paris, 1956. p. 162 and Service de Statistique Generale. Resultats statistiques du
recensement de la population du 31 octobre 1954. Vol. II. Sexe, age, etat matrimonial, lieu de naissance, instruction.
Alger [1959]. p. 151. Tables XII and XIV.
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With regards to the administrative organization, I will always refer to the regional boundaries
existent in Constantine during the colonial years; more specifically, between 1870 and prior to
the territorial changes undertaken after 1955. The following section provides more detail on the
territorial administrative division present in French Algeria during the years analyzed, and Table
D.3 in Appendix D shows the list of communes or municipalities (and their actual corresponding
wilaya or province) that have changed their names after Independence in 1962 (for example,
colonial Philippeville is now Skikda and Bône is Annaba).
Sources and territorial coverage
The first two chapters in this thesis will use data at the municipal level (or commune) for the
years 1904/05 and 1913/14.40 This data is located in the colonial archives in Aix-en-Provence
(see Appendix D for more detail) and comes from annual agricultural statistics reported by the
French colonial administration in Constantine, the largest of the three departments in Algeria.41
With regards to the territorial coverage, this study is limited to the “pacified” areas under
French civil administration and does not include military territories such as the Southern territo-
ries or “Territoires du Sud” (that is, the Sahara regions). At present, Algeria covers 2,381,741
square kilometers, of which almost 90 percent is the Sahara desert. French Algeria, which lasted
from 1830 to 1962, was limited to the northern fertile regions; as Ruedy (2005, p. 5) explains,
“the heart of historical Algeria is a band of valleys, mountains, and plains extending roughly
three hundred kilometers inland from the Mediterranean.” By 1848 the northern part of Algeria
was entirely controlled by the French and was divided into civil and military territory and, as
settlement consolidated, the regions under military administration shifted towards the civil one.
However, the areas in the Sahara (classified as “Territoires du Sud”) were maintained under
the military administration up to 1956.42 According to the Tableau Général des Communes
(henceforth, TGdC), at the beginning of the 1900s the civil territory covered a total of 130,880
hectares, of which 50 percent (about 62,086 square kilometers) belonged to Constantine.43 Thus,
although Algeria is currently the tenth-largest country in the world, in the 1900 only a 5.5 percent
of it was under the French civil administration (20 percent including the regions under military
administration) and Constantine accounted for almost 3 percent of the current area.
In 1848 Northern Algeria was divided into départements, which were then subdivided into
arrondissements (districts) – in Constantine, these were Constantine, Batna, Bône, Bougie,
Guelma, Philippeville, and Sétif – and communes (which I will refer to as municipalities). The
latter were subsequently divided into communes de plein exercice (henceforth, CPE), communes
mixtes (CM), and communes indigènes (CI). This study exclusively covers the CPE and CM
as these were the ones controlled by France in the Northern part of Algeria during the years
40They are partly available also for 1906/1907. Regarding viticulture and cereal production there is additional
data for the campaign of 1900/1901.
41The other two are Alger and Oran, which were created in 1848, modified in 1957, and disappeared in 1962.
42This information was obtained from the ANOM-iREL online search engine. See Appendix D for more detail.
43The military territory in Constantine covered 129,661 square kilometers.
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analyzed.44 The majority of settlers located in the CPE, which were the municipalities in which
the colonial administration was elected and under French civil law, whereas in the CM the
majority of the population was indigenous, the colonial Administrateur was chosen by the
general government, and they were under Islamic law. The latter, which were projected to be
future CPE, were mainly tribal areas and douars; they included military posts, and were regions
with no (or very few) settlers and only a few of them were beginning to engage in commercial or
industrial activities.
These statistics allow us the study of around one hundred municipalities prior to the 1957
territorial reform.45 It is a unique spatial dataset since it accounts for both cereal and viticulture
production for each commune, differentiating by ethnic group. There is data on area cultivated,
production, type of equipment (number of machines according to horsepower, type of plow,
etc.), and agricultural construction used (e.g. steam mills, water mills, etc.). The agricultural
population can be analyzed according to nationalities and land tenure categories (owners, farmers,
sharecroppers, or laborers), and there is information on the distribution of cultivated and non-
cultivated land according to owner category (state property, public domain, communal forests,
etc.).46 There is data on the number of agricultural properties based on their size in hectares
(below 10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-100 and more than 100 hectares), and area distribution based
on nationality and cultivation method (à la mode Européenne or à la mode Indigène). Regarding
labor markets, there is data on the number of workers(resident and non-resident within the
municipality), days worked, average price per day, and value of salary paid (journées agricoles)
for both the settler and indigenous populations.
Chapter 4, unlike the other two chapters, uses population data reported at a lower unit of
observation than that of municipalities. It is subdivided into settlement centers (centres), plots
of land (fermes), tribal areas or fractions, and douars (i.e.,the tribal areas to which the sénatus-
consulte had been applied). It is obtained from the TGdC for the years 1884, 1892, and 1897
(see Appendix D for details). These statistics were published by the General Government of
Algeria (henceforth, GGA). They provide information on population densities and cover both
civil and military territory.47 The General Governor was in charge of providing yearly statistical
information to the French Parliament on the colony’s progress. He also indicated to the prefects
how to adapt the Algerian statistics to the French data-collection system (Kateb, 2004). However,
Algeria was very different, in particular with regards to the presence of nomadic populations.48
44The TGdC (1902) reports that within the civil territory, a 20 percent were CPE (24,026 square kilometers), of
which the 7,500 square kilometers were in Alger, 7,225 in Oran, and 9,301 in Constantine. The rest of the civil
territory (aprox. 80 percent) were CM, which occupied a total of 106,853 square kilometers, of which 24,354
were in Alger, 29,714 in Oran, and 52,785 in Constantine. The military territory (34,809,113), not included in the
analysis, was divided in CM with a total of 5,827,961 square kilometers and CI with 28,981,152.
45The final sample is limited to one hundred observations for each year after having homogenized the data to
match observations between both periods.
46Information is also provided on quantity of land cleared, cost of clearing, and value of cleared and non-cleared
land. It includes data on farm animals and derived products with ample detail on each group.
47The 1884 volume reflects the state of the population situation in the 30th of September. The 1892 and 1897
volumes reflect it in the 1st of January for the corresponding years.
48Griffin (1976) explains that in Algeria, in addition to the sedentary indigenous rural owner or fellah, there were
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Thus, the applied census technique changed according to the surveyed population category. More
specifically, populations in the civil territory and those located in the settlement centers in the
military territory completed a family questionnaire, while the populations in the tribal areas
within the military territory were inferred by counting the number of tents (assuming that each
tent hosted five to seven people). This is why the regions and data used in this study are limited
to the civil territory, and thus the results are less affected by the differences in data-collection
methodology.
Spatial Dataset Construction
By using Geographic Information System (GIS) software, I have aggregated and adapted Con-
stantine’s current administrative boundaries into those established at the beginning of the 1900s.
This allows to match geographic information to the data obtained from the colonial agricultural
statistics. In addition, the software provides spatial reference, permits the calculation of distances
and the spatial relation of variables. To match the data from the colonial agricultural statistics
to the geographic data, I georeferenced the historic maps with the actual post-Independence
administrative boundaries (in other words, I overlaid the historic maps on the actual boundaries).
The Appendix D specifies the details on the aggregation and changes of the current munici-
palities. The old pre-Independence boundaries were identified in various historic maps: i. a
1902 colonization map, ii. a 1902 transportation map, iii. a 1939 administrative map, and iv. a
1949 administrative map. Indeed, although the 1939 and 1949 maps are posterior to the period
analyzed, they often provide more clear information. For instance, they display different colors
according to the type of boundaries (e.g., settlement centers and douars). Using posterior maps
does not affect the results given that the boundaries between 1902 and 1949 are almost identical;
this is because the major territorial administrative reform undertaken after Algeria’s annexation
to France in 1848 – dividing the country in three provinces (Alger, Oran, and Constantine – was
in the second half of the 1950s.49 Thus, the final boundaries analyzed in this thesis are those of
1902.
the semi-nomads and nomads. Among the semi-nomads, a portion moved continuously from one area to the next
depending on available pasture, while others changed from a summer camp to a winter camp. Yet they did not move
from their tribal area and thus should not affect my analysis, as my unit of observation is the tribal unit. However,
the nomads did leave the tribal areas: in spring they moved from the southern regions in the Sahara to the north, and
returned in October.
49Some southern territories such as Tébessa or Khenchela did experience territorial modifications between 1902
and 1949 but these are excluded from the analysis.
Chapter 2
The Crowding-Out of Small Family
Farm Settlers
Abstract
This chapter examines the Constantine region in French colonial Algeria at the beginning
of the 1900s, to study the relation between agricultural settler density, considered to be
the outcome of the French rural settlement failure, and the property size distribution at a
municipality level. The agrarian structure, which departed from the initial “small-settlement
economy” goal, associates a lower degree of population settler density to higher levels
of land concentration, confirming the hypothesis of land amalgamation as the cause of
the crowding-out of small family farm settlers. It argues that the institutional land size
restrictions, which in the nineteenth century limited property size expansion by means of
granting small plots of land, had a progressively weaker direct influence on settlement as
a response to land aridity, allowing for the presence of larger properties in the frontier or
later settled regions. Results show that the presence of the road network played an important
role as well, having a positive effect on the rural settlers and hindering land concentration.
Finally, the results suggest that regions endowed with higher levels of settler family farms
positively linked to a greater degree of indigenous agency.
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2.1 Introduction
Historians of French colonial Algeria often argue that the French government’s experiment to
establish a rural family farming settler economy failed. The goal of the French government
from the beginning was to create a settler economy by gradually increasing the European rural
population. Through official colonization (i.e. organized by the colonial administration), it
aspired to expand rural settlement by means of migration waves and granting small plots of land
conditional on obligatory residence. The idea was to form a “peasant’s paradise, a prolongation
of France across the Mediterranean where myriads of French settlers would make the Tell bloom
with small farms and cosy villages, as in the western provinces of the homeland” (Roberts, 1963,
p. 215).1 Yet, what initially was expected to be a peasant rural society of small family farm
landholdings resulted in a speculative cash crop production colony based on relatively large
estates devoted to wheat and wine. As stated by Charles-Robert Ageron, these large-landholdings
known as a latifundia system, forced out and discouraged rural settlers, formally ending the rural
settlement organized by the colonial administration:
What had in fact been happenning from a very early date was the amalgamation of small prop-
erties, little farms which were economically doomed in a country geographically favourable
to latifundia or great estates, and now given over to speculative crops for the export market.
In the process, the settlers themselves had been squeezed out (Ageron, 1991, p. 61).
Indeed, the recorded history of French Algeria frequently mentions that the colonial adminis-
tration failed to create a family farm economy and achieve a significant rural settler population
growth. Roberts (1963, p. 229) stated that “French settlement in Algeria cannot thus be termed
a success,” while Amin (1970, p. 32) asserted that the decrease of rural European population
with respect to the total, the crowding out of small-settlers in favor of big land-owners, and the
agricultural production stagnation after the 1930’s are all factors that allow its classification
as a “failure.” Ageron (1991, p. 61) holds that evidence of this failure was the withdrawal
of official colonization motivated by the stagnation of the rural European population between
1906 and 1926 (Ageron, 1991). More recently, Sessions (2015, p. 210) argues that beyond the
debate on who was to blame, French officials and commentators coincided in that “there was
no question about Europeans who failed to cultivate the lands they had acquired.” As shown
in the demographic statistics in Table 2.1, with regards to expansion of rural settlers, although
the absolute figures doubled between 1872 and 1893, the failure was visible in relative terms
in the following years; in 1893, 41 percent of the total European population was rural; a figure
that fell to 39 percent in 1900, then dropped to 35 percent in 1911, and by 1948 was down to 22
percent.2 In addition, contrary to what the colonial administration had hoped for, the number of
1The term “Tell” refers to the Tellian Atlas, a part of a wider mountain chain (Atlas mountain) located between
the Mediterranean and the Sahara.
2From Ruedy (2005), based on Ageron (1968) and selected censuses from the Service de Statistique Générale
in Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaire, vol. 2 (1979), p. 97 and Les Algériens musulmans et la France, vol. 1
(1968), p. 551.
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Table 2.1: European rural population, French Algeria 1872-1948
Year Eur. Rural Pop. % of Total
1872 100,549 41
1881 146,647 38
1893 201,541 41
1900 189,164 39
1911 153,441 35
1926 236,672 28
1936 230,311 25
1948 201,009 22
Source: From Ruedy (2005), based on
Ageron (1968).
Figure 2.1: Total rural indigenous and settler population,4 French Algeria 1872-1936
Source: Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie (1948). For further detail on sources see Appendix D.
rural settlers was outpaced by the indigenous population growth after the 1900s (see Figure 2.1).
Several reasons are found to explain this; Colonial historians for instance argued that rural
settlement failed due to agricultural inefficiency among local populations while anti-colonialist
blamed land speculation. There seems to be a lack of unbiased views and dispassionate analysis
(Ageron, 1991; Prochaska, 2004).3 Yet, in Algerian colonial history one commonly finds the
conclusion that land concentration was the main cause of the crowding out of small rural
settlement. Interestingly, this hypothesis challenges one of the main purposes of Algeria’s
colonization: the establishment of a family farm type of settlement.
This chapter examines the institutional component of the settlement process, providing
evidence that supports the hypothesis of the crowding-out of rural settlers as a response to
3See the first chapter of the book Making Algeria French, colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 by D. Prochaska for
a review on the theoretical foundations of historians on colonialism and Algeria.
4The settler category is proxied by the non-Muslim group while the indigenous population is proxied by the
reported Muslim category.
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land concentration. To do so, it analyzes the relation between land concentration, mostly
determined by institutional regulations on property size, and European rural population density
in the Constantine department at the beginning of the 1900s. It applies an instrumental variable
approach using the year of creation of the settlement centers (or centres de population) – i.e.,
territorial entities destined to rural settlers exclusively for agricultural production and delimited by
a “colonization perimeter” – to proxy for institutional colonial restrictions of land-size. Algeria’s
colonial land settlement experience illustrates the interdependence between institutions (i.e., land
size restrictions) and geographic features. In other words, when land was available (or the frontier
was not exhausted), the institutional force dominated: the creation of a settlement center preceded
the settler population, and the size of the land granted for farming was highly controlled. Yet, as
the frontier was exhausted and land scarcity became evident, land size restrictions were weakened,
demonstrating the unavoidable response of institutions to the relative factor endowments. Thus,
I will argue that the land regulations, initially shaped by the colonial goal of achieving a family
farm economy and then by land aridity, allow justifying the instrument’s exogeneity.
Despite a significant amount of research blaming land concentration, there is no empirical
study measuring the relation between land concentration and rural settlement. By analyzing
agricultural data collected by the colonial administration in 1904/05 and 1913/14 across one-
hundred municipalities (or communes), one can see that land concentration was indeed the
strongest determinant of the settlement failure. The results will show that a later settlement relates
to a higher land concentration. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 3 demonstrating
that a worse land quality in the frontier regions (that is, the ones settled later) required extensive
areas for cereal cultivation and more capital and labor investment. The analysis in this chapter
also includes additional institutional variables such as the development of road infrastructure
and indigenous agency (proxied by the presence of indigenous owners). The results indicate that
the road infrastructure (i.e., roads per hectare) hindered land concentration, leading to higher
European population density levels. Finally, the results also seem to point towards a positive
relation between the presence of indigenous owners per municipality and rural settlers. Thus, this
chapter demonstrates how institutions and factor endowments determined the outcome of rural
settlement which, according to the colonial administration’s ideal, should have been reflected in
high rural settler density levels and the creation of a small family farm economy. The reason’s
as to why the economy went the opposite direction, leading to a progressive higher presence of
large landholdings, are analyzed in the following chapter.
2.2 Land Concentration and Rural Failure
There is extensive research on the long-term effects of land ownership distribution on economic
growth and development within and across countries. Nonetheless, there is no clear-cut answer as
to whether natural geography – for instance, the suitability of land towards cash-crop cultivation
– dominates over factor endowments – that is, the relative amounts of land and labor that affect
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production methods, choice of crops, or institutions – nor is there an answer as to which are the
mechanisms underlying the interaction between these factors (Domar, 1970; Frankema, 2010;
Easterly, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2001). However, beyond the controversy over the transmission
channels by which the legacy of settlement affects long-run development, it is undeniable that the
evolution of landownership plays an important role (Frankema, 2010; Cinnirella and Hornung,
2016; Erickson and Vollrath, 2004).
In the case of Algeria, it is argued that the increasing levels of settler ownership of large
landholdings during the colonial years explain the family-farm settlement failure. Indeed, Algeria
fulfilled the requirements – fragmented rural factor market, land scarcity, and labor abundance
– for which, according to Griffin et al. (2002), small farmers are a social optimum. They are
expected to be more labor intensive and generate a higher output per land unit due to the
incentive structure.5 However, land concentration gives the landowner market power to depart
from the social optimum, having a negative effect on rural wages, generating labor surplus, and
leading to a decrease in total output. For instance, Martinelli (2014) shows that, in fragmented
rural markets, ownership concentration (through market power) drives the relative factor prices,
decreasing wages and increasing land rents. Economic theory then predicts inefficiency, higher
inequality, and widespread rural poverty among the asset-less workers and tenant farmers. Thus,
Constantine is an interesting case-study and, thanks to its available data, allows an analysis of
the relation between rural settlement and land concentration. Figure 2.2 provides a first support
to the hypothesis of the crowding out of rural settlers; that is, on the one hand, a higher presence
of small ownership is related positively with the settler density levels and, on the other hand, a
higher presence of large ownership links to lower levels of rural settlers.
2.3 The Process of Land Settlement
This section demonstrates that, due to the French official colonization policy, before the 1900s
the creation of the settlement centers always preceded the arrival of settlers. It outlines how
French arrival affected the Algerian land market arguing that the year of creation of the settlement
centers reflects a progressive flexibility of the land regime regulations, allowing for higher land
concentration. The Europeans in the settlement centers established prior to 1870 were limited
regarding the size of their holdings, and government concessions relied on free, small plots of
land. As Bennoune (2002, p. 43) explains:
Up to the 1860s the colonial state had followed an economic policy which aimed at the
establishment of homestead farmers on the fertile Algerian lands. For example, between
1841 and 1851, 428,000 hectares were allocated to 15,000 settlers, averaging about 28
hectares each.
5For small farmers (in comparison to large landowners) in fragmented rural factor markets, the access to capital
is more expensive (particularly because of informal credit markets), land rent is higher (because of the greater
opportunity cost due to a lower land endowment), and thus the opportunity cost of labor is relatively lower (Griffin
et al., 2002).
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Figure 2.2: European rural population and property size distribution, Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
(a) % properties <10 hectares (b) % properties >100 hectares
The lines 04fit and 13fit are the trend lines corresponding to the year 1904/05 and 1913/14. Figure (a) displays the relation
between the share of properties below 10 hectares and the European population in logarithms. Figure (b) presents the relation
between the share of properties above 100 hectares and European population density in logarithms. Source: SA (1904/05,
1913/14).
This changed in the 1870s when the new civil administration supplied a larger amount of
land, allowing further expansion, but still continued with farm size regulations. These regulations
on the size of the granted plots turned less rigid as the administration “realized that large tracts
of land were necessary to cultivate the semi-arid areas” (Lützelschwab, 2013, p. 7).6 After the
1880s it becomes harder to directly link the administration’s land policies and rural settlement
per se given that the increasing role of the factor endowments (reflected in a growing scarcity of
cultivable land as the frontier was exhausted) restricted the administration’s margins of maneuver.
In 1904 a decree was passed that facilitated the direct purchase of land without the control of the
colonial administration by allowing open-land sales to the public. Thus, it is particularly after
the 1900s that there was a tendency towards greater land concentration.
Since occupation the French government wanted to ensure the creation of a colony of small
farmers that would resemble a “rural democracy of small owners” (Lützelschwab, 2013, p.
7).7 The ultimate aim was to give the most fertile land to settlers, apply and expand French
sovereignty, and justify the cost of colonizing Algeria in the Metropolis. According to the
colonial administration, France did not suffer from overpopulation or an economic crisis which
might have encouraged voluntary migration (Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie, 1922). For
this reason, settlement was organized and managed by the State. This policy, known as official
colonization, was based on granting small plots of land located in settlement centers. As
explained by Bellahsene (2006), the initial idea of these centers was that of a territorial entity
destined solely to rural settlers. That is, the economic activity evolved exclusively around
6Chapter 3 provides more detail on the cultivation techniques. The newly open to settlement land in the frontier
regions, which was relatively more arid, required extensive cultivation.
7The author quotes Rivet (2003, p. 177).
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agricultural production and these centers were not intended to become future towns or villages.8
It was an instrument of conquest and a symbol of colonization so that the creation and territorial
expansion of settlement centers was prioritized over the enlargement of the already established
ones.
Thus, the case of Algeria is of particular interest as official settlement preceded private
settlement. Bellahsene (2006) argues that land settlement was ultimately dependent on the
administration’s prior evaluation of a center’s viability and land availability. Algeria’s complexity
– which required finding records and interpreting and enforcing new rules in a territory where
the land was not empty at arrival,9 where customary and Islamic law ruled over land tenure, and
tribes had inherited Ottoman hierarchical power structures – affected the intensity of expansion
but did not paralyze it. As the GGA (1922; p. 13) explains:
[. . .] the State must necessarily organize the settlement and the economic life of the regions
to be opened to European influence and channel and support individual efforts. It must
ensure that the colonization of the country be carried out gradually, according to a previously
elaborated and systematic plan. In short, official colonization must set the stage for private
colonization by supporting individual initiatives.10
However, the degree of territorial expansion and land distribution was strongly determined
by the type of colonial administration in charge of the settlement process. It changed from a
rigorous military administration in the 1870s to a civil settler-friendly, pro-expansion one. Thus,
the legal flexibility that limited the size of the granted plots of land was forged by the clash
between these two administrations (Sivak, 2008).
On the one hand, the military administration, which ruled from occupation to the fall of
Napoleon III’s Empire in 1871, was considered to be an obstacle for settlement. According
to Sivak (2008, p. 97), “military officers prized stability and clear channels of information-
gathering, and the displacements provoked by settler colonialism were not germane to such
goals;” moreover, “military administration, with its seemingly limited tolerance for the bourgeois
ideals of private property and the free circulation of people and goods, further complicated the
picture.” This was enhanced by the fact that Napoleon III did not consider Algeria to be a colony,
and publicly stated in two letters (1863 and 1865) that he envisioned an “Arab kingdom” that
would co-exist with the French (Carroll, 2013).11 The civil administration, on the other hand,
sought to attain a self-sustained and growing European settler population which would adapt to
the French administrative organization, differ from the slave-based societies, avoid “the ills of an
8As explained in the introduction, according to Bellahsene (2006), the foundational “rural” concept of the
settlement centers became more “urban” in 1919 when official colonization had ended and cultivable land was
scarce. Its basic structure was a “colonization perimeter” (Périmètre de Colonisation) circumscribing a village in
the center, designed exclusively to provide accommodation for families, and the to-be-cultivated plots of land were
located at a maximum of one-hour distance from the village.
9Especially in the fertile areas in the Kabylia (Sivak, 2008).
10Author’s translation.
11“Lettre au gouverner d’Algérie – 6 février 1863,” in La Politique Impériale exposée par les discours et
proclamation de l’Empereur Napoléon III (Paris: Henri Plon, 1865).
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industrializing metropolitan society” (Sivak, 2008, p. 85), and respond to an ideal of “national
renewal” (Sessions, 2005, 2015). Thus, after the 1870s, it became of great importance to secure
a land market that would attract settlers and allow expansion beyond the Northern limited civil
areas. Property became the instrument through which the land market would be secured so that,
as Sivak (2008, p. 68) explains, “organizing the transfer of land and securing a property regime
[. . . ] emerged as a key policy objective.”
Hence, in the 1830s and the 1840s the colonial administration focused on setting the legal
means to appropriate land and establish private property. This was particularly complicated
since it involved combining French law and new measures – i.e. “expropriation, verification
of traditional land titles, as well as the unilateral adoption of laws that advantaged settlers”
(Lützelschwab, 2013, p. 7) – with customary and Islamic law.12 It is during this time that the
institutional framework was built, constituting Algeria’s administrative organization and inaugu-
rating the official colonization policy. However, many of the legislative measures undertaken
during this period failed since the military campaign was still ongoing, land titles were difficult
to determine due to unfamiliar customary and Islamic law, and many Ottoman officials carried
away with them important documents after the French occupation (Bellahsene, 2006).
In addition, land speculation was a continuous concern for colonial administration as it in-
creased land prices and discouraged small settlers. This is why throughout the nineteenth century
legislation continuously fought against speculative land acquisitions (Bellahsene, 2006).13 Thus,
since occupation, the government undertook a variety of measures – e.g., abrogating unruly land
transactions contracted during the occupation years, forbidding sales to Europeans or, to avoid
corruption, banning officials or the military from owning any stake in companies) – in order to
avoid speculation (Sessions, 2015). This soon led to a systematization of the conditions under
which plots of land from public domain were granted to concessionaires. For instance, in 1836
the concessions were limited to a maximum of three plots of five hectares each to each settler
(the grant was proportional to the settler’s resources and conditional on cultivation, improvement,
and minimum residence) and in 1838 a decree limited to a maximum of twelve hectares or less
the size of land distributed from the State to settlers (Sessions, 2015).
However, although the limit on maximum number of plots was officially suppressed in 1841
the concessions of large areas were frequently hampered by administrative requirements. Indeed,
the “granting of smaller concessions was gradually turned over to local authorities in Algeria,
but concessions of over twenty-five hectares continued to require the approval from the highest
12To expand public domain land the government declared to be the owner by right of empty Ottoman lands
(mostly Beylik), religious Habous lands (an inalienable type of land assigned to an organization related to charity,
religious, or civic works) , sequestered lands from French regime opponents and immigrated Turkish tribes, and
land declared to be vacant or uncultivated (Lützelschwab, 2013; Sivak, 2008). For more detail see the Introduction.
13This is reflected in the following paragraph on the tendency to speculation (author’s translation):
The Administration’s role will be to ceaselessly counteract this tendency [land concentration], which has had
the effect of slowing colonization down, at best, and altogether compromising it, at worst, through the prema-
ture and “unexplained” decay of uninhabited villages, and of lands that were never cultivated but that have
instead been leased to their original yet hypothetical indigenous owners. (Bellahsene, 2006, p. 161)
2.3. The Process of Land Settlement 45
Figure 2.3: European property size and year of creation of settlement centers per municipality, Constantine
in 1904/05 and 1913/14
Settlement year (Creation) is the average year of creation of settlement centers in a municipality. The Average size per property
is a weighted average of the size of properties in all groups. The lines 04fit and13fit are the trend lines corresponding to the
years 1904/05 and 1913/14. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898) and ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail
on sources.
levels of the colonial and metropolitan administration” (Sessions, 2015, p. 248). In line with
this, Figure 2.3 demonstrates that in Constantine the European average size of properties was
lower in municipalities where the settlement centers had been created earlier. The figure also
shows a lower density of dots between 1860 and 1870 caused by the 1863 sénatus-consulte,
a law that paralyzed settler expansion and land transactions as it prioritized the inventory of
indigenous property within tribal areas and the provision of legal land titles in accordance with
French law (Bellahsene, 2006, p. 169). This law divided tribal communal lands into municipally
self-governing units known as douars (see Figure D.3 in Appendix D),14 “parcelling” lands
considered by the administration to be undivided and collectively owned (McDougall, 2017).
The stagnation of new settlements brought in by the sénatus-consulte came to an end in the
1870s with the arrival of the Third Republic and the new civil administration. The latter focused
on increasing the number of settlements and creating a free land market between settlers and
Algerians that would facilitate land access to the former (Lützelschwab, 2013). In particular, the
1873 Warnier law, together with the “little sénatus-consulte” law of 1887,15 encouraged private
colonization (Ageron, 1991). These laws facilitated land transactions by extending the French
civil code to indigenous land – which had been previously delimited and granted property titles
14These territorial units had a council of notables named djêema formed by 6 to 16 members (not elected up until
1919) and it was presided by a Caïd who was appointed by the French government and proposed by the colonial
administrators of its corresponding CM (Sivak, 2008). Although some authors find that the law was originally
intended to support Napoleon’s idea of an “Arab kingdom” by legally delimiting tribal land (Ageron, 1991), it is
also argued that it was directed towards the consolidation of colonial land gains as it provided land titles and thus
facilitated legal land transaction (Sivak, 2008).
15Which basically fragmented more tribal lands into douars.
46 Chapter 2. The Crowding-Out of Small Family Farm Settlers
(due to the sénatus-consulte) – and providing more individual property titles to what the colonial
administration regarded as collectively owned (Bennoune, 2002). Although these measures
increased the State’s domain,16 it especially benefited private colonization by permitting land
transactions between Europeans and Algerians. For instance, Bennoune (2002, p. 48) explains
that the fragmentation of indigenous landholdings permitted private settlers to acquire, by means
of legal auctions, more than 500 thousand hectares of arable land between 1871 and 1896. In
line with this, one can see in Figure 2.3 a territorial expansion boom brought in by the civil
administration reflected in a higher concentration of dots between the 1870s and the 1880s. Yet
this expansion, as explained by Nouschi (1961), was soon limited by the 1897 law (reinforced in
1898) which acknowledged the jurisdictional and economic situation of the fellah (indigenous
small rural owner) and safeguarded tribal land by consolidating the droit de chefâ’a, a right that
allowed the indigenous owners to reclaim land titles which, prior to the 1873 Warnier law, had
been unduly sold by co-owners of communally-held land.
After the 1900s, the share of ownership in large landholdings increased. A decree was passed
in 1904 that changed the land settlement system, turning sales into the general rule and grants
into the exception. According to Roberts (1963), this decree reflected a problem which had
been developing from the 1880s and that affected rural population; namely that free grants
were economically non-viable due to land scarcity. According to the author the direct causality
between rural settlement and official colonization disappeared. In other words, success or failure
of European settlements was not solely dependent on colonial policies; additional factors, such
as land aridity, were playing a role in determining the trend towards land concentration. Still,
although land purchases through private colonization gained significance in the twentieth century,
it was official colonization which had the stronger role in the nineteenth century (Ruedy, 1967)
and, in the words of Belkacemi (1984, p. 152), “without ever disappearing, [private colonization]
thrived in the shade of an official colonization generally disdainful towards it.”17
Ultimately, Figure 2.4 evidences that, in rural Constantine, the relation between settler density
and the year of creation of the settlement center is consistent with the process of settlement
explained in this section. That is, the transition from a military to a civil administration (which
passed laws facilitating transactions and expropriations) determined the expansion boom in the
1870s. The figure also shows the stagnation in the 1860s, due to the sénatus-consulte, and, after
the 1900s, when official colonization started to reach a “geographic” dead-end (Yacono, 1993).
The figure additionally demonstrates that the distribution of the year of settlement aggregated at a
municipal level is sufficiently representative of the individually counted one. Thus, one can argue
that Constantine’s agricultural statistics at a municipal level, conditional on the average timing
of settlement, allow to capture the main trends of Algeria’s land-policy institutional framework.
16Especially by appropriating fallow land declared to be uncultivated or unproductive.
17Author’s translation.
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Figure 2.4: Density of settlement centers and year of creation of settlement centers, Constantine 1904/13
and 1913/14
(a) All settlements individually counted (b) Settlements aggregated by municipality
Figure (a): the “All settlements individually counted” sample contains 249 settlement centers for which it was possible to
obtain the year of creation. The earliest year of settlement is 1838 and the latest 1910 (mean year is 1871). Figure (b): The
“Settlements aggregated by municipality” sample measures the average year of settlement per municipality; that is, the sum
of the years of creation of all the settlement centers in a municipality divided by the total number per municipality. The total
number of settlement centers is 99, the earliest year is 1843 and the last year is 1904 (the mean is 1867). Source: SA (1904/05,
1913/14), Atlas Administratif de l’Algérie (2011), Busson (1898), and ANOM-iREL.
2.4 The Indigenous Agency
There is no consensus on the mechanisms explaining the dominance of large rural properties
and the resulting crowding out of family settler farms in French Algeria. The prior section has
described the main characteristics of the colonial land policy, demonstrating that institutional
restrictions on property size permitted larger holdings in the later settled (or frontier) regions.
The following chapter will show that these frontier regions, endowed with a highest share of
large properties, in order to overcome the scarcity of arable land, required adopting newer
agricultural methods that relied (if possible) on labor abundance generated by the colonial land
market policies. Hence, the outcome of settler farming ultimately depended on indigenous labor
availability. This highlights the importance of understanding the indigenous agency per se –
i.e., the “role” or participation of the indigenous populations in production – which, in line with
Green (2013) and Frankema et al. (2014), affects the relation between settler farming and labor
control.
In sociology or philosophy, and most recently political science, “agency” is commonly
understood as the capability of actors to have an effect on a given context. The context sets
the conditions on the environments that constrain or facilitate an actor’s actions (Lewis, 2002;
Sibeon, 1999). A growing literature finds that the role or participation of indigenous populations
in production did have an effect on long-term development (Frankema et al., 2014; Green, 2013).
According to these studies, prior research neglects the relation between the context generated
by both geographic factors, colonial path dependence, and indigenous agency per se. In other
words, economic history on settlement theory has maintained the idea that indigenous agency is a
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deterministic reduction of the environment set by settlers. Yet this analysis can result misleading
as indigenous pre-colonial determinants and the participation in the production process during the
colonial years played a role as well. For instance, in the case of Algeria, Lützelschwab (2013, p.
2) argues that the indigenous lower production costs outperformed settler small family farming,
pushing settlers to engage in “capitalist” means of production. Thus, regardless of whether it
hindered or facilitated settler land concentration, indigenous agency should be included in the
analysis to fully understand the success or failure of settler farming.
However, although the participation of the indigenous population in the rural economy and
the role of pre-colonial institutions require further investigation, their measurement exceeds the
reach of this dissertation. Thus, in this section I argue that the indigenous land tenure distribution
(for example, a higher share of laborers relative to that of owners) captures the degree of landless
labor and thus, of indigenous agency. This is because the owners category during colonialism
is regarded as the most prominent and least vulnerable group among all the indigenous rural
land tenure classes. Indeed, Nouschi (1961) proves that in Constantine the regional balance
between the owners’ presence (represented mostly by small ownership known as fellahs) versus
that of laborers (ouvriers journaliers) and sharecroppers (metayers or khammès) responded to the
degree of French occupation. Namely, he argues that in Constantine there was a trade-off relation
between the presence of small indigenous owners and the presence of laborers and sharecroppers.
This is because the self-employed fellahs lost their land and became landless waged labor in the
areas most vulnerable to land expropriations, while in areas where resistance to colonization was
stronger (predominantly in the Kabylia), indigenous ownership is highest (Nouschi, 1961).
For instance, Lützelschwab (2000) presents an example demonstrating how indigenous labor
surplus, explained by a high degree of landless labor, decreased indigenous bargaining power and
allowed settlers to increase yields and efficiency (not social welfare) in the Compagnie genevoise
des Colonies suisses (henceforth, CGCS), a large farming enterprise in Constantine. The author
explains that the company, who relied on indigenous sharecropping, in order to increase working
time and intensity of labor was forced to modify explicit clauses in the sharecropping contracts
to provide incentives.18 Yet, it resulted particularly difficult to increase the time and effort amidst
impoverished sharecroppers (as a result of years of epidemics, drought, and famine) who, in
addition, still had the option to search for alternative cultivable land if they disagreed with
the new contract terms. However, this situation changed in the 1890s when the labor-to-land
ratio increased as a consequence of the massive land expropriations after the Kabylia conflict,
generating an excess supply of labor that increased the tenant’s bargaining power and allowed the
adoption of more labor-intensive dry-farming techniques among the indigenous population. In
other words, the land market forces dominated the sharecropping incentive: a lower indigenous
agency – reflected in higher levels of landless labor – allowed the large farming estate to engage
18Lützelschwab (2000) explains how, after the 1860s, the company had to rely solely on indigenous sharecroppers
and abandon direct exploitation by Europeans who failed to cultivate the lands (for different reasons such as
epidemics or inappropriate cultivation techniques).
2.4. The Indigenous Agency 49
in newer agricultural techniques and increase production.
Table 2.2: Settler and indigenous land tenancy per district, Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
District
Share of agricultural population by tenancy
Owners Tenants Sharecroppers Laborers
1904 1913 1904 1913 1904 1913 1904 1913
Settler
Batna 51 53 11 10 0 1 39 36
Bone 49 53 10 16 5 6 36 25
Bougie 58 69 14 13 3 2 19 22
Constantine 61 57 13 13 6 8 19 22
Guelma 62 60 13 16 2 3 23 22
Philippeville 50 53 19 18 3 4 28 25
Setif 68 73 12 13 4 3 16 10
Indigenous
Batna 45 52 2 5 34 23 19 20
Bone 20 21 23 13 21 26 37 39
Bougie 38 49 14 11 28 27 13 27
Constantine 26 33 14 11 34 29 26 26
Guelma 38 37 8 9 42 30 12 24
Philippeville 40 35 3 8 27 27 30 30
Setif 43 45 2 2 39 37 17 16
The share of agricultural population by tenancy is the rural population within one category
(owner, tenant, sharecropper, or laborer) over the total rural population. Source: SA (1904/05,
1913/14), Archives & Culture (2011), and Busson (1898).
Thus, a lower vulnerability towards land expropriations, reflected in a higher presence of
indigenous owners, should partly capture indigenous agency. In addition, the reasoning behind
the inclusion of indigenous owners in this analysis also relies on research by Von Sivers (1979,
1982), who provides evidence on pre-colonial institutions demonstrating that not only did an
Algerian rural elite persist at least until 1914, but that this indigenous leadership, despite being
politically irrelevant, enjoyed economic influence because of its landed and agricultural wealth.
This influence was not only present between 1870 and the First World War, but helped determine
income and property patterns prior to Independence. The author criticizes the lack of studies on
the Algerian social stratum, concluding that Algeria’s prominent indigenous category excluded
sharecroppers and laborers and that Constantine’s local rural elite was mostly reflected by
indigenous small rural owners. The following section summarizes Von Siver’s (1979, 1982)
main findings.
Regarding Algeria’s colonial history two misconceptions are commonly found. The first is
based on the idea of French direct rule whereas in reality, as Von Sivers (1982, p. 116) clarifies,
the French government exercised control by appointing local Algerian administrators to collect
taxes. Therefore, despite being “the closest approximation to direct rule feasible in a colony
where a foreign minority ruled over an indigenous society,” it was far from being direct, and
Algerians in rural areas were under Algerian administrators. The absence of French direct control
was reinforced in the 1870s due to the arrival of the civil administration, which entailed territorial
administrative changes that unintentionally lessened control over local populations.19 Aware
19The new administration appointed civilians (substituting the Bureaux Arabes) to the newly created communes
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of this loss of control in the 1880s, the colonial administration changed the official Algerian
appointment system from a body that looked kindly upon the “traditional rural aristocracy” into
a “body of commoners” that would facilitate French manipulation on the local indigenous affairs.
This change triggered the second misconception: the idea of a successful “decapitation” of the
Algerian traditional rural elite which asserts that French government dismantled the traditional
family networks within the office positions. Von Sivers (1982) assembles an index based on
data from a representative sample of 5,809 administrative tenures between 1846 and 1914,20 and
proves that, to the contrary, the elite survived and maintained its control over local affairs.21
The author goes further, examining the prominent indigenous groups shaping leadership in
the French political stratum, Algerian land ownership, and income patterns (Von Sivers, 1979, p.
58). He uses French government records from 1898 – compiling information on “names, families,
genealogies and material conditions of all people of local and regional notoriety” – to analyze
the material situations of Algerian leaders in office. Additionally, he matches the percentage
share of income groups among leaders in office in Constantine between 1880 and 1914 to other
statistics of wealth and income of leaders in 1860 at the national level.22 He concludes that the
prominent indigenous ownership categories for overall Algeria were the same ones represented
in the political stratum and excluded landless sharecroppers and laborers.
With respect to Constantine, as shown in Figure 2.5 (dashed line), more than 50 percent
of land ownership in 1914 was of small properties (below 10 hectares). The figure also shows
that, regarding indigenous leaders in the administration, the “small” (0-1,500 francs), “middle”
(2,000-4,000 francs), and “very large” (10,000-50,000) income groups increased concentration,
and that “small” size properties were the ones that increased most between 1895 and 1915.
Indeed, Von Sivers (1982, p. 120) explains that in Constantine the “historical-geographic factors
clearly played a part in the make-up of the local elite” given that the mountainous regions –
mostly endowed with small ownership – helped resist Ottoman rule. Hence, in line with Nouschi
(1961), a weakened indigenous population should be reflected by a higher presence of both waged
labor and sharecropping. In addition, as argued by Von Sivers (1979, 1982), the indigenous
owners, mostly represented by the presence of small-size ownership (fellahs),23 should help
capture Constantine’s local rural elite.
mixtes and thus diminished familiarity with local affairs particularly given that colonial issues, such as infrastructure
development, were prioritized.
20See Von Sivers (1982) for sources. As summarized by him, they come from: “tables of tribal leadership
organization, nomination and dismissal forms, personnel files” and a questionnaire undertaken by the French
government that registered the wealth of all “notables” in the CPE and CM. Yet these questionnaires span many
years and are incomplete.
21Von Sivers (1982) finds a significant and constant distribution in the administrative offices of representatives
from the most important indigenous families over two generations.
22To estimate the material situation of Algerian leaders in office, the author does not include tax commissions
and emoluments granted. See Von Sivers (1979, p. 59) for more detail on the estimation procedure. Main sources
are obtained from ANOM and Nouschi (1961, p.591).
23The correlation between small size indigenous properties and total indigenous owners is almost 50 percent.
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Figure 2.5: Share of owners and holdings sizes (1914) and share of leaders and size of Private Gross
Income (1895-1915) in Constantine
Source: Sivers (1979); original from Nouschi (1961). For details see Sivers (1979). The 1895-1900 sample contains 142
observations and the one for 1910-1915 includes 286 observations.
2.5 Data and Empirical Model
This section explores whether a higher endowment of large properties affected rural settlement
by analyzing the variation across Constantine’s municipalities in the early 1900s. It studies the
determinants of European rural population – focusing on institutional factors (that is, legal land
size restrictions, infrastructures, and indigenous agency) – by applying both ordinary (OLS) and
two-stage least square (2SLS) methods. Taking advantage of the first-stage results of the 2SLS,
it analyzes the land concentration determinants.
The data used are the agricultural statistics collected by the colonial administration in
Constantine in the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. These cover approximately 100 municipalities
(or communes), allowing to analyze a number of variables that reflect the agricultural economy –
e.g., area cultivated, cereal and wine production, capital investment, land tenure categorization,
land prices, number of properties, cultivation techniques, etc. – and always differentiate between
settler and indigenous population. In particular, this chapter uses the data on the rural population
densities, extension of the area cultivated, the land tenure categorization (owners, farmers,
sharecroppers, or laborers), and the number of agricultural properties based on size of cultivated
area in hectares (below 10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-100 and more than 100 hectares). In addition
to this data, it uses Geographical Information System (GIS) software to provide spatial reference
and control for natural geographic variables (such as elevation and crop suitability for cultivation)
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and human geography (such as railways and road density).
The equation to test the effect of land concentration on rural settlement is the following:
(EurAgricPop/ha)i,t = a+ bxX
′
i,t + caA
′
i + ddD
′
i,t + µi,t (2.1)
There are N sets of observations of municipalities i in two time periods (where t = 0 is for
1904/05 and t = 1 for 1913/14). The dependent variable is European agricultural population
per European-owned hectares in logarithms (EurAgrPop/ha). The regressors in vector Xi,t
that change in time are: i. the European land concentration index (IndexLC_Ei,t) and ii.
the indigenous agency variable measured as the density of indigenous owners per hectare
(IndigOwnerDen) or as the share of indigenous owners over the total indigenous agricultural
population (IndigOwnerShare). In addition to the land concentration index, as a robustness
check to the results, I will also use the average European property size (AverSizeProp(I)) and
the share of large properties (ShareProp > 41ha) as proxies to land concentration. The vector
Ai accounts for observed municipality heterogeneity factors assumed not to be affected by time
change. This is the case for access to the railway infrastructure which was completed by 1900
(ShortP thRW ),24 the suitability of land for low rain-fed wheat cultivation in the settlement
centers (taking the value of 9 if highest and 1 if lowest) (CropSuit), the road network density
(RoadNetwork), and the ratio of settler-to-indigenous municipal population (Sett/Ind84).25
The vector D′ includes several dummies: i. a time dummy (DY ear) equal to 0 if 1904/05 and
1 if 1913/14, ii. a wine suitability dummy (D_Wine) which is equal to 1 if there are hectares
suitable for viticulture and 0 if not, iii. a type of municipality dummy (DType) equal to 1 if
the municipality is CPE and 0 if CM and, iv. a dummy variable (D_K) reflecting whether the
municipality belongs to the Kabylia (equal to 1) or not (equal to 0). In addition, the final models
contain dummies capturing the presence of European properties according to the size category in
order to provide an additional insight into the European land distribution effects. The equation
allows for the constant term a and µit is the time-varying error. Both the OLS and 2SLS standard
errors have been corrected for clustering on the district level.
Research uses different measures to account for land concentration (or land inequality) and
its legacy on economic growth and development. The most common one is the GINI index
(or Theil index) used by authors such as Vollrath (2013), Martinelli (2014), or Ramcharan
(2010). However, this measure is not sensitive towards within group variation. In other words,
as explained by Cinnirella and Hornung (2016), if there are only 10 large properties within the
same category then the GINI would reflect perfect equality neglecting the relevance of large size
ownership. Thus, Cinnirella and Hornung (2016) overcome this by using the share of the largest
24The variable measures aggregates the average walking distance from the settlement points to the nearest
railway station and the railway-travel distance to the nearest port. Alternative regressions also included individually
the average walking distance from the towns to the nearest railway station (in hours and assuming walking speed of
five kilometers per hour) but the R2 decreased and the results did not change significantly.
25It includes the population in the settlement centers, douars, tribal fractions, and plots of land, proxying for
the presence of higher urbanization levels (most settlers were located in towns). It does not allow one to draw any
conclusions on the rural land-to-labor ratio.
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landholdings,26 and, alternatively, Erickson and Vollrath (2004, p. 6) use agricultural population
per holding since, in their view, the GINI coefficient “misses the important inequalities across the
land-holders and the landless.” This paper, to capture the relative importance of large properties,
measures European land concentration as a weighted index of properties according to the share
of their size category: the value of 1 is given to properties below 10 hectares, going progressively
up to 5 for those above 100 hectares (IndexLC_E). It additionally uses other variables to capture
large ownership such as the number of properties above 41 hectares (ShareProp>41ha) and the
average size per property (AverSizeProp(I)).27 The GINI index (GINI_E) was also calculated,
yet it is not included in the regressions given that there are numerous municipalities that have
all properties concentrated in one size category. The correlations in Table A.2 in the Appendix
A demonstrate that the agricultural European population has a negative linear relation with
all European land concentration variables (IndexLC, AverSizeProp(I), ShareProp>41ha, and
GINI_E). This supports the crowding out of the small rural settlers hypothesis; in other words,
where there is more land concentration the population density is lower. The highest correlation
is -0.34 for the land concentration index (IndexLC_Ei,t), -0.33 for AverPropSize(I), -0.20 for
AverPropSize(II), -0.30 for ShareProp>41ha and, -0.12 for the GINI index.
One may argue that a higher presence of large properties directly implies lower rural-settler
density levels or that the areas first settled (hence the most accessible and fertile) clearly were
more attractive and thus brought in a higher number of settlers. However, more land concentration
does not necessarily imply a lower density. The dependent variable EurAgrPop/ha captures
the overall land tenure categories as it includes owners, sharecroppers, tenants, and wage-
earners. Therefore, an increase in land concentration could lead to lower levels of owners but it
could also increase simultaneously the amount of wage earners and tenants (many times due to
landless owners turning into waged laborers). Additionally, there are cases such as La Meskiana,
Soummam, Aïn Beïda, and Duvivier that report very high levels of both rural settler density and
land concentration. Moreover, these four municipalities provide further evidence of no relation
whatsoever: between 1904/05 and 1913/14 they experience a strong rural settler population
decrease (ranging from 30 percent to up to more than 90 percent of its initial value) but no change
(or only slightly) in land concentration (a maximum of 3.4 percent). Ultimately, although the
firstly settled and more fertile areas resulted more attractive to settlers, the official colonization
26To proxy for the reliance upon serfdom and laborers in Prussia’s agrarian economy.
27See Appendix for variable construction and descriptive statistics on the different land size variables. The
main problem with the average size per property is that it does not reflect the distribution within municipalities.
Given the agricultural statistics available for Constantine, there are two methods for calculating the latter. The
one included as an explanatory variable (AverSizeProp(I)) requires assigning the mean size value within each size
category (for example, to the category between 0 and 10 hectares, I assign the value of 2.5 hectares) and multiply
each of them by its corresponding share over the total number of properties. The problem with this approach is that
it does not distinguish size beyond 100 hectares and thus requires assuming the mean value for the largest properties.
The other option is to directly calculate the ratio between the number of hectares owned by Europeans over the
total number of European-owned properties (AverSizeProp(II)). However, the problem with this method is that the
variable construction comes from two different sources and thus one cannot recognize whether the European-owned
(cultivated and non-cultivated) hectares in the numerator refer to the same properties as the ones in the denominator.
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controlled settlement, prioritized territorial expansion over urbanization, and assigned the plots
of land according to the number of settlers (family and members). Thus, an earlier established
settlement center does not necessarily imply higher rural settler densities.28
Regression estimates by OLS are inconsistent if there is reverse causality. In other words, one
could argue that explaining rural settlement using land concentration runs into an endogeneity
problem given that land amalgamation affects rural settlement but rural settler density might also
influence land distribution. As a result, despite passing the exogeneity test for all variables (shown
later), and having argued in section 2.3 that land ownership size was limited and determined
prior to settlement, the analysis includes an instrumental variable approach as a robustness check
to the exogeneity problem.
A 2SLS is used to instrument European land concentration (IndexLC_E) with the average
year of creation of the settlement center per municipality (Creation). The year of creation of a
settlement center, which accounts for the land size restrictions set by the colonial administration,
should capture the exogenous variation on land concentration due to institutional restrictions.
These restrictions, initially very rigid with regards to the size of the granted plots of land,
became more flexible and permitted a greater presence of large properties, partly as a response
to Algeria’s land aridity on the frontier (namely the regions settled after the 1870s). Indeed, as
Figure 2.6 demonstrates, the relation between crop suitability and year of settlement for the older
municipalities (i.e., settled before 1870) is different to the one given on the frontier municipalities
(i.e., settled after 1870),29 evidence that the later the settlement center was inaugurated, the worse
the land quality for cultivation.
Regarding the instrument’s validity, the variable Creation is not a weak instrument: the corre-
lation with land concentration is almost 50 percent and positive, it has a reasonable explanatory
power in the first stage regression (significance at a 1 percent level), and the F-statistic for joint
significance is above ten. However, it could still be argued that even though a settlement was es-
tablished before the 1870s (under more strict land policies), the latter could experience territorial
expansions after the 1870s (with less strict farm size restrictions) and thus, the initial year of
settlement is not accurately capturing institutional land size restrictions. Yet, the information
provided by Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie (1922) shows that none of the earlier settled
municipalities experienced territorial enlargements nor the arrival of more settlers (indeed, the
colonial administration prioritized geographic expansion by means of creating new settlement
centers rather than increasing the size of the ones already established). Among the 183 settlement
28Clearly the proportional relation between the number of settlers and the number of assigned plots weakens for
the settlements established later in time because private colonization gained relevance. However, assuming that
the relation is proportional, a t-test on the mean differences between the number of settlers in the relatively better
quality pre-1870 settlement centers and the post-1870 ones is not significant. See Table A.3 in the Appendix A for
detail on the number of initial settlers established in the settlement centers.
29The correlation coefficient is -0.01 for the Older municipalities and -0.27 (and significant at a 5 percent
confidence level) for the frontier. The outlier in the older municipalities that has a zero crop suitability level is
Biskra, a strategical region on the way to the Sahara. If I drop it from the sample, then the correlation is 0.1 and
insignificant.
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Figure 2.6: Year of creation of a settlement center and crop suitability per municipality, Constantine in
1904/05 and 1913/14
The Older municipalities have an average year of creation of settlement centers below 1870, while the Frontier municipalities
report an average above 1870. The lines Older_fit and Frontier_fit are the trend lines. The Creation is the average year of
creation of a settlement center per municipality. CropSuit is the crop suitability index (class) for low input level rain-fed
wheat (the highest value is 9 and the lowest value is 1). Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL, and
IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
centers reported to be created or enlarged between French occupation and 1900, only 10 were
expanded (8 were enlarged in the 1890s, 1 in 1881, and 1 in 1878), so that the vast majority of
enlargements were undertaken after the 1900s.
Opting for the 2SLS approach has two advantages; firstly, the first-stage estimates allow one
to examine the hypothetical channels through which land concentration affected population and,
secondly, it reinforces the OLS results. By isolating the explanatory power of the instrument
on land concentration in Table 2.4 (first-stage results), it is possible to infer which hypothesis
holds better regarding the channels that led to a higher presence of large estates: the restrictions
on land size (colonial institutions), the land’s suitability for wheat cultivation (natural geogra-
phy), the road and railroads (infrastructure development), the prior settler-to-indigenous ratio
(urbanization), and an indigenous agency proxy (which also should partly capture pre-colonial
institutions). These results provide insights into the general debate on the channels through
which colonialism might affect long-term growth.
Table 2.3 shows the OLS and the 2SLS estimations. Regressions 1a and 1b do not take into
account the indigenous agency variables; 2a and 2b include the ratio between the number of
settlers and the indigenous population in 1884; and the regressions 3 to 5 include the indigenous
agency variables. The remaining five columns (1c, 2d, 3e, 4f, 5g) examine land concentration
according to property size by including a dummy reflecting the presence of properties by size
(D_<10ha is the reference, while the other dummies are equal to 1 if there are properties between
11 to 20 hectares, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 100 and above 100 hectares). Standard errors are
cluster-robust, and Wooldridge’s (1995) robust regression-based test on endogeneity shows that
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we cannot reject exogeneity of all variables.30 These results are consistent with the ones obtained
using alternative land concentration variables (see Tables A.7, A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A).
It is clear from Table 2.3 that land amalgamation had a significant and negative effect on
population density across municipalities. Results estimated by OLS and 2SLS are consistent
with the hypothesis of the crowding out of rural settlement. The first-stage regressions estimates
(Table 2.4) show that the year of creation of a settlement has a strong predicting power (at a 1
percent significance level) on the average size of property; that is, an earlier settlement related to
more strict institutional farm-size restrictions, while the settlements after the 1870s experienced
lower regulations as a response to land aridity. The negative effect of both land concentration
and the instrument on the settler density is logical given that – as Chapter 3 will explain in
more detail – the higher aridity in the frontier regions required dry-farming techniques. These
techniques relied on extensive plots for cultivation and necessitated more intensive labor and
instruments. Thus, working the frontier lands resulted more expensive and the progressive fall
of restrictions to private land transactions (and fading of official colonization) help explain the
lower rural settler levels. Estimates by OLS show that, on average, a 1 unit decrease in the
land concentration index (IndexLC_E) leads to a 38 percent increase in the rural settler density.
This implies that it can range from an increase of less than 1 settler in a remote area such as
Akbou (an increase from 0.006 to 0.01 settlers per hectare), to an increase of more than 200
settlers (0.07 settler per hectare) in a better communicated area like Sétif. The instrumental
variable estimates increase the coefficient up to more than 50 percent on average. However, due
to the reliability of historic agricultural statistics and the limited number of observations for
Constantine, it is recommended to take only into consideration the negative sign rather than the
size of the coefficient.
The road network has a direct and significant effect in both the first and second stage tables,
implying that it hindered land concentration (Table 2.4) and helped rural settlers (Table 2.3).
Indeed, as Belkacemi (1984) explains, roads had been initially built in the 1830s to guarantee
military control during occupation and, up to the 1870s, they consolidated colonial settlement
by expanding security and trade, enhancing land values, increasing agricultural production,
and lowering prices. They shaped the evolution of colonial villages, departing from initial
postes-cafés or caravenserais, whose unique function was to cater for travelers or operate as
control points (Belkacemi, 1984). Roads not only determined the location of most settlements but
they probably made family farms more competitive (making concentration harder) by reshaping
economic geographies and local networks.31 Additionally, it is plausible that its initial attraction
for speculation provoked the colonial administration to implement land size regulations within its
surroundings, hindering land concentration. Regarding reverse causality, the road infrastructure
30It is the only exogeneity regression-based test that allows clustering. The endogeneity test (adjusted for 7
clusters corresponding to districts) reports for model 1b a p-value of 0.43, for model 2b a p-value equal to 0.50, for
3b has a p-value of 0.58, for 4b of 0.47, and for 5b a p-value of 0.57.
31This is a growing line of research that merits further investigation. See Jedwab et al. (2015); Jedwab and
Moradi (2016).
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developed slowly and, by the time the civil administration arrived in the 1870s – changing
the roads’ role from strategic to economic – the settlers demanded railways instead of roads
(Belkacemi, 1984), thus suggesting that road expansion preceded rural settlement.32
The railway variable does not show a significant effect. This in accordance with Chapter
4 that analyzes in more detail the effects of the railway infrastructure on population densities.
Indeed, small rural cultivators barely benefited from the railway infrastructure in Constantine. As
explained by Nouschi (1961) and Belkacemi (1984), the tariffs were high and their structure gave
comparative advantage to large producers, particularly as these were lower for large volumes
of merchandise. In addition, given that all goods were charged equally, it was relatively more
expensive for small cultivators to transport cheap products such as wheat or barley. In fact, it
was less expensive to import cereal from France than to transport it between Algerian regions,
and the frequent delays often ruined the product.
The model also includes the indigenous agency variable which, as argued in Section 2.4,
accounts for the share of indigenous population least vulnerable to colonial land policies and
most represented in office. Although these variables have potential reverse causality problems
and thus the coefficients must not be interpreted as causal relations, it is interesting to see
how it relates to rural settlement. The regressions 3a to 5b in Table 2.3 show that the two
variables (IndigOwnerDens and IndigOwnerShare) are positively and significantly related
to European agricultural population density. The question is why the relation is positive. As
previously shown, and in line with the crowding-out hypothesis, the regions endowed with higher
levels of large landholdings link to lower levels of European rural settlers. The large settler
estates in these regions – particularly the ones engaged in dry-farming and viticulture – benefited
from a surplus of landless indigenous labor (represented by laborers and sharecroppers) and
thus, it is reasonable that indigenous ownership is lower in the regions endowed with large and
labor dependent settler estates.33 Yet these results point towards a potential relation between
settler farming and indigenous agency but do not allow for any causal interpretation; thus, the
following step (which exceeds the reach of this thesis) would be to undertake a simultaneous
variable approach to estimate the bi-directional causality between them.
The geographical factors such as wheat or wine suitability do not show a direct effect on
population density or land concentration. With respect to crop suitability, since areas suitable for
viticulture are also appropriate for wheat cultivation, it is not possible to identify and quantify the
individual effect of each crop on population density. Crop suitability for low input level rain-fed
wheat does not show a significant relation but it is consistently positive throughout all models in
Table 2.3, implying that a higher suitability relates to more rural settlers per hectare. Yet in the
32In addition, to strengthen the argument against reverse causality, the roads that could have been built as a
response to the settlers’ demands were only built after the 1900s because it is then that it became financially possible:
the colony achieved financial autonomy and thus allowed to devote funds to building new roads as opposed to
devoting the limited budget solely to railway expansion.
33The abundant indigenous labor supply was generated after the 1870s as a result of colonial land expropriations
and persistent indigenous demographic growth (for more detail see Chapter 3).
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Table 2.4: Determinants of European agricultural land concentration, Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
Dep. variable: European land concentration (IndexLC_E)
2SLS (1b) 2SLS (2b) 2SLS (3b) 2SLS (4b) 2SLS (5b)
Creation 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
RoadNetwork -0.078** -0.081** -0.080** -0.071* -0.082**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.035) (0.029)
ShortPthRW 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.053
(0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040)
CropSuit 0.157 0.167 0.167 0.140 0.170
(0.092) (0.110) (0.110) (0.100) (0.107)
DWine -0.153 -0.156 -0.157 -0.131 -0.184
(0.222) (0.234) (0.233) (0.236) (0.229)
DYear 0.114 0.113 0.113 0.108 0.127
(0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.079) (0.088)
DType 0.055 0.018 0.011 -0.042 -0.081
(0.451) (0.455) (0.480) (0.515) (0.528)
Sett/Ind_84 0.389 0.369 0.197 0.352
(1.121) (1.132) (1.274) (1.097)
D_K -0.040 -0.010 -0.011
(0.182) (0.171) (0.181)
Owners/ha_I -0.109
(0.080)
ShareOwners_I -0.301
(0.357)
Constant -60.415*** -59.417*** -59.275*** -58.396*** -57.883***
(13.600) (13.823) (14.373) (13.998) (11.990)
N 194 194 194 189 193
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
R2_A 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL, and
GIS databases. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
two stage step (Table 2.4) it appears (although insignificant) with a positive sign, supporting that
wheat suitability positively related to land concentration; indeed, wheat cultivation was pushed
south into the frontier (giving place to viticulture in the north) and was characterized by extensive
fields, thus linking to land concentration. In Table 2.3 the dummy variable for wine suitable
municipalities has a negative and persistent relation (and sometimes significant) implying that
the areas suitable to wine on average were associated with inferior levels of rural settlers. In
fact, as explained in Chapter 3, viticulture in Algeria was characterized by capital intensive large
estates that, in contrast to the small family wineries found in the southern regions in France,34
required a significant capita investment and thus access to its production was limited.
The institutional dummy accounting for the type of municipality (DType) is occasionally
34Further research should look into this relation since, as explained by Isnard (1959), one theory on Algerian
wine argues that settler population and wine expansion were dependent on each other, implying a cause-effect
relation that finds the Statut Viticole in the 1930s (which imposed size limit on wine plantations) to be the cause of
the population settlement stagnation. This is criticized by authors who argue that although viticulture expansion
reinforced rural settlement, it did not cause it (proven by the fact that official colonization located settlers in the
settlement centers with no viticulture).
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significant in both the ISLS and 2SLS models. This variable, equal to 1 if CPE and 0 if CM, ac-
counts for the territory under French law versus the areas under Islamic and customary/traditional
law. The negative and occasionally significant effect on rural settlement (as displayed in Table
2.3) is reasonable given that, as Bellahsene (2006) explains, the possibility to implement French
law and establish private property titles in the CPE, as opposed to tribal land areas which entailed
a higher complexity in the CM, facilitated appropriation and expansion. This result provides an
insight into the channels through which differences in “legal origin” – in this case, common law
versus Islamic law – can affect long-term development (La Porta et al., 2008). Finally, additional
variables such as the ratio between the settler municipal population and the indigenous one in
the 1880s (Sett/Ind_84), the year dummy, and the Kabylia dummy are not significant.
2.6 Conclusions
By studying the case of Constantine at the beginning of the twentieth century, this study pro-
vides empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis of the crowding-out of rural settlers as a
response to land concentration in French colonial Algeria. Results estimated by OLS and 2SLS
demonstrate that land amalgamation had a significant and negative effect on population density
across municipalities. By taking advantage of the first-stage results, this paper examines the
channels through which land concentration affected settlement failure, providing support towards
the interdependency between the institutional forces (i.e., the land regulations aiming for a small
family-farm type of settler ideal) and the relative cultivable land availability.
In other words, it seems that the official colonization policy implemented by France, which
in the nineteenth century limited land concentration expansion by means of granting small plots
of land, did have the ultimate effect on land concentration. Yet as soon as land scarcity became
evident at the turn of the century because of Algeria’s land aridity, land-market institutions had a
weaker direct influence on settlement and allowed land concentration. The regions settled on the
frontier, which are endowed on average with larger properties, required more capital investment
to expand cultivation (this is examined in more in detail in Chapter 2) and thus help explain
the crowding out of small, family farms. Results show that the presence of the road network
played an important role as well, having a positive effect on the small rural settlers and hindering
land concentration. Finally, although it is not possible to make any causality conclusions, the
inclusion of indigenous owners as a control variable for the presence of “indigenous agency”
shows that the latter positively related to family farm settlers. Overall, the results suggest that the
institutional variables – channeled through land policies and infrastructures – had the strongest
effect on the outcome of rural settlement and land concentration.
Chapter 3
Factor Endowments and Farm
Structure: A Regional Approach
Abstract
The adaptation of crops, agricultural techniques, and farm size to the new environments
ushered in by colonialism help identify the sources of long-term growth and development.
This chapter is a simplified approach to this adaptation process. It examines the relation
between factor endowments (land and labor) and the process of settlement itself in the
Constantine region at the beginning of the 1900s. French Algeria boosted grain and wine
production during the colonial years, but differently to that of the new overseas grain
exporters, the Algerian farming system diverged into large estates reliant on indigenous
wage labor and sharecropping. As fertile land became increasingly scarce, the ability to
participate in the grain export market depended on the capability of engaging in modern
agricultural techniques. The results demonstrate that the adoption of new agricultural
methods on the frontier and later settled regions depended on the abundance of indigenous
labor but required larger capital investment to offset the worse land quality, ultimately
explaining the lower rural settler density levels. Thus, abundance of indigenous labor was
the key factor that permitted engaging in the cereal export-led sector in a land scarce settler
economy. This provides further evidence on the mechanism underlying regional differences
in farm structures, helping to identify the impact of colonialism on agrarian structures.
62 Chapter 3. Factor Endowments and Farm Structure: A Regional Approach
3.1 Introduction
The international trade environment evolved rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century. It
was a period of world market integration, leading to changing relationships between nations,
through shifting specializations and comparative advantages (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2008). This
phase of world integration was considered to be “the ‘golden age’ of settler societies;” which
comprehended ”the long 19th century (1814-1914) and, particularly, the First Globalization era
(1870-1914)” (Willebald and Bértola, 2013, p. 106). In French Algeria commercial agriculture
boomed and trade became one of the key drivers of development, conducing to a structural
transformation in the rural economy. The settlement process implied a regional integration into
the international economy and, as settlers moved into the interior regions, the relation between
geographic features (such as land quality) and population densities changed.
Although there are a substantial number of studies that examine the effects of land inequality
(or concentration) on long-term development, the origins are unclear (Vollrath, 2013; Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2002; Easterly, 2007; Frankema, 2010; Erickson and Vollrath, 2004; Cinnirella
and Hornung, 2016).1 In Algeria, the newly established factors of production – mainly reflected
in the land-to-labor ratio – shaped the regional differences in agricultural production and farm
structure. The development of commercial agriculture – characterized by cash crop production
and relatively large landholdings – led to high levels of land inequality even prior to Independence
in 1962 (Griffin, 1976; Ageron, 1991). This chapter analyzes the way in which the relative factors
of production shaped regional differences in farm structures, helping to identify the origins of
settler land concentration.
Despite the initial “fertility myth” of Algeria, which had inflated settler’s expectations,2
the colony was not abundant as far as land was concerned. The lack of arable land became
particularly evident after the 1870s as one moved towards the frontier. This located the country
far from a new form of family farming characterized as land-abundant and self-sufficient as the
one described by Offer (1991) that appeared at the end of the nineteenth century among the
overseas grain growing countries. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3.1, although in the mid-1850s
Algeria ranked above Argentina and showed similar levels to Canada or Australia in terms of total
acreage devoted to wheat, by the years prior to 1914 the figures had changed. While the other
countries had at least doubled their extension, French Algeria stagnated, increasing modestly at
only 13.5 percent over its initial value.
Nonetheless, regardless of the limitations on arable land, settler-owned large properties
1As reviewed by Frankema (2010), the debate is inconclusive as some argue that local endowments – geograph-
ical features, natural resources, or factors of production — shaped land distribution, while others highlight the
role of institutional variables (Easterly, 2007; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001). In addition,
according to Frankema (2010), local endowments can explain a higher presence of large estates but are insufficient
to account for the distribution patterns, unless complemented by political economy arguments (for example, the
creation of coercive institutions to obtain labor).
2Based on the “‘myth’ of Algeria’s great fertility” rooted in the Greek and Roman ideal of North Africa. See
Sessions (2015, Chapter V) for more detail.
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Figure 3.1: Total wheat acreage, 1885-1914 (5-year moving average) from Malenbaum (1954)
* Is a 4-year moving average. Source: Malenbaum (1954).
represented an important proportion. Section 3.2 will demonstrate that the portion of cultivated
land owned only by Europeans was relatively high and positioned the colony between the United
States and Great Britain. Yet, Algeria’s indigenous labor availability – mostly originated from
colonial land policies after the 1870s – helped consolidate a farm structure more in line with
Great Britain; that is, an unequal three-class system composed of landowners, tenant farmers,
and farm laborers (Offer, 1991). This is interesting given that since its arrival, the colonial
administration strove to create a rural and equal society of small family farms (see Chapter 2 for
more detail). However, despite the institutional efforts to limit the size of landownership, the
country turned out to be a speculative cash crop producing colony made up of relatively large
estates devoted mainly to wheat and wine (Ageron, 1991).
These large properties, most commonly described as large, capitalist, export-led, labor-
dependent estates, are regarded by numerous historians that study French Algeria as one of the
main determinants of the failure of rural settlement and as the origins of a highly unequal and
fragmented economy. Sometimes they are described as large landholdings owned by companies
or individuals and dependent on rents and indigenous sharecroppers, while other times they
are defined as modern, large, and wage-dependent. Recognizing the differences of the various
farming models, such as whether they are based on labor-dependent or self-sufficient families, is
important as they do not respond in the same way to changes in relative factor prices, nor do they
make the same decisions based on a given a set of factors of production.
Thus, one of the central issues addressed in this chapter is the study of how these large estates
responded to factor endowments. So far I have proven that large rural properties were mainly
located in the later-settled municipalities or frontier regions.3 These were able to boost cereal
3See Section 3.3 in the Introduction and Chapter 2.
64 Chapter 3. Factor Endowments and Farm Structure: A Regional Approach
production as long as they innovated and adopted newer and more intensive agricultural tech-
niques to overcome the relative worse land quality.4 However, the adoption of these techniques
depended on the land-to-labor ratio.5 The dependence on the labor-to-land ratio also holds true
with respect to the regional diffusion of mechanization. A relatively low labor supply and high
wages affect the labor-dependent farm production function, encouraging mechanization to save
labor. In contrast, if land were to be abundant, the higher mechanization might be explained so as
to increase farm scale. This was the case for the United States in the first half of the 1900s, where
(the choice of) adopting a tractor was motivated to allow an increase in the scale of farming
to increase both the amount of land harvested and crop yields (Olmstead and Rhode, 2001).6
Thus, a deeper analysis of the relative quantities of land and labor, together with their regional
disparities, helps understand the origins of agrarian structures.
In this Chapter I argue that labor abundance was key to agricultural innovation, allowing to
offset land aridity in the frontier regions and engage in cereal production. By taking advantage
of annual agricultural statistics reported by the French administration at the municipal level
in Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14, this chapter assesses in a simplified way the relative
agricultural techniques based on the factor endowment intensities. It provides a comparative
view based on the period of settlement, thus accounting for the institutional land size restrictions
and land aridity. The purpose is to facilitate the understanding of Algeria’s rural settlement by
relating farm size and factor proportions, arguing that the regional average farm-size variation
mirrors what Olmstead and Rhode (1993, p. 112) defined as “a fossil record, capturing the
production choices made as the region reached maturity.” This permits an examination of the
role of agricultural intensification regarding land use and rural techniques, contributing to the
settler-economy literature, and Gareth Austin’s “de-compression of history” (Austin, 2008).
Based on the induced innovation hypothesis – a model first developed by Hicks (1932) and
extended to agricultural economics by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) – this chapter first assesses
technical change highlighting the role of land, labor, and capital (and their prices) as key
constraints on agricultural production within wage-dependent estates. This model considers that
innovations are developed to economize the relatively scarce factors. In line with critics to the
model, I include the timing of settlement to explain the different farming systems.7 Finally, as this
4These areas were subject to higher climatic vulnerability and irregular yields (drought, late frosts in spring,
hail, or very hot climates).
5As an illustration, Boserup’s (1965, p. 32) quote reflects how the availability of labor can shape the incentives
to switch into a more intensive crop rotation frequency:
Unless he [the peasant] keeps a large herd of domestic animals and uses much labour to collect their manure,
prepare composts and spread it carefully in the fields, he is likely to obtain much lower crop yields per hectare
under short-fallow systems or annual cropping than by cultivating the same land under the system of forest
fallow.
6The authors find that the causality was bi-directional as a higher scale also induced the adoption of the tractor.
7Olmstead and Rhode (1993) state that the model fails to fully account for agricultural development and
innovation as it relies uniquely on factor prices and market signals. They argue that, at a regional level in the United
States, the factor prices went in the opposite direction as the one predicted by the model, and only at an aggregate
level for the whole country does the ratio of factors support Hayami and Ruttan’s arguments. They find that the
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model is limited to wage-dependent estates, the section then compares modes of productions in
three municipalities with only large landholdings and reviews Lützelschwab’s (2006) case study
of a large farming estate (the CGCS), to develop an insight into the type of farming dependent
on indigenous sharecropping.
3.2 New World Conditions in an Old World Market
As argued in Chapter 1, the international prices and the colonial tariff regime assumed a vital
role and influenced settlers’ production choices. They help explain the colonial market shift
towards wine and cereal production and the boost in exports after the 1870s. However, to explain
the relation between the settlement process and agriculture, it is necessary to understand the
evolution of the organizational farming structure during the period. This is of particular interest
as Algeria can be classified as a case of a settler economy framed in an Old World market under
New World conditions.
The higher international market integration at the end of the nineteenth century led to very
different forms of farming. For example, as explained by Offer (1991, p. 105), in an Old World
wheat importing country such as Great Britain, only few farmers worked the land they owned
and tenant farmers farmed the highest share of holdings. The size of grain producing farms
averaged below one hundred hectares, and most of the farmers working their own land owned
less than 20 hectares and only a few possessed more than 120 hectares. The size of family farms
was limited and the farming structure consolidated an unequal three-class system – landowners,
tenant farmers, and farm laborers – characterized by high shares of labor supervision, rent
incomes, and soaring land prices. However, even within grain exporting regions there were also
strong differences in the forms of farming. On the one hand, in regions like Russia, India, and the
Danube, the new international grain flows led to peasant farming with “land shortage and high
rents, a surfeit of mouths to feed, taxation, usury, political oppression, poor communications,
illiteracy and apathy.” On the other hand, in the New World grain suppliers farmers had “sufficient
land, draft animals and machinery, cheap credit, literacy, enterprise, education and scientific
support” (Offer, 1991, p. 87). The latter, defined by Offer (1991) as the prairie farmer figure,
was characterized by a new social form endowed with cheap and available land, self-exploitation
or efficient family units, low production costs, and small-scale economies, where the lack of
power and no laborer-manager-landowner division led to more equal societies.
Thus, to understand Algeria’s farming structure, it is first necessary to examine where did
the colony situate in terms of land availability. Table 3.1, obtained from Malenbaum’s (1954)
estimates, provides a general comparative idea about the international categorization of the wheat-
exporting countries, classified in “overseas,” “European,” and “extra-European.” It shows that the
total wheat-devoted acreage experienced a strong expansion in the USA, USSR, Argentina, and
more settled areas had more stable land-to-labor ratios, but the frontier areas experienced rapid increases in land
prices. Thus, the authors conclude that the model must include the analysis of the settlement process.
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Table 3.1: Wheat acreage (in hectares) and total production (in quintals) from Malenbaum (1954), grain
exporting countries 1885-1914
Countries
Wheat Area (5-year averages, million of hectares) Wheat Production (millions of quintals)
1885-89* 89-94 94-99 1899-04 04-09 09-14 1885-89* 89-94 94-99 99-04 04-09 09-14
Argentina 0.81 1.40 2.51 3.59 5.62 6.50 5.22 12.87 16.22 25.39 43.03 40.04
Australia 1.34 1.41 1.73 2.20 2.35 3.08 7.05 8.52 7.43 11.62 16.14 24.63
Canada 1.04 1.17 1.47 1.68 2.28 4.03 10.42 11.13 14.10 20.85 28.31 53.65
USA 19.65 21.31 22.45 23.88 20.81 21.82 140.34 171.01 186.85 194.28 182.85 189.00
Total 22.84 25.30 28.16 31.34 31.06 35.41 163.23 203.54 224.61 252.15 270.33 307.32
Bulgaria 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.97 1.08 7.49 9.85 8.76 8.44 9.58 11.49
Hungary 2.93 3.25 3.29 3.59 3.73 3.68 36.12 39.14 38.87 43.36 44.69 46.16
Rumania 1.18 1.44 1.48 1.59 1.85 1.85 12.49 14.97 15.13 16.82 20.20 23.90
Yugoslavia 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.38 1.52 2.40 2.61 2.75 3.05 3.35
Poland 0.40 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.51 3.38 4.33 5.06 5.17 5.55 6.34
USSR 17.67 18.73 19.99 23.69 26.98 31.07 97.31 98.09 123.08 148.37 168.84 215.49
Total:
Incl. USSR 23.17 24.99 26.38 30.55 34.41 38.57 158.30 168.78 193.52 224.90 251.91 306.72
Excl. USSR 5.50 6.26 6.39 6.86 7.42 7.50 61.00 70.69 70.44 76.54 83.07 91.24
Algeria 1.26 1.25 1.28 1.35 1.38 1.43 6.15 6.21 6.91 8.49 7.97 9.55
Morocco 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.56 2.86 2.97 3.10 3.24 3.48 3.76
Tunis 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.53 1.36 1.55 1.93 1.44 1.52 1.69
Chile 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.44 0.42 3.89 4.79 3.51 3.24 4.16 5.47
Uruguay 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.31 1.22 1.36 1.69 1.66 1.91 1.85
Indian Penin. 11.02 10.69 10.23 9.29 10.95 11.83 72.35 67.28 65.49 67.77 82.12 95.75
Total 13.68 13.36 13.03 12.17 14.01 15.08 87.83 84.16 82.63 85.85 101.17 118.07
In contrast to the original source, I changed acres to hectares (1 acre = 0.405 hectares) and wheat bushels to quintals (1 quintal = 3.675
wheat bushels); Morocco refers to French Morocco; * 4-year average. Source: Malenbaum (1954, p. 236-239).
Canada between 1885 and 1914. Yet, if we exclude the USA, USSR, and the Indian peninsula
from the sample, then it demonstrates that during the first years Algeria was positioned well
above the other extra-European countries and situated just behind Hungary and Australia in
terms of total extension. However, acreage virtually stagnated throughout the period, with only a
slight increase of 13.5 percent. This is very different from Australia, for example, which began
with a similar value but increased by 129 percent in the same period. Hence, although these
aggregated figures must be regarded with caution, they suggest that cultivable land was scarce in
contrast to the New World countries and already by the 1870s the frontier expansion had been
nearly exhausted in Algeria.
Hence, given the limited amount of arable land, what happened to the ratio between land and
labor? Table 3.2 shows various indicators relating land and rural population at a district level in
Constantine. The first three columns show that, on average, less than half of the total municipal
area was cultivated, while more than 50 percent was owned (without changing significantly
between 1904 and 1914). The low shares of the cultivated area among the hectares owned are
explained by the high land aridity levels encountered in French Algeria. With respect to the
cultivated hectares per capita (that is, including both indigenous and Europeans in rural areas), the
values range from 1 hectare per person to almost 5 (see column All under Cultiv/AgrPop). If we
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compare these figures to the ones reported in Simpson (1987) for 1880 and 1930,8 Constantine’s
amount of cultivated land per laborer was below the one in Spain (3.63 in 1880 and 5.70 in
1930 respectively), Germany (6.34 and 6.46 respectively), and France (6.96 and 8.80). It was
above that of Japan (though not far), (0.66 and 0.91), and was significantly lower than the values
reported for Great Britain (14.7 and 17) and the United States (25.4 and 40.5). However, if we
restrict the observations to the settler population (that is, the settler cultivated area divided by the
rural settler population) as shown in column Eur., we can see that the values are significantly
higher, demonstrating that – if Algeria had been empty of local populations since French arrival
– settlers per se would have been relatively labor scarce. Yet, in contrast to the New World
“prairie” family farms, land was not abundant and settlers heavily relied on indigenous laborers
and sharecroppers. Thus, in line with this, if we add to the denominator of Cultiv/AgrPop
the amount of indigenous wage labor (column Eur.&Ind.Labor(I)) and sharecroppers (column
Eur.&Ind.Labor(II)), one can see that at the beginning of the 1900s Algeria positioned within the
labor abundant/land scarce type of settler farming.
Table 3.2: Total rural population densities per district, Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
District
Share Share (1)/(2)
Cultiv/AgrPop
Size Share
Cultiv. Owned All Eur. Eur.&Ind. Eur.&Ind. Property Prop.>41ha
(1) (2) Labor(I) Labor(II)
1904
Batna 0.25 0.50 0.57 4.46 12.40 4.24 1.99 39.09 0.32
Bone 0.20 0.66 0.34 1.00 3.40 1.12 0.88 20.74 0.10
Bougie 0.35 0.68 0.52 1.90 10.75 1.72 1.40 47.96 0.48
Const. 0.41 1.00 0.52 1.80 17.87 2.90 1.49 48.85 0.44
Guelma 0.28 0.69 0.45 1.28 7.13 2.55 1.01 41.80 0.34
Philip. 0.26 0.71 0.37 2.06 8.80 1.70 1.33 28.41 0.24
Sétif 0.44 0.76 0.57 2.08 17.03 5.61 1.95 51.84 0.51
1913
Batna 0.33 0.55 0.56 4.69 12.60 4.70 2.41 40.25 0.33
Bone 0.26 0.67 0.43 1.43 4.92 1.24 1.14 27.83 0.17
Bougie 0.26 0.65 0.40 1.83 8.23 1.64 1.09 47.14 0.46
Const. 0.48 1.10 0.55 1.68 18.65 3.12 1.65 54.42 0.51
Guelma 0.26 0.61 0.43 0.93 7.43 2.48 1.22 40.49 0.33
Philip. 0.29 0.77 0.38 1.79 11.08 1.61 1.24 31.04 0.24
Sétif 0.46 0.83 0.54 1.65 15.85 6.05 1.79 54.14 0.53
Share Cultiv. is the ratio between European and indigenous cultivated hectares over the municipality’s total area
in 1902; Share Owned is the ratio between European and indigenous owned hectares over the municipality’s to-
tal area in 1902; (1)/(2) is the ratio between Share Cultiv and Share Owned; Cultiv/AgrPop is the ratio between:
i. European and indigenous cultivated hectares over total rural population (column All), ii. European culti-
vated hectares over European rural population (column Eur.), iii. European cultivated hectares over European
rural population plus indigenous wage labor (column Eur.&Ind.Labor(I)) and, iv. same as Eur.&Ind.Labor(I)
plus indigenous sharecroppers in the denominator (column Eur.&Ind.Labor(I)).9 The Share Prop>41ha are
the weighted means (based on the settler rural population) of the share of properties above 41 hectares; Size
Property is the European average property size in hectares per municipality. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14),
Busson (1898), and ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
8Based on Binswanger et al. (1978) and Simpson’s calculations for Spain. For more detail see Simpson (1987).
68 Chapter 3. Factor Endowments and Farm Structure: A Regional Approach
Indeed, in colonial Algeria the land-to-labor ratio strongly shaped agricultural production:
the relative labor abundance in the frontier was key to innovate and overcome land scarcity,
allowing to engage in cash crop production. 10 The introduction of new farming techniques –
i.e., changes in crop rotation frequency and more intensive preparatory plowing – allowed wheat
production to increase yields and expand beyond the Northern fertile areas.11 These techniques
allowed for the succession of crops in the same plot (whereas previously a part was left fallow)
thanks to the combination of superficial (10 to 15 cm) and deeper plowing (from 20 to even 40
cm) that preserved the moisture, avoided excessive soil erosion, and increased wheat yields.12
Adopting these new methods necessitated more intense labor, modern European plows (not labor
saving), and stronger draft animals (see Figure 3.3) (Lützelschwab, 2000).13
Thus, although labor abundance was key to agricultural innovation, capital was also a major
constraint. The modern plows were not only more expensive but, as shown in Figure 3.3, they
required stronger and hence more expensive draft animals in contrast those used with indigenous
plows. This also affected livestock as the new methods removed the fallow fields used for
animal feeding. Hence, cash crop cultivation in less fertile areas was more expensive. This
is visible in a detailed explanation by Trabut and Marès (1906) listing extensive costs (fixed,
annual, and per hectare) required to establish a 200 hectare farm in the High Plains. To cultivate
100 hectares, as a fixed cost, the settler would have to buy land (40,000 francs),14 12 horses or
mules (3,600 francs), 4 big modern plows for deep plowing (800 francs), around 7 small plows
for the superficial work (600 francs), and approximately two reapers (6,000 francs). Farming
also required the construction of a stable and a house at a cost of 6,000 francs. In addition, the
corresponding annual costs to sow 100 hectares would require animal feeding (4,380 francs),
labor (2,500 francs), reparations and machinery depreciation (1,500 francs), seeds (2,000 francs),
9The data on sharecroppers does not allow to distinguish between those cultivating European lands and
those cultivating indigenous-owned lands. Thus, I calculated the mean share of the total land owned by Europeans
(approximately 20 percent) and multiplied the latter by the total number of indigenous sharecroppers per municipality
(assuming that indigenous sharecroppers equally distributed their work among all the cultivated area).
10Settlers initially struggled to adapt to Algeria’s climate and new environment (Mollard, 1950). Algeria’s
climate was similar to that of Spain which, as Simpson (1996) explains, was very different from Atlantic Europe
and was not able to engage in the agricultural revolution because of land aridity. The latter restricted the diffusion of
new crops and pastures that permitted higher husbandry densities.
11The recovery of wheat prices, the tariff assimilation policy, and changes in credit and infrastructure also helped
expanding cereal cultivation.
12These techniques, known as preparatory plowing, were already present in Algeria prior to French arrival.
They were implemented by the Carthaginians and Romans and somehow forgotten in the nineteenth century. They
permitted cereal cultivation below 500 mm of yearly rainfall (though, when it was below 400 mm, other crops such
as alfalfa had to be planted) (Mollard, 1950). For detail on the methods used in French Algeria see Trabut and Marès
(1906). The season for preparatory deep plowing was in December and January, the superficial plowing in March,
and the sowing of different cereal crops in Autumn. Lützelschwab (2000) explains that in a three-year rotation
system, which was the one used at the beginning of the 1880s by the CGCS, land was cultivated with winter cereal
in the same plot during two successive years and then, during the third year, the plot was left to lay fallow. The use
of fertilizers was limited to the areas with more advanced cultivation such as Sidi bel Abbés (Mollard, 1950).
13This was similar to the settlers of the American Great Plain. Dry-farming necessitated extensive plots and
more intense land use methods to compete in the global market, ultimately affecting the scale of farming. For more
detail on the dry-farming methods on the Great Plains see Libecap and Hansen (2002).
14Assuming the price of the hectare is 200 fr.
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Figure 3.2: Total wheat acreage in hectares per municipality, Constantine in 1913/14
The data is classified according to equal intervals. Source: SA (1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. For details on map
sources and spatial aggregation see Appendix D.
and capital interests (4,133 francs), as well as other general costs (1,500 francs). Finally, the
cost for all the agricultural labor tasks per hectare, such as plowing, sowing, and planchage,15
harvesting, etc., would equal to approximately 160 francs per hectare. Hence, although rural
credit was facilitated after 1901 when the regional banks (Caissés Régionales de Crédit Agricole
Mutuel) were created,16 access to land and agricultural production in semi-arid areas was barely
affordable for family units and small rural settlers.
Cereal cultivation had been displaced and pushed south into less fertile areas due to the
introduction of viticulture (Mollard, 1950). Indeed, although cereal represented the highest share
of the total cultivated area in all three departments, viticulture played a key role in Algeria’s
agricultural development and was considered to have consolidated settlement in the long run
(Isnard, 1947, 1975). Many settlers turned to wine production as a response to the international
cereal price drop and the phylloxera vineyard disease in France.17 Yet, as Meloni and Swinnen
15Planchage was the use of a three-meter board to avoid water evaporation.
16These credit institutions regulated financial flows going from the Banque de l’Algérie and the colonial
Administration to the local banks that provided agricultural credit to individuals. Griffin et al. (2002) explains that
the credit system reflected the dualism between both the indigenous and settler populations. Indeed, the role of the
credit institution created in 1893 for the Algerian population – known as S.I.P (Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance)
and later as S.A.P (Sociétés Agricole de Prévoyance) – has been severely criticized and questioned Griffin et al.
(2002).
17Isnard (1975) states: “It is not exaggerated to say that Algeria was saved, in that occasion, by an insect.”
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(2014) explain, in Algeria winegrowers struggled as production in warm climates required
advanced technology to complete the fermentation process. Production became possible after
the mid-1850s because of Pasteur’s scientific innovations (i.e., known as “cold fermentation”)
which, together with trade regulations, allowed wine to represent “half of the Algerian exports
and almost one third of [its] GDP” and helped Algeria becoming the first exporter to France
(Meloni and Swinnen, 2014, p. 10). Algerian viticulture specialized in cheap table wines and
relied on modern machinery and intensive labor. The settlers’ demand for cheap wage indigenous
labor boosted in the 1880s as wine prices dropped due to its production recovery in France
(Ageron, 1991; Isnard, 1949; Belkacemi, 1984).18 According to Isnard (1959), in contrast to
cereal cultivation that relied more on sharecroppers, viticulture was more labor intensive and
absorbed almost entirely the waged labor. It produced economies of scale and was mostly
characterized by large, capital-intensive wineries, departing from the Old World, small-family
type of vineyards (Simpson, 2011a).19 Thus, in comparison to the Old World where the entry
costs were low, engaging in viticulture in Algeria and owning a vineyard was also expensive
(e.g., installing a wine cellar) and labor intensive.20
In summary, international prices and the tariff policy assumed a vital role and influenced
settlers’ production choices. They help explain the colonial market’s shift towards wine and
cereal production. Protective French tariffs positioned Algeria in a privileged position that
allowed the country to greatly increase exports after the 1870s (as New World countries), despite
the evident lack of cultivable land (as Old World countries), and this affected the organizational
farming system. Land scarcity and labor abundance marked the beginning of an organizational
structure which, according to many, laid the groundwork for an agrarian economy very different
to what was initially expected. In particular, cereal cultivation in the later settled frontier regions
– which, as shown in the previous chapter, were endowed the highest land concentration levels –
required labor abundance and high capital investment, which was incompatible with the small
rural peasant economy.
18It substituted the relatively more expensive settler daily laborers. The recovery of wine production in France
pushed wine prices downwards so that wine producers in Algeria were forced to decrease production costs. It is
found that viticulture laid the origins of wage labor in Algeria. To see a more detailed analysis regarding viticulture
in Algeria and its trade with France, see Meloni and Swinnen (2014). Regarding the effects of viticulture within the
Algerian society see Isnard (1975).
19Indeed, although in the 1880s most winegrowers (around 77 percent) were small owners, they only possessed
14 percent of the total vineyard plantations, while the owners of properties above 50 hectares (which were only 6
percent of all the winegrowers) accounted for more than half of all Algerian vineyards and harvests (Isnard, 1975).
For instance, in 1863 the average property devoted to viticulture was around 1.2 hectares Yacono (1993), while in
1959 the average surface of a vineyard was of 26.7 hectares in Constantine (AAEEAA, 1990)
20In addition, the phylloxera plague raised costs as it required replanting disease-resistant vines and more delicate
vines with a shorter life-span. Moreover, as Simpson (2011a) explains, “by 1900, the new wine-making techniques
included refrigerators, continuous presses, aero-crushing turbines, sterilizers, and pasteurizers, and these helped
create economies of scale [. . . ].” For example, as Simpson (2011a, p. 10-11) explains based on Augé-Laribé (1907;
p. 143-137), “vineyard owners in the Midi with less than 5 hectares usually worked their vines with hand hoes
rather than plows. On larger properties, the vines were likely to be plowed, and those over 25 or 30 hectares needed
hired labor and perhaps a manager. Vineyard of 80 hectares or more took on the characteristics of an industrial
enterprise.”
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Figure 3.3: Indigenous and European plow in French Algeria
(a) Indigenous Plow
(b) European Plow
The photo above shows a traditional indigenous plow used for superficial land scratching, while the European modern plow
shown in the picture below allowed a deeper plowing. Source: Clerc, Pascal (2008). Les formes de la domination: paysages ru-
raux de l’Afrique du Nord colonisée, Mappemonde, number 91 (3-2008). Retrieved from http://mappemonde-archive.
mgm.fr/num19/articles/art08302.html. Original Source of photo: Gallouéec, L. and Maurette, F. (1922). Géo-
graphie de la France et de ses colonies. Classe de Troisième. Paris: Hachette, p. 286.
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3.3 Farm Size Restrictions: “Older” vs. “Frontier”
Though farm size restrictions are explained in more detail in Chapter 2, it is necessary to briefly
mention them here as well as they relate to changes in agrarian structure. The timing of land
size restrictions permits the classification of municipalities into two categories: the “old” and
the “frontier.” This is in line with Olmstead and Rhode (1993), who argue that (in the case of
the United States in the nineteenth century) the “older areas were constrained by past decisions
about farm size and organization.” The arrival of the French shaped the Algerian land market,
and settlement was organized and managed by the colonial administration (known as “official
colonization”). The year of creation of a settlement center reflects a progressive flexibility
of the land regime’s regulations on property size. The year 1870 is used as a benchmark –
separating the older from the frontier municipalities – as it experienced the transition from a
military administration to a civil one. Before the 1870s, the military administration prohibited
territorial expansion beyond the northern settlement centers, and ownership was restricted by
the government’s concessions of free, small-size plots of land.21 In contrast, after the 1870s,
the new civil administration “realized that large tracts of land were necessary to cultivate the
semi-arid areas” (Lützelschwab, 2000, p. 7) and supplied a larger amount of land (but still under
land-size regulations). At the turn of the century it becomes harder to link official colonization
to rural settlement due to the introduction of a land market,22 growing land scarcity, and rising
crop suitability towards large-scale production.
Figure 3.4 shows a positive relation between the presence of large ownership and the average
year of settlement, as well as a boom in the number of settlements created immediately after the
1870s. The ownership share distribution (Figure 3.5a and Figure 3.5b ) was biased towards larger
estates in the frontier areas and smaller in the older regions (white dots in Figure 3.6).23 Small
ownership presence is clearly linked to firstly settled areas (most fertile) while larger estates
located in more remote tribal areas were affected by the 1873 Warnier law (as it fragmented
tribal land and boosted private land transaction).
The map in Figure 3.6 shows the locations of the areas endowed with higher levels of small
properties; the municipalities settled the years prior to the 1870s (change of administration) show
on average a significantly higher share of small properties (30 percent versus 10 percent)24 and a
21The military administration “prized stability and clear channels of information-gathering, and the displacements
provoked by settler colonialism were not germane to such goals” and its “limited tolerance for the bourgeois ideals
of private property and the free circulation of people and goods (. . . ) complicated the picture” (Sivak, 2008, p. 97).
22The 1873 Warnier law began a free land market between indigenous and settler population, fragmented tribal
land, and expanded the French civil code.
23The average for municipalities settled prior to the 1870s is of 41.06 and after is of 51.29 hectares. The average
size of property is always smaller in CPE municipalities (mean value of 43.15 hectares) in comparison to CM (mean
value of 54.98 hectares).
24Small properties include the number of properties below ten hectares. A t-test on the mean difference is
significant at a 1 percent confidence level (under the equal and unequal variance assumption). I have aggregated
the 1904/05 and 1913/14 observations, but the test is also significant for each individual year. The number of
observations is 99 for the older regions and 98 for the frontier.
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Figure 3.4: Average property size and year of creation of settlement centers, Constantine in 1904/05 and
1913/14
The lines 04fit and 13fit are the trend lines for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. The Average size per property is the European
average property size (or AverSizeperProp(I)) in hectares per municipality. Settlement year (or Creation) is the average year of
creation of a settlement center within a municipality. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898) and ANOM-iREL. See
Appendix D for more detail on sources.
Figure 3.5: Share of properties by size and average property size density per period of settlement,
Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
(a) % of small and large properties per district (b) Average property size density
Small landholding are those below 10 hectares and large landholdings are those above 41 hectares. Source: SA (1904/05,
1913/14), Busson (1898) and ANOM-iREL. For details on map sources and spatial aggregation see Appendix D.
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Figure 3.6: Share of settler-owned small properties over the total number of properties, Constantine
1904/05 and 1913/14
The data is classified according quantiles (equal count). Small landholdings are those below 10 hectares. Source: SA (1904/05,
1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for map sources (CEPC and CVC) and details on spatial aggregation
with GIS software.
lower share of large properties (35 percent versus 50 percent)25 Using an index reflecting the
overall distribution of properties according to their size (and setting to one-hundred the upper
bound limit to the highest average size of large property), one can see that the average size
is higher in the later settled municipalities, going from an average of 45 hectares to 47. The
following histograms show that the data approximate a bimodal distribution given that the density
of the later settled municipalities ranges around a higher mean, while the density of frontier
municipalities skews towards smaller size.
3.4 The Factor Endowments: A Comparative Approach
Proving that Algeria’s colonial rural economy had a relative low land-to-labor ratio does not
explain why land concentration was high. Thus, this section analyzes whether the frontier
regions, endowed with the highest shares of large landholdings, responded differently to relative
25Large properties account for properties above 41 hectares. A t-test on the mean difference is significant at a 1
percent confidence level (under the equal and unequal variance assumption). I have aggregated the 1904/05 and
1913/14 observations, but the test is also significant for each individual year. The number of observations is 99 for
the older regions and 98 for the frontier.
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production factors and their prices as opposed to the earlier settled regions. For this reason it first
assesses, based on the period of settlement, the dynamic process of regional adaptation to more
advanced agricultural techniques (i.e., mechanization or land use methods) among the large,
wage-dependent properties. To do this, I apply Hayami and Ruttan’s Induced Innovation model
to compare the relative production factors between the frontier and older municipalities. Given
that this model limits the analysis to wage-dependent estates, the analysis is complemented with
a comparative study of three municipalities with only large landholdings to get an insight to the
type of farming found in addition to wage-dependent estates. To conclude, as an example of
large estates that relied on indigenous sharecropping, I summarize the case of the CGCS studied
by Lützelschwab (2000). I argue that labor abundance helped offset the worse land quality in
the frontier; yet, the capital needed for cultivation and the progressive withdrawal of official
colonization (as argued in Chapter 2) help explain the crowding out of small family settlers.
The frontier regions engaged mostly in cereal cultivation; as stated by Lützelschwab (2000),
it was the only crop that allowed cultivation under “a capitalist perspective” in arid climates.
Thanks to dry-farming, the French administration was able to provide at the beginning of the
1900s new and uncultivated lands for cereal cultivation to settlers in the High Plains. Thus, the
cultivated area expanded to the surroundings of Constantine, Batna, Guelma, Sétif, Mostaganem,
Sidi-bel-Abbès, Miliana, and Orléansville, and, in all of Algeria, it was augmented by 170,000
hectares between 1905 and 1915 (Mollard, 1950). In the case of Constantine, European wheat
cultivation expanded from 160 thousand hectares in 1898/1902 to 209 thousand in 1906/1910
(Lützelschwab, 2000).26 In line with this, the agricultural statics for Constantine in Table 3.3
indicate that the share of wheat over the total cultivated area was greater in the frontier regions,
with a difference of more than ten percentage points. Viticulture, on the other hand, represented
a small portion of the cultivated area and the share difference of vineyards over the total area
between the older and frontier regions is not significant.27 Figure 3.7 shows the differences in
the average share of each crop (wine or wheat) and its total extension based on the period of
settlement (before or after 1870).
Concerning the labor market, a first glance at the data from the agricultural statistics shows
that the daily indigenous labor force employed during the agricultural seasons was relatively
smaller and more expensive in the older areas (Table 3.3).28 These results suggesting a higher
supply of indigenous labor in the frontier are in line with Algeria’s colonial history. The latter
was prompted after the 1870s as a result of colonial land policies, steady population growth, and
the failed Kabylia rebellion in 1871, forcing the impoverished local populations to search for
26In 1881/85 it was 2,837 thousand hectares, 2,749 in 1888/92, 2,836 in 1898/1902, and 2,902 in 1906/1919.
The values are five year averages. From Lützelschwab (2000), the original source of the data is the SGA.
27The mean for the older regions is 0.097 percent and for the frontier regions is 0.126. The mean difference is
not significant both under the unequal and equal variance assumptions.
28There is a negative and significant correlation between the year of settlement and indigenous wages per day.
The indigenous labor per day, which reflects the number of workers employed, shows a high dispersion. Values
range from a minimum of 0.03 workers per day to a maximum of 1.24.
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additional sources of income.29 As an illustration, Ruedy (2005, p. 98) describes that “in the last
years of the Second Empire, settlers had been surprised, for the first time, to see large numbers of
natives searching for work in the colonization centers,” and Belkacemi (1984, p. 245) stated that
“repressive military, fiscal and land policies resulted in the post 1871 period, in the disintegration
of traditional peasant structures and the availability of a large supply of manpower.” The frontier
regions were particularly affected as colonial land policies pushed indigenous populations from
the fertile coastal regions into the inland semi-arid areas (i.e., the frontier) (Griffin, 1976, p. 16).
In addition, the outcome of the 1871 rebellion in favor of the French resulted in severe sanctions
– money contributions and land sequestrations – that increased the indigenous labor supply in the
hinterland Kabylia regions, the plains of Sétif, and the Eastern areas in the proximities of Aïn
Beïda, and Batna.30
However, these data must be analyzed with caution as it is available at an aggregated annual
basis, and thus it is not possible to account for seasonality which was particularly strong in
Constantine. As explained by Nouschi (1961), labor employment in Constantine was mostly
seasonal and relied on both daily wages and piecework (service provided independent of time).
The author explains that wages per day ranged between 1 and 3 francs, with a mode fluctuating
around 1.50 and 1.75 francs, while piecework could vary from 20 francs per hectare (if harvested
using a sickle) up to 110 francs per hectare (for grape harvesting). Accounting for seasonality
would allow a deeper understanding of land use systems and size of farming. For instance, the
transition from a three-field rotation system into a two-field intensive one (with no plot left
fallow) increases seasonality as it requires a higher number of workers because of the more
intensive preparatory plowing techniques at certain times of the year (Sumpsi, 1975).31
With respect to the land market, Table 3.3 demonstrates that land prices (average land value
of one hectare of non-cleared land) were relatively cheaper in the frontier; despite numerous
missing observations, a t-test on the mean differences shows that these were significantly lower.32
This is logical given that the frontier had a lower settler occupation per colonized hectare (see
Table 3.3) and an average lower land quality, that is also reflected in significantly inferior annual
cereal yields (see Figure B.1 in Appendix for detail on geographic distribution).33 In addition,
29The laws passed in 1873 and 1887 permitted the land commercialization that facilitated the fragmentation of
indigenous communal lands. This partition of land clashed with indigenous population growth so that the per capita
size of property decreased, forcing local populations to search for additional sources of income.
30A dummy variable for these regions (equal to one if Kabylia, equal to zero if others) is positively and
significantly correlated to the municipalities with higher quantities of annual labor employed during the agricultural
seasons.
31The author studies Andalusian large estates in the beginning of the 1930s to understand the labor productivity
implications of capital gains experienced from changes into more intensive agricultural techniques. Sumpsi’s (1978)
article is very useful as it recreates different farming systems based on hypothetical 1,800 hectares farms in the
Andalusian region. As the Constantine region, particularly the frontier regions, Andalusia is of particular interest as
it is characterized by drylands and experienced similar changes in the rotation system.
32Values are consistent for cleared and non-cleared hectares, and annual (fermage) tenancy rates. The mean
difference in land prices becomes stronger if the test is applied for the municipalities of CPE (a mean equal to
210.6 francs per hectare) versus the CM (103.1 francs per hectare); assuming unequal variances, the difference is
significant at a 95 percent confidence level.
33The pair-wise correlation between the crop suitability index and land prices is negative and significant at a
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with regard to cereal cultivation, the evidence shows that the cultivated area per property was
more extensive in the regions settled later in time.34
Figure 3.7: Share and extension of the wheat-cultivated area and viticulture by year of creation of
settlement centers, Constantine in 1904/5 and 1913/14
(a) Share of cultivated crop (b) Area cultivated in hectares
Figure (a) is the average share of the area cultivated of wheat or wine over the total area cultivated in the municipality. Figure
(b) displays the average total cultivated area in hectares of wheat and wine per municipality. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14),
Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
Table 3.3: Factor prices and quantities, Constantine 1904/5 and 1913/14
Region
Mean Prices Quantity Land Land “Innovation”
Land Labor Share Settler Lab. to to Mach. Share land
(fr/ha) (fr/day) Cereal per col. hectare per day Labor (I) Labor (II) per hectare Europ. mode
Older 218.47 1.83 0.70 0.06 0.03 11.03 21.56 0.004 0.50
Frontier 135.87 1.64 0.83 0.04 0.06 5.46 17.16 0.001 0.33
P-value 0.042** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.033** 0.004*** 0.224 0.024** 0.001***
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The values are shown for unequal variances although significance level is the same under
the equal variance assumption. The variable Land is the average value of one European-owned hectare of non-cleared hectare;
Labor refers to daily indigenous labor; Share Cereal is the European share of wheat cultivated hectares over the total European
number of cultivated hectares; Settler per col. hectare is the rural settler population over the number of hectares of the settlement
centers in the municipality (estimated with the 1902 CCO map and GIS software); Lab. per day is the daily indigenous labor;
Land to Labor (I) is the ratio between the number of European cultivated hectares and the number of indigenous laborers;
Land to Labor (II) is the ratio between the number of the European cultivated area in large landholdings over the number of
indigenous laborers; Mach. per hectare are steam tractors per cultivated hectares; Share land Europ. mode is the number of
hectares cultivated à la mode Européenne. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for
more detail on sources.
Thus far I have set forth the relative differences in quantities and prices of land and labor. The
results suggest that cereal farming in the frontier relied on more extensive cultivation and cheaper
indigenous labor to produce similar (or lower) yields as the ones obtained in the earlier settled
regions. In other words, agricultural innovation was introduced to offset the worse land quality
and allow cash crop production in semi-arid areas. However, in order to understand what drove
settler production functions it is also necessary to analyze the land-to-labor ratio. This is more
one percent significance level.The winter cereal yield is 9.5 grains (quintals) per cultivated hectare in the older
municipalities and 8.1 in the frontier.
34By calculating the ratio between the European wheat cultivated area and the number of properties (or settler
owners), it is possible to get an idea of the average cultivated extension per property (or settler owner). The
correlation os positive and becomes significant at a one percent confidence level confidence level.
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complicated given that the agricultural data used (that is, the SA for 1904/05 and 1913/14) gives
information on the total number of laborers, days worked, and wages, but it does not provide
data on the corresponding area cultivated by such laborers. Table 3.3 shows a broad estimate of
the land-to-labor ratio (Land to Labor (I)) reflecting a significantly higher value for the older
municipalities (see Appendix B for detail on construction). Yet this estimate is inaccurate as
the numerator includes the cultivated hectares for all types of properties, both small and large.
The problem is that these two farming units cannot be aggregated as they will make different
production decisions based on a given set of factors. That is, small family farms are not directly
affected by wages as they do not employ laborers. Hence, I create a more precise estimate (Land
to Labor (II)) by restricting the numerator to the properties that most likely relied on waged labor.
Based on Sumpsi (1978),35 I argue that wage-dependent farms can be proxied by those above 40
hectares.36 The results show that the Land to Labor (II) is still higher for the older municipalities,
but it is not significantly different, allowing one to conclude that the number of estates relying
on daily labor during the high seasonal peaks did not differ significantly between both areas
(which is likely justified by seasonal labor force mobility).37 However, the Land to Labor (II)
variable must also be regarded with caution, not only because Sumpsi’s values are estimates
and correspond to different regions that probably differ on the timing of tillage and harvesting,
but also because the estimates are limited to cereal cultivation and thus a 40 size benchmark
overestimates that of viticulture which was more dependent on seasonal wage labor.38
Thus, once we know the relative prices and quantities of land and labor, it becomes possible
to finally test Hayami and Ruttan’s Induced Innovation model (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971).
This model allows examining how wage-dependent estates responded to the relative factors of
production. The key point is that technological change allows the substitution of the relatively
scarce input for the abundant one in a given economy; i.e., if labor is scarce relative to land, then
the innovation is labor-saving and will entail mechanization to increase the marginal product of
land (for instance, as in the case of the United States and the mechanical reaper in the nineteenth
35Sumpsi’s (1978) estimates are based on a 1,800 hectare exploitation and assume a two-field intensive rotation
system with no fallow, animal traction, and seasonal labor. I rely on wheat cultivation because it accounts for the
largest share of the cultivated area in Algeria.
36The reasoning is as follows. In line with Sumpsi (1975), a 40 hectare property would seem to require a total of
around 326 daily laborers for annual sowing, which equals to 11 laborers working every day during a 30 day month
(usually sowing is done in October and accounts for 20 percent of the annual daily labor used). The harvest for the
same cultivated area in the month of June demanded approximately 7.4 daily laborers during 30 days. Given that
the timing of harvesting was particularly critical, the demand for seasonal labor was high and included also women,
children, and industrial workers (Simpson, 1987). Thus, assuming a five-unit family farm with all five members
working, a plot of 40 hectares would need more than one whole family working every day throughout the month
for both sowing and harvesting. Hence, a 40 hectare size seems to be a reasonable benchmark to determine the
properties dependent on wage labor.
37This result is supported by the indigenous labor density variable (Laborers/ha_I ) obtained from a different
SA folder (see Appendix B for detail). The latter provides information on the indigenous rural population density
for the different land tenure categories (and thus, it should cover the total cultivated area and not only the wage
dependent farms). A t-test on the mean difference is not significant, suggesting that the regional variation in the
land-to-labor ratio is not sufficient to account for the regional differences between the old and frontier large estates.
38For example, as Simpson (2011a) argues, the optimal vineyard size in the Midi was 60 to 80 hectares and
economies of scale appeared beyond 30 hectares.
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century). Based on the model, if the land-to-labor ratio is higher in the older regions, and
labor and land are more expensive,39 then it is to be expected that mechanization (and land-
saving techniques) is also higher.40 This is because technological advances are brought in to
overcome factor scarcities. For example, in Algeria, the harvest of a 30 to 40 hectare lot using ten
harvesters lasted a month, whereas two to three days were sufficient when employing a modern
six draft-animal harvester with only two laborers (Lützelschwab, 2000).
The data confirm the prediction: the density of all agricultural instruments per hectare was
higher (particularly threshers and mechanical reapers) in the older municipalities. Table 3.4
shows that the number of agricultural tools per hectare (as dependent variables) correlates
most significantly (and with the expected signs) to land prices, the amount of indigenous labor
employed, and wages.41 The tractors follow a similar pattern as the other agricultural instruments.
However, it is important to keep in mind that mechanization was particularly low and that
meaningful changes in agricultural techniques are reflected in the adoption of modern French
plows that permitted deeper plowing in the arid regions.42 The adoption of these plows is
reflected in column 5 in Table 3.4. In column 6 the dependent variable is the ratio between
the number of French plows and the traditional indigenous plow used by settlers, reflecting the
“modernization” level at any given scale. Yet the French plow was not a labor saving technology
(see Figure 3.3). The meaningful labor saving effect comes with the mechanical reaper, which
accounts for the most expensive fixed cost (together with the land purchase). The latter can be
substituted by labor force while the deeper plowing necessarily requires modern plows.43 The
statistics in Table 3.3 confirm this by showing significant differences between the frontier and
the older regions with respect to the mechanical reaper intensity, while insignificant regarding
the European plow.44 Finally, and consistent with Isnard (1975), the predominance of large
wine properties (reflected in the variable ShareWineArea_E in Table 3.4) provides a powerful
explanation of the high degree of technical improvement, which should be reflected in more
advanced machinery, a greater number of skilled workers, and the highest share of waged labor.
To sum up, with respect to wage-dependent estates, the data and the model both show that
it was relatively cheaper to expand the amount of cultivated land and benefit from a higher
labor supply in the frontier regions rather than increasing the use of labor-saving machinery
(in particular, mechanical reapers). However, as clarified by Hayami and Ruttan (1971, p. 19),
the model is an approximation to the dynamics of the mechanization diffusion that are not as
39There is a negative and significant correlation between the year of settlement and the ratio of cultivated land
over the number of indigenous laborers per day.
40Despite lack of data, Mollard (1950) argues that the use of fertilizers was limited to advanced cultivated areas.
41Only thresher density (column 2) does not respond to the indigenous labor variable, but this is logical as it is
the sole agricultural technique in the analysis that is not seasonal (Olmstead and Rhode, 1993).
42Indeed, as explained by Olmstead and Rhode (2001, p. 668) in the beginning of the 1900s, tractors were still
too big and unsuitable (defined as “giant steam plows”), particularly for small properties, and thus its expansion was
limited.
43As explained by Trabut and Marès (1906), the cultivation of 100 hectares required four big European plows.
44A t-test for the mean difference equal to zero is significant at a five percent confidence level with a p-value of
0.0001.
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Table 3.4: Mechanization in Constantine in 1904/5 and 1913/14
Dependent variable: (1) Tractor (2) Thresher (3) Harvester (4) FrenchPlow_E (5) Instruments (6) Modernization
L/day_I -10.15** 10.51 -11.96* -62.05** -151.12** -0.05**
(3.00) (17.95) (5.36) (17.78) (41.18) (0.02)
Wage/day_I 0.74 0.01 0.80 18.41** 25.99* 0.02**
(0.54) (0.93) (1.80) (6.52) (12.69) (0.01)
LandPrice 0.02*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.17*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00)
ShareWineArea_E 0.21 18.71 0.34 230.90*** 472.84*** 0.23***
(0.83) (14.28) (1.48) (17.99) (45.00) (0.02)
DYear 0.33 -0.48 1.11 2.47 8.29 0.00
(0.64) (1.17) (0.96) (6.83) (13.68) (0.01)
Constant -1.71 1.89 1.87 -4.95 48.33* -0.02**
(1.06) (1.63) (3.14) (7.86) (20.19) (0.01)
N 137 135 136 136 136 137
R2 0.72 0.03 0.10 0.70 0.66 0.66
R2_A 0.71 -0.01 0.06 0.69 0.64 0.65
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors. All dependent variables are per thousand except for
Modernization. Land price is the average value of one hectare of non-cleared hectare. Modernization is the ratio between the
number of French plows and indigenous plows per municipality. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL.
See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
clear-cut as expected. For example, they explain that mechanization might also be brought in
by land-saving incentives; for example, in Japan the horse plow was introduced to improve
cultivating techniques so as to increase the yield per hectare, not to save labor. This also seems to
be the case for the frontier regions in Constantine; that is, agricultural innovation was introduced
to offset the worse land quality and improve yields.
However, the prior analysis is limited to wage-dependent large estates. Thus, to provide an
additional insight of the different types of farming, I compare three municipalities endowed
(almost entirely) with large properties (more than 41 hectares), settled at different moments in
time, and endowed with distinct land qualities.45
Oum el Bouaghi (third column in Table 3.5) should reflect a region that required dry-farming
as it was settled after the 1890s and has a medium soil suitability for wheat cultivation.46 In
contrast, Aïn Taghrout (second column) presents a very similar soil suitability level but was
settled earlier in the 1870s (shortly after the civil administration had been established).47 If we
compare the two of them, one can see that, given a similar suitability level, the later-settled
municipality – with lower yields per hectare, a far lower level of the share of land cultivated in the
European style (à la mode Européenne),48 an almost null or lower mechanization level, no wage
45Suitable hectares are defined as the number of hectares above the medium level ( the index is equal to 4) for
low input level rain-fed wheat from the IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database.
46Within the municipality, one settlement center was established in 1893 and the other in 1901.
47One settlement center was established in 1872 and another in 1875.
48It accounts for the cultivated area according to the cultivation method. Constantine’s agricultural data provides
unusual information on the distribution of the cultivated area according to the cultivation method: a la mode
Européenne (European modes of cultivation) and a la mode indigène (indigenous modes of cultivation). They
are both available only for the year 1904. Despite no clarification as to what the characteristics of each method
are, based on the literature on French Algeria, which continuously mentions the indigenous traditional means
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labor, and a considerably higher density of indigenous sharecropping – did not introduce modern
agricultural techniques and thus relied on traditional means of cultivation. Oued Athmenia (first
column), on the other hand, was settled earlier in the late 1860s and had the best land quality
for wheat cultivation;49 yet, as Table 3.5 reports, it displays lower yields in comparison to Aïn
Taghrout. Thus, what makes Aïn Taghrout different? Despite its lower land quality, it reports the
highest share of cultivated land by European modern methods, the highest density of indigenous
rural population and wage labor, and, as shown in Figure 3.8, it is geographically surrounded
by the most indigenous-populated areas. Indeed, as shown in the map, it was the nearest to the
Kabylia region, the mountainous regions with high indigenous population densities and that was
the most intensively affected by land expropriations after the 1870s.50 Thus, this region had the
highest indigenous labor supply and hence the most likely to adopt the more labor-intensive rural
techniques. In addition, this closer comparative analysis shows that the municipality with higher
suitability (Oued Athmenia), and the one that made a bigger effort to overcome land aridity (Aïn
Taghrout), were indeed related to wage-dependent farms.
Table 3.5: Comparative analysis: Oued Athmenia, Aïn Taghrout, and Oum El Bouaghi in 1904/05
Oued Athmenia Aïn Taghrout Oum El Bouaghi
Average year of settlement 1868 1873.5 1897
Average size of large property 426 380 142
Crop suitability 7.38 5.76 5.27
Share cultivated Á la Mode Européenne 0.60 0.82 0.05
Settlers
Wheat cultivated area per settler 14.62 36.58 15.26
Wheat cultivated area per property 159 114 49
Wheat production per cultivated hectares 5.13 5.83 3.31
Share of wine 3.31 0.00 0.00
Share of cereal 0.99 0.99 0.91
Oxen per hectare 0.12 0.00 0.00
French plow per hectare 0.01 0.02 0.02
Mechanical reaper per hectare 0.00 0.01 0.00
Machine per hectare (Tractor) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rural population per hectare 0.02 0.04 0.06
Rural population per suitable hectare 0.11 0.22 0.16
Indigenous
Oxen per owned hectares 0.08 0.00 0.00
Sharecropper per cultivated hectares 0.06 0.11 0.23
Laborer per cultivated hectare 0.10 0.20 0.00
Source: SA (1904/05), IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database, Busson (1898), ANOM-
iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
of cultivation as that relying on long fallow and the indigenous plow, it is reasonable to assume that a la mode
Européenne refers to the modern agricultural practices introduced in the 1900s.
49One settlement center was created in 1862, one in 1870, and a third in 1870.
50The average elevation index from the IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database shows that for Aïn
Taghrout it is 973, for Oum el Bouaghi it is 888, and for Oued Athmenia it is 830.
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Figure 3.8: Indigenous rural population per suitable hectare, Constantine in 1904/05
The indigenous rural population per suitable hectare data is classified according to quantiles (equal count). Suitable hectare
refers to the number of hectares with a crop suitability for low input level rain-fed wheat above the medium level (that is, equal
to 4). Source: SA (1904, 1913), IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database, Busson (1898), and ANOM-iREL. For
details on map sources and spatial aggregation see Appendix D.
But does the previous example of Oum El Bouaghi mean that large properties that relied
on indigenous sharecropping – and thus, did not employ waged labor – did not adopt newer
agricultural methods? The research by Lützelschwab (2000) on the Compagnie Genevoise des
Colonies Suisses, a settler farming estate in Constantine, proves the contrary: it shows that the
adoption of modern agricultural techniques among indigenous sharecroppers was possible due to
the surplus of indigenous labor.51 According to the author, in the 1890s the land market forces
(i.e., expropriations) changed the ratio between land and labor, leading to an excess supply of
local labor which ultimately increased the landowners’ bargaining power.52 Thus, it allowed
agricultural innovation by increasing the working time and intensity without having to modify
explicit clauses in the sharecropping contracts. In line with this argument, as a final check, it
is possible to examine the share of land cultivated in the “European mode” by the indigenous
population. The share is positively and significantly correlated to the regions affected by the
Kabylia rebellion, and a t-test on the mean differences shows strong disparities between the
older and the frontier regions. On average, in the old municipalities, the European methods were
adopted on almost 50 percent of the total cultivated area, of which 80 percent was cultivated
51This example was also presented in Chapter 2.
52The author explains that before the land market forces changed (prior to the 1870s), the poverty among
indigenous sharecroppers decreased the company’s margins to provide the incentives that would increase working
time and effort. In addition, land was not exhausted so that the indigenous sharecroppers, if discontent with their
contract terms, could search for alternative lands to cultivate.
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by Europeans, and 20 percent by the indigenous. In contrast, in the frontier regions, around 30
percent of the land was cultivated a la mode Européenne, out of which 60 percent was cultivated
by Europeans and 40 percent by indigenous. This demonstrates that the share of land cultivated
with modern techniques by the indigenous population was higher in the frontier, particularly if
affected by the Kabylia rebellion.53
Finally, it is useful to look at the draft-animal regional disparities given that changes adopted
in tillage operations across farming systems (i.e., waged labor, sharecropping, or self-sufficient
family units) are related to the quantities and prices of animals. More specifically, the climate
and soil in the frontier areas required European animal-traction plows for a deeper preparatory
plowing during the Autumn season (Lützelschwab, 2000; Trabut and Marès, 1906). In these re-
gions, what previously was left to lay fallow during a period was now cultivated more frequently;
thus, it required a higher use of draft animals and needed less land for livestock-feeding.54 For
instance, Trabut and Marès (1906) explain that a colon necessitated one simple or double Brabant
plow and four to five horses or Arab mules to prepare a 20 hectare plot before the sowing season.
Oxen could also be used for the same task (see Figure 3.3) but the final choice of the type of
draft animal depended on various factors such as the soil, the climate, the size of plots, access to
pasture, etc. Figure 3.9 depicts the mules-to-oxen ratio distribution, reflecting higher values in
the frontier regions with worse land quality for cultivation.55 This seems reasonable as oxen tend
to be related to regions with abundant pasture and smaller farms, whereas mules relate to larger
farms located in plain fields with scarce pasture (Simpson, 1987, p. 281).
However, these figures must be regarded with caution as the density levels of oxen and mules
in Constantine are significantly low. For instance, if we compare the values reported by Simpson
(1987) for different regions in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century, one can see that the
lowest reported value in 1891 in Spain (for Cáceres) was 1.5 times larger than the highest one
found in the department of Constantine, and 20 times larger than its overall mean.56 These low
values in French Algeria are explained by, on the one hand, the lack of association between
husbandry and agriculture within the settler sector (Bennoune, 2002) and, on the other hand, the
more intensive rural methods that shortened the fallow period and decreased the amount of land
available for pasture and eroded the soil (Lützelschwab, 2000).57 Thus, in the frontier – where
53These values come from the SA (1904/05). See Appendix D for more detail.
54Boserup (1965) explains that to maintain draft animals there are three options: first, keep a part of permanent
land for grazing, second, the cultivation period is shortened so that there is a portion of land left fallow for animal
pasture, and third, give the animal a portion of the harvest for feeding.
55This is supported by: i. the positive and significant correlation between the year of settlement and the ratio, ii.
the negative and significant correlation between the density of mules per cultivated hectare and the land suitability
index, and iii. the positive and significant correlation between the density of oxen and the land quality.
56The author calculates that in 1891 the ratio between the number of mules over the oxen and cows is 34.71
in Sevilla and Córdoba, 27.70 for Cáceres, and 96.69 for Castellón, Tarragona, and Valencia. In Constantine, the
highest value for the ratio between the mules and the oxen (not including bulls, oxen for manure, cows, and calfs) is
18.6 in 1904 for Aïn Abessa, but then all the values are below 10 and the overall mean is 1.38. The density of mules
per cultivated hectare has a maximum value of 0.5 but the mean is 0.06. The oxen per cultivated hectare have a
maximum value of 0.6 but a mean of 0.09.
57Livestock among the indigenous population was also negatively affected. The French settlement had an
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Figure 3.9: Mules-to-oxen ratio (settler owned), Constantine in 1904/05
The mules-to-oxen data is classified according to quantiles (equal count). Settlement point includes towns, villages, settlement
centers, hamlets, and individual plots, and is classified according to average year of creation (before or after 1870) of the
settlement centers in a municipality. Source: SA (1904/05), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. For details on map sources and
spatial aggregation see Appendix D.
the climate and soil did not favor cultivation, where irrigation and fertilizers were absent, and
where land for pasture was too low to allow for mixed-husbandry – the results suggest that settler
farmers minimized production costs by hiring relatively cheap labor.
3.5 Conclusions
Because “the great grain or vinegrowing properties absorbed [the small settler’s] concessions
and spat out the people,” Charles-Robert Ageron argued that French Algeria lost its “colonial
justification” (Ageron, 1991, p. 61-62). What shaped, then, these properties?
At the turn of the century cereal and wine production grew in French Algeria thanks to
colonial trade policy and agricultural structural transformation. Although the limited arable land
to expand rural settlement in Algeria was evident by the late 1870s, the average property size per
rural settler was high; particularly in the frontier regions settled after the 1870s. This chapter
disentangles the relation between the type of farming on large estates, the process of settlement,
and the land-to-labor ratio at the outset of the 1900s at a municipal level. To do this it takes
advantage of annual agricultural statistics reported by the French administration at the municipal
level in Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14.
extremely negative effect on livestock density in Algeria (Yacono, 1993). The larger European holdings together
with the population growth stirred the indigenous cultivation methods.
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The key agricultural change during the colonial years was the adoption of newer and more
land and labor-intensive farming methods that permitted to expand cultivation into the more arid
frontier regions. The results show that the possibility for the large landholding to innovate and
adopt these techniques (i.e., preparatory plowing and the use of the French plow) depended on
the availability of indigenous labor. In addition, the generally low levels of advanced agricultural
machines (such as the mechanical reaper), particularly in the frontier regions, suggest that large
farms relied heavily on the surplus of labor generated by colonial land policies after the 1870s.
Based on the timing of settlement, this chapter first uses Hayami and Ruttan’s (1978) Induced
Innovation Model to understand the regional differences between wage-dependent estates. This
model is an instrument that allows for the assessment of the dynamic process of adoption of
agricultural techniques (i.e., the use of mechanical reapers or French plows) by examining the
relative amounts of labor and land. The model suggests that the frontier regions, endowed with
higher aridity, relied on the abundant indigenous labor supply in order to be competitive. Yet
this model only allows for examination of the wage-dependent estates. Thus, to gain a better
understanding, the chapter includes a comparative analysis of three municipalities settled in
different moments and thus, with distinct soils. It indicates that the municipality with high yields
but a medium cultivable soil relates to higher levels of indigenous labor and modern agricultural
techniques (not mechanization levels). It finally shows, based on a study by Lützelschwab
(2000), that the adoption of modern agricultural techniques in a large sharecropping-dependent
estate was possible as a result of a higher labor-to-land ratio after in the 1880s that provided
the landowner with a higher bargaining power. Thus, the results suggest that the availability of
indigenous labor was the key-factor that allowed the large farms – both wage or sharecropping
dependent–in the frontier to be competitive.
The final question is, then, whether these results are consistent with the crowding out of the
small rural settlers hypothesis. As shown in this chapter, the frontier regions were significantly
endowed with larger properties and lower rural settler density levels. These regions required new
agricultural practices to expand cultivation and offset the worse land quality. The institutional
land-market regulations after the 1870s – in particular, a decree passed in 1904 that facilitated
private land transactions and led to higher land prices (Mollard, 1950)– biased ownership
to colons with sufficient resources to face the new cultivation requirements – i.e., purchase
of land, buying and feeding draft animals, agricultural instruments, seasonal labor, capital
interests, reparations and machinery depreciation, wine cellars, planting disease-resistant vines,
refrigerators, etc.– in the relatively less-cultivable regions. In addition, the scarcity of livestock
and draft animals, together with the absence of fertilizers and irrigation in the frontier, limited the
margins to decrease production costs and, thus, pushed landowners to increase income through
rents (Bennoune, 2002). Hence, the need for capital and land prices excluded small settlers from
access to the later open-to-settlement lands.

Chapter 4
Build It and They Will Come?
Secondary Railways and Population
Density in French Algeria
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of gaining railroad access on indigenous and settler
population density in French Algeria at the end of the nineteenth century. A growing amount
of research shows that railway expansion at this time implied changes within the regional
social and production structures, allowing previously marginalized regions to participate
in international trade and thereby boosting growth. Yet few studies point out that it also
increased marginalization and reinforced dual economies in areas that did not experience
access to the infrastructure or that did not have the required economies to profit from and
engage in international markets. By taking advantage of unique territorial population data at
a sub-municipal level and digitized historical colonization maps in the Constantine region,
this paper measures the effect of gaining railway access in relatively isolated areas – areas
in which the infrastructure arrived later – using a differences-in-differences methodology.
Results show that the indigenous population responded positively to railroad infrastructure
only in those regions where settlers were already located while the settler density did not
respond to the infrastructure. As a robustness check to the results, this study restricts the
sample to minimize selection bias and also provides an instrumental variable approach
to account for omitted variable bias. In line with literature on Algerian railways, the
results confirm that the railway in Constantine was unfelt in many regions and helped
reinforce regional inequalities. The results provide support to the hypothesis that indigenous
population growth was partly a response to the colonial demand for labor.
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4.1 Introduction
The ratio between the rural settlers and the indigenous population during the colonial years
turned out differently from what the French colonial administration had hoped for. At the
turn of the twentieth century rural settlers were outpaced by a persistent indigenous population
growth. Indeed, as Bennoune (2002, p. 54) explains, it was expected that local population
would disappear given that the crisis experienced by the indigenous population between the
1830s and 1870s (i.e., epidemics, droughts, famines, and a major rebellion in the Kabylia region)
had allowed many “French theorists” to predict “the doom of the native ‘race.”’ Yet, after the
1870s, natural growth figures recovered and “alarmed” many settlers. It seemed unreasonable
that despite the low indigenous margins to increase agricultural production after the 1870s —
i.e., the frontier and cultivable land were exhausted (see Chapter 3), the tribal areas were legally
circumscribed, and the tax burden was extremely high — the local indigenous population kept
growing and outpaced the growth of settlers. Thus, given that the railway was intended to be
an instrument that would ease colonial control and security, and hence expand settlement, it
is interesting to see whether or not it helps explain population trends; more specifically, if it
helped consolidate settlement by increasing the number of settlers and decreasing the indigenous
population density.
It would seem reasonable to expect that gaining rail access had a clear positive effect on both
population groups primarily because, as Nouschi (1961) describes, it allowed for competition in
French markets (particularly if waterways were absent) thanks to a higher regional integration
and lower transport costs. Yet the true impact is unclear. On the one hand, one could anticipate
a positive effect on the settler population given that the “colonization and railways were for
the colonists, essential elements in the success of French policies” (Belkacemi, 1984, p. 351),
helping to consolidate rural settlement and facilitating market access. However, on the other
hand, the effect could be negative or null in some regions as the tariff structure highlighted
regional inequalities, favored large producers, and discouraged small cultivators (Belkacemi,
1984; Nouschi, 1961); thus, helping to explain the “crowding out” of the small family farm type
of settlement (see Chapter 2).1
With regard to the indigenous population, the railway effect in the previous literature is also
inconclusive. According to Bennoune (2002), in order to explain its persistent population growth,
many historians on colonial Algeria relied on the hypothesis of the removal of the Malthusian
positive checks. In other words, they found that colonialism improved living standards and
decreased the mortality caused by famines or plagues due to better communications, improved
public health services, human capital, etc. Hence, if this were the case, gaining rail access should
positively affect population growth. However, following S. H. Coontz,2 Bennoune (2002, p. 55)
argues that the indigenous demographic growth was primarily explained by the colonial demand
1Mostly reflected in the relative decline of the rural settler share over the total settler population, which decreased
from 41 percent in 1872 to 35 in 1911 (Ruedy, 2005; Ageron, 1968).
2H. Coontz, Population and the Economic Interpretation (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 192.
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Figure 4.1: Total rural indigenous and settler population,3 French Algeria 1872-1936
Sources: Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie (1948). For further detail see Appendix D.
for labor and, therefore, the Malthusian hypothesis had “to be rejected both on theoretical and
empirical grounds.” This is in line with other authors such as Ruedy (2005), who stated that the
labor demand generated by “the concentration of factors of production in colons hands” played
the major role given that the persistent indigenous growth, together with higher impoverishment
levels, was only feasible if it was accompanied by a growing demand for labor. Then, in this
case, the effect of the railway on the indigenous population should only be positive in regions
were demand for labor was highest; that is, in the proximities of the settlement centers.
Thus, this chapter measures the effect of gaining railway access on the settler and indigenous
population densities. However, as Banerjee et al. (2012, p. 3) argue, the conclusions on the
impact of railway’s will clearly be conditioned by the selected departure point given that “the
first road to connect the agricultural hinterland to a port is very different from the fifth such road.”
For this reason, I restrict the analysis to the regions in which the infrastructure arrived relatively
later in time; that is, during a “second wave” of railway construction in the second half of the
1880s.4 To do this, it uses a differences-in-differences methodology (henceforth, diff-in-diff).
Although the contribution of the railway infrastructure on growth has been studied with very
different techniques – depending on the question to be answered, it has been undertaken by
means of growth accounting or social savings (Fourie and Herranz-Loncan, 2004; Bogart et al.,
2015; Coatsworth, 1979; Fogel, 1979) and economic geography (Fourie and Herranz-Loncan,
2004; Jedwab et al., 2015; Jedwab and Moradi, 2016; Atack et al., 2010; Tang, 2014) – the
diff-in-diff permits the analysis of the differential effect on population between the regions that
3The settler category is proxied by the non-Muslim group while the indigenous population is proxied by the
Muslim category. See Introduction for more detail on terminology.
4The “first wave” began with the construction of the first line built in 1862 and the following boom in the 1870s.
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gained railway access (treated) and those that did not (control).
To undertake this technique, I will first argue that obtaining access in these remote areas
was exogenous to population growth. It is difficult to make such an assumption if economic
development, often proxied by population growth, is found to bring in railway infrastructure.
Yet the sample analyzed covers areas that obtained access relatively later in time. These areas –
some settlement centers and a majority of tribal areas in the municipalities where only a minority
of settlers were just starting to locate (commune mixtes)5 – were not a priority for the colonial
administration for various reasons: some experienced local resistance during occupation, others
were built to extract natural resources, some were necessary to link to Sub-Saharan Africa,
and others were created to achieve an equal and fair regional railway distribution. Thus, the
construction was partly motivated so as to expand settlement, but not as a response to high
population density levels. Additionally, to improve the accuracy of comparison between the
treated and the control groups, I match the observations based on a propensity score matching
technique and restrict the analyzed samples in different ways (i.e., excluding regions with settlers
in 1884 and regions with termini points). I also demonstrate that the regions that received the
railway were not relatively more (or less) disadvantaged in terms of population densities and I
implement an instrumental variable approach to reinforce the results.
The Impact of Railways on the Economy and Population
Several publications in recent years have documented that the introduction of the railway per-
mitted countries to specialize into higher value crops, reshaping their social and production
structures. Market integration grew as hinterland regions, previously marginalized from in-
ternational trade, were now able to participate, benefit from returns to scale, and many times
experience persistent effects on economic development and growth (Jedwab et al., 2015; Jedwab
and Moradi, 2016). Among the effects brought in by railroads, Donaldson (2010) argues that the
lower trade costs and the gaining of comparative advantage increased the level of real agricultural
incomes and decreased the volatility.
In Africa the railroad network is considered to have contributed to the growth of rural
populations, modifying the economic activity of the surrounding areas, and triggering urban
growth. This new infrastructure led to increasing returns to scale that subsequently consolidated
path dependence and set multiple spatial equilibria (Jedwab et al., 2015). According to Yacono
(1993), in Algeria, although numerous routes lacked economic sense or strategic location (e.g.
connecting settlement centers), overall the network had a significant impact as it reinforced and
changed the economic development of the colony. Nouschi (1961) explains that after 1890, when
tariffs were relatively more unified and lowered, the railway infrastructure permitted the settler
and indigenous products, which were negatively affected by the international grain price drop
5Many of these tribal areas were known as douars which were areas or sections to which the Sénatus-Consulte
1863 had been applied; that is, the areas “legally” divided by the colonial state in order to provide land titles and
facilitate land transactions.
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in the 1880s and competition from Tunisian wheat,6 to finally compete in the French market.
Additionally, in a detailed study of Algerian railways, Belkacemi (1984) points out that they
contributed to urban growth, affected the geographical distribution of settlement, increased both
urban and rural populations, and facilitated the implementation of colonial land policy (for
instance, to gather information on indigenous land titles the surveyors would locate along the
railway lines).7 It also increased the area cultivated by Europeans (mainly viticulture and cereals)
and prompted mining industry (iron ore and phosphates) by means of creating new markets,
decreasing transport costs, increasing maritime trade, mobilizing bigger volumes of goods and
people, expanding irrigation, and increasing land values in the neighboring regions.8
However, in line with Coatsworth (1979), the redistribution of economic activity brought in
by the railway could be unequal, lacking backward linkages within a country and exclusively
benefiting the export-led sector. This new infrastructure affected the distribution of land and
the “balance of social forces,” facilitating land grabbing and generating additional labor surplus
(Coatsworth, 1979, p. 958). It highlighted dual economies by redistributing economic activity
and reinforcing ethnic segregation (Herranz-Loncán et al., 2016). In the case of Algeria, the
railway was an instrument through which land policies were consolidated, easing colonial control
and the expansion of settlement. Thus, it probably helped channeling indigenous labor surplus
into the export-led settler sector,9 helping set the path towards the dual economy developed
during the colonial years.
In addition, tariffs were high and thus the impact on agricultural production was limited.
The small farm cultivators, particularly in Constantine, were unable to benefit as they suffered
from relatively high tariffs in comparison to large producers (Nouschi, 1961). And even the
large farming estates, such as the Compagnie genevoise des Colonies suisses, faced prohibitive
tariffs and were unable to compete with grain producers in France (Lützelschwab, 2000, p.
190). The high prices for users, the frequent delays, the uncoordinated timetables (because of
fragmented railway ownership), the lack of specialized labor, and insufficient rolling stock and
station facilities restricted the railroad’s effect on agricultural production (Belkacemi, 1984).
Finally, the effect in some areas was not significant due to their remote localization and the
inadequacy of the line’s planned economic viability with respect to cargo flows and population
movements (Yacono, 1993). Accordingly, based on Auguste Burdeau’s arguments in 1891 in the
Chambre d’Agriculture, Nouschi (1961) explains that, in contrast to the railway experience in
the United States which created economic activity, Algeria lacked the economic life necessary to
render the network profitable.
6After 1890s the imports of Tunisian wheat were exempt from all taxes in the port of Marseilles.
7Belkacemi (1984, p. 334) explains that it was particularly the case for the implementation of the 1873 Warnier
Law which established private property among the Arabs; in particular he states that “In 1885, 1886, and 1887,
surveyors operated particularly along roads and railways.”
8Belkacemi (1984, p.343) provides evidence of cases where irrigation was used as an instrument to improve
fertility and thus ensure the success of the railway infrastructure by means of increasing traffic.
9The export oriented sector, owned entirely by the settler population, relied on the indigenous labor surplus
generated by colonial land policies (Griffin, 1976).
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Therefore it seems reasonable to suggest that the railway’s contribution to the development of
Algeria’s dual economy was manifold: it facilitated growth exclusively for large producers as it
improved access to relatively cheap indigenous waged labor, discouraged small family producers
with high tariffs, and highlighted regional differences by providing comparative advantage to the
regions that gained access or that were endowed with relatively competitive tariffs. Given that,
already prior to independence, the country lacked export diversification and was characterized by
high income and social inequality,10 and that “the dominant characteristic of the Algerian market
was its fragmentation” (Ruedy, 2005, p. 96), it is interesting to examine whether the railway
played a relevant role in this, fitting within the literature linking colonialism and long-term
economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dell, 2010; Allen et al., 2012; Frankema, 2011).
This chapter also adds on research that studies the effect of the railroad on population. The
population density is frequently used as a proxy for economic development and growth (Atack
et al., 2010; Hornung, 2013; Jedwab and Moradi, 2016; Gregory and Henneberg, 2010; Berger
and Enflo, 2015), and most studies tend to find that it responds positively to the arrival of the
railway. For instance, Hornung (2013) argues that the railway positively affected Prussia’s urban
population growth between 1840 and 1871. Gregory and Henneberg (2010) conclude that earlier
access leads to a higher population growth in England and Wales between 1825 and 1911. Atack
et al. (2010), while trying to clarify the bi-directional causality between settlement and economic
development in the American Midwest, find that although the effect on population densities
was insignificant, the impact on the share of population living in urban areas was positive and
significant. Likewise, Berger and Enflo (2015) demonstrate that population growth in towns
was positively and significantly affected by the arrival of the railway during a “first wave” of
railway expansion in Sweden between 1855 and 1870, yet much of it was explained by the
redistribution of economic activity. Finally, Jedwab and Moradi (2016) show that although the
railway in Sub-Saharan Africa was exclusively built to link the coast to the mining centers, the
lower trade costs pushed the nearby rural populations to engage in cocoa production, augmenting
rural populations (as labor demand increased) in the railway’s proximity, raising population in
the urban centers (as trading stations developed), and ultimately affecting the distribution of
economic activity. Hence, following this literature, it is also to be expected that the railway
positively affected overall population density levels.
10As shown by Good (1961), by 1954 the non-Muslim population was fully within the “developed” sector and a
10 percent was located in the rural sector and the rest in non-agricultural activities, whereas Muslims were mainly
located in the agricultural sector (around 70 percent of the total) with about 80 percent of them engaged in the
traditional sector. The source used by Good (1961) is the Tableaux de l’Economie Algérienne, 1958, p. 24 from the
Service Statistique Générale. Additionally, there were only a few Algerian landowners that were able to diversify
into a market economy, but the amount was insignificant relative to the total rural indigenous population (Ageron,
1991; Stuart, 2010).
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4.2 The Railroad in French Algeria
The Geographical Railway Network11
On the African continent the railroad network expanded from almost 1,750 route kilometers in
1871 to nearly 6,600 in 1884. Most of it, about 40 percent, belonged to the British in South Africa,
but almost 30 percent was built in Algeria (Harter, 2005). By 1935 the Algerian network was
comprised of a total of 4,861 kilometers (Direction des Chemins de Fer, 1935).12 Over half of the
French colonial expenses were directed to Algeria and distributed between military expenditure
and the payment of the railroad interest stock (Guarantie d’intérêt) (Bobrie, 1976). According to
Belkacemi (1984), total Algerian colonial investment in the railway infrastructure amounted to
633 million francs, without including the 367 million interest stock paid to shareholders.
It was under Napoleon III that railway construction began in the colony, and the basic overall
structure was completed in the 1890s. It was formed by a main trunk route running parallel
to the coast linking Oran, Alger, and Constantine to other coastal and interior regions.13 The
Constantine railway network, as shown in Figure 4.2, united the ports of Bougie, Philippeville
and Bône and the southern hinterland regions Tébessa, Aïn-Beïda, and Biskra to the central line.
By the end of the 1880s Algeria’s rail system linked Morocco to Tunisia and crossed important
inner cities.14
The Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Algériens (CCFA) was the first company to obtain line
concessions in 1860 for the Philippeville–Constantine, Algiers–Blida, and Oran–Sig routes. It
was a joint-stock company created to consolidate French presence and allow the transport of
natural resources from the hinterland regions to the ports. In 1862 the company inaugurated
eight steam locomotives which carried both passengers and merchandise at a speed of 20 to 25
kilometers per hour between Alger and Blida. Nonetheless, only the Algiers–Blida line was
completed as financial problems soon affected the company which, according to Belkacemi
(1984), were explained by a lack of administrative efficiency and insufficient geographical
studies of relief and climate. Consequently the government had to rely on alternative companies
and by the late 1880s the six railway lines built in Algeria were owned by the East Algerian
Company (CEA), the Franco-Algerian Company, the Parys-Lyon, the Mediterranean Company,
the Bône-Guelma Company (CBG), the West Algerian Company, and Mokta-el Hadid (Harter,
2005).
11Most information on the geographic distribution and expansion of the railway in French Algeria has been
obtained from the webpage http://alger-roi.fr/Alger/transports/chemin_fer/, containing many articles and historic
material on Algeria’s railway’s network. In particular, I have relied on Morton (2000) and Pastor (2001).
12The published statistics from the Direction des Chemins de fer also reports that the network had a total of 809
steam locomotives and 32 electric locomotives. There were a total of 932 traveler wagons, including 13 luxury cars,
4 restaurants, and a total of 40,985 seats. In order of volume the products most transported were cereal, farines,
wine, vinagrettes, beverages, minerals and livestock.
13The latter, together with its coastal vertebrates, was established by the first of the three development plans
designed to create the infrastructure. The first was established in 1857, the second plan began in 1879, and the third
initiated in 1907 and lasted up to 1909.
14It was expected to link Senegal and Gaboon-Congo through the Sahara desert but this was never achieved.
94 Chapter4.BuildItandTheyWilCome?
Figure4.2:MapofConstantineinthe1900s
Source:CEPC(1883)andCVC(1902).TheregionsaredotedifthedensityoftheKabyliaorBerberspeakingpopulation
(owners)overthetotalnumberofhectaresownedbytheindigenouspopulationisaboveone.Formoredetailonsourcesee
AppendixD .
AlEasternlineconcessionsweredistributedbetweentheCEAandtheCBG.Althoughthe
CEAopenedthePhilippevile–ConstantineandConstantine–Sétiflinesbeforethe1880s,15itis
duringthisdecadethatthecompanyﬁnalyﬁnishedtheEasternnetwork.TheMénervile–Sétif
linewascompletedwiththeinaugurationoftheEl-Achir–Sétifsectionin1882andtheEl-
Achir–Ménervilein1886.TheBougie–SétiflinewascompletedwithBougie–Beni-Mançourin
1888andTazmalt–Beni-Mançourin1889.16Thecompanyexpandedintothesouthbybuilding
thetrackel-Guerah–Biskraindiferentsections:Batna–Aïn-Toutain1886,Aïn-Touta–El-
Kantarain1887,andEl-Kantara–Biskrain1888.17 IttheninauguratedAïn-Beida–Ouled-
Rahmounin1889andlater,inthe1900s,expandedtoKhenchela.18TherestoftheConstantine
networkwasassignedtotheCBG,19launchingtheBône–GuelmaandGuelma–Khroubsroutes
15ThePhilippevile–Constantinelineopenedtotrafﬁcin1870andtheConstantine–Sétifconcessionwasin1875
andopenedtoservicein1879.TheCEAwasalsoassignedothertracksbetweenAlgerandConstantine,suchas
Maison–Carée-Almain1877(incirculation1879)andAlma–Ménervilein1878(incirculation1881).
16Bothconcededin1884.
17Theconcessionforaltheselineswasgrantedin1880.
18Theﬁrstlineisconcededin1885whilethesecondin1900.Theprolongationafterthe1900stoKhenchelais
notincludedinthisstudy.
19AlsonamedtheSociétédeConstructiondesBatignolestowhichtheinitialconcessionwasgrantedin1874
andwhoalsoreceivedtheconcessionforthelinefromTunisiatotheAlgerianborderinthelate1870s.
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before the 1880s.20 It then opened Souk-Ahrás–Duvivier in 188121 and spread to the Tunisian
border in 1884.22 Ultimately, the Souk-Ahras–Tébessa track was completed in 1888.23
Build It and They Will Come?24
The methodology measuring the effect of the railway requires clarifying that the reasons behind
the expansion of the infrastructure were exogenous to population growth. This section, mostly
based on Belkacemi’s (1984) thesis French Railways in Algeria, 1805-1990, argues that the
lines built in the 1880s (see the darker lines in Figure 4.2) were established in order to increase
settlement, for strategic purposes (i.e., mainly to consolidate settlement), and as a matter of
regional equality, and therefore they did not relate to the already existent population levels.
Railway expansion was primarily a tool used by the colonial administration to advance
settlement. Belkacemi (1984, p. 322-323) quotes the following report from Burdeau’s House of
Representatives:
Draw a map of Algerian railways and another of the density of European population [. . . ]
and you will notice that the railway is a perfect colonizing river which carries new settlers
and sets them down along its banks.25
According to the author, this was particularly the case during the 1880s in the new open-to-
settlement territories, such as the settlements built between 1881 and 1891 in the High Plains of
Sétif, Batna, and the lands around the Beni-Mançour–Bougie tracks (Belkacemi, 1984, p. 323).
In these regions, which are the ones included in the analysis, the settlers came after the line
and/or were settled in the proximities of a projected line.26
There was also a strong military component that explained the construction of the railway
lines in the regions analyzed. For instance, Belkacemi (p. 321) notes the following statement
from the Courrier d’Oran in 1881:
[France] should construct railways in the territories of hostile (or suspect) tribes and make the
stations military strong point and fortified blockhouses from which to carry out surveillance
and control of the surrounding areas.27
20Within the line Bône–Guelma, the track Bône–Duvivier opened to transit in 1876 while Duvivier–Guelma
opened in 1877. The concession was given in 1877. Khroubs was linked to Constantine by the completion of the
Constantine–Sétif track.
21Conceded to the company in 1877.
22It was conceded in 1882 and the line opened to service the 29th of September 1884. Yet the population data
used in this paper from the TGdC in 1884 dates on the 30th of September, so the probability that the population data
is affected by the railway opening is very low.
23Declared of public utility in order to be built in 1885.
24The quote in the title is commonly attributed to the movie Field of Dreams (1989). In the movie the quote is
“If you build it, he will come.”
25Burdeau, A. L’Algérie en 1891. Rapport de discours à la chambre des députés, Paris, 1892.
26Furthermore, the author argues that the decrease in the creation of colonial villages was explained by the lack
of railway development after 1892.
27From Courrier d’Oran, 19 October 1881.
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Indeed, most of the tracks analyzed in this chapter (i.e., El-Guerra–Batna, Batna–Biskra, Ouled-
Rahmoun–Aïn Beïda, and Duvivier–Souk-Ahrás–Tébéssa) “were all conceived as lignes de
pénétration of only mediocre economic value” and were designed to restrict uprisings and secure
the territory (Belkacemi, 1984, p. 318). In addition, the dotted areas in Figure 4.2 account for the
Kabylia or the southern Aurés and Oases (in the proximities of Batna and Biskra) which were to
be secured as they experienced more indigenous uprisings (in particular, after the 1871 Kabylia
rebellion).28 The map illustrates how the lines connecting Bougie, Constantine, and Philippeville
formed a “defensive outer circle” that would surround the most rebellious regions (Belkacemi,
1984, p. 315). Even the lines linking Tunisia and going south towards Tébessa were built as a
response to the needs of the ministry of war who aimed to secure the Tunisian border, facilitate
occupation, and transport troops directly from Bône (Belkacemi, 1984).
Finally, the factors explaining railway expansion in Constantine were often based on matters
of fairness rather than economic ones. Indeed, regional inequality with regards to railway
expansion – in contrast to the road infrastructure, which was homogeneous throughout the
departments – often became the primary cause of conflict, leading to the formation of pressure
groups in the Conseils Généraux or in the Chambers of Commerce. For instance, traffic to the
port of Bougie severely diminished given that most of the products transported from the plateau
of Sétif went to the ports of Alger and Philippeville.29 According to Belkacemi (1984), the
cause of its lagging behind in trade was the delay in the construction of Bougie’s railway, which
also became a motive for conflict. The author explains that El Guerrah–Batna, Batna–Biskra,
Souk-Ahrás–Tebessa, and Beni-Mançour–Bougie lines proved to be economically inefficient as
they were built based on equity issues.
The Effects of the Railway Network
The effect of the railway on Algeria’s economic activity and population growth is unclear.
On the one hand, economic historians have proven how railway infrastructure increased rural
settlement, contributing both to the growth of population and the creation of settlement centers. It
provided greater security and helped promote the development of towns by attracting merchants,
leading to the establishment of new shops, hotels, etc. (Belkacemi, 1984). Yet, on the other hand,
historians have also argued that the effect was null and that railway expansion highlighted regional
inequalities. As Nouschi (1961) explains, the colony lacked sufficient economic life to render
the network profitable.30 The insignificance of the railways’ impact in some areas was often due
to their remoteness and the inadequacy of the line’s planned economic viability with respect to
trade flows and population movements (Yacono, 1993). This seems to be particularly the case
28The dotted area in Figure 4.2 displays the regions endowed with the highest densities of Kabylie or Berber-
speaking local populations. The data was obtained from the SA(1904/05). See Appendix D for more detail on
sources.
29The three of them were initially built during French occupation for military purposes. The ports of tertiary
importance in Constantine were Djidjelli, Collo, Herbillon and La Calle.
30The author quotes Auguste Burdeau in the Chambre d’Agriculture in 1891.
4.2. The Railroad in French Algeria 97
for the Constantine department and, more specifically, for the regions that gained access during a
“second wave” of railway expansion in the 1880s. In fact, the evidence suggests that the effect of
these railway lines –specifically, El-Guerrah–Batna, Batna–Biskra, Souk-Ahrás–Tébessa, and
Beni-Mançour–Bougie– was essentially null (Belkacemi, 1984).
The railway’s limited impact on economic activity is explained by the high tariffs and
their complex structure. Belkacemi (1984), based on numerous reports from the Chambers
of Commerce and the Conseils Généraux, explains that the tariff structure, in particular that
regarding special tariffs, resulted complex and unclear to users who frequently manifested
their discontent. The tariffs were high and differed across regions; for instance, in 1886 the
cost of transporting cereal in Constantine was 8 cents per ton higher as compared to Oran and
Alger. Similarly, the tariffs in Algeria were higher than those set in France and, despite certain
reductions before 1892, the gap between both territories remained significant (ranging from 25
percent to 50 percent). Additionally, the administrative process required to modify tariffs was
complicated and the incentives were low.31 Indeed, there was a general consensus, reflected
in the 1877 and 1884 parliamentary reports, in the Chambers of Commerce, and the Conseils
Généraux, that the tariff reductions in Algeria did “not really stimulate commercial transactions”
(p. 282).32
One of the reasons explaining the high and regionally unequal tariffs was the lack of route
competition between the railway companies due to their geographical isolation and sharing of
the long-distance lines. The only competition encountered was that based on redirecting the
commercial flows to the ports by means of special tariffs. In Constantine, as Belkacemi (1984,
p. 285) explains, the competition between the CEA, the PLM, and the CBG with regards to
certain commodity flows generated “complaints from disadvantaged regions that the benefits of
reduced tariffs ought to be generalized throughout the colony.” Furthermore, the introduction
of differential tariffs in the late 1880s – that “reduced the value of proximity,” benefiting intra-
termini, long-distance routes, at the expense of the regions relatively near the ports – provided
some producers with an “unfair advantage” while others were negatively affected, especially in
the marginal regions (Belkacemi, 1984, p. 283):
They [the railway companies] were [. . . ] reluctant to extend the benefits of differential
tariffs to undynamic economic regions where traffic was limited and operating costs high.
The ability of the railway companies to engage in seemingly arbitrary tariff policies was
constantly blamed on their monopoly position and the advantages offered by the guarantie
d’intêret system.
31The proposals had to pass through the Gouvernor Général and several colonial bodies, the comité consultatif,
and the minister of public works. Tariff reductions were particularly difficult to approve as they ultimately implied a
lower income for companies and thus, an increase in the guarantée d’intêret paid by the State to finance the railway
(Belkacemi, 1984).
32Belkacemi (1984) relies mainly on the Conseil Général d’Alger, Oct. 1899; Chambre des députés, 1893;
Chambre de commerce de Bone, 1883-84; and Chambre de commerce d’Alger, 1876-77. For more detail on sources
used by the author see (Belkacemi, 1984, p.280-283).
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Even in times when agricultural production was high the effects of the railway were restricted.
The high seasonality of crops, notably in Constantine where cereal cultivation was important,
often provoked shortage crises during high production seasons due to the lack of storage space
in station facilities,33 scarcity of specialized labor, and insufficient rolling stock. Furthermore,
crop seasonality complicated the ability of railway companies to calculate the optimal crop
volume to be transported. This led to an excess of transport capacity throughout the year that
increased expenses, which pushed the companies to lower operating costs, thereby decreasing
capital investment and efficiency (i.e., reduced maintenance, infrequent service, high tariffs).
However, the reduction in operating costs was mostly determined by the type of colonial
railway financing system. To attract private capital, after 1874 the State relied on a forfait (or
fixed rate) state guarantee (guarantie d’intêret) system, granting concessions to companies in
exchange for an annual fixed payment.34 The payment lasted the whole concession term of 99
years and was proportional to the initial capital invested. Thus, the company’s gains did not vary
with its actual yearly expenses so that the incentives were directed to gain profits by decreasing
construction and exploitation costs.35 According to Belkacemi (1984), this system required an
excessive share of the colonial budget (increasing from 10 percent between 1872 and 1878 up to
more than 26 percent after 1888), but it also pushed concessionaries to minimize costs, ultimately
benefiting shareholders and neglecting the economic development of the colony. Therefore, in
addition to the lack of specialized material, such as refrigerated wagons (Nouschi, 1961), the
cuts in operating costs ultimately led to frequent delays and excessive transport time for the
commodities (Belkacemi, 1984).
It is also argued that the railway solely benefited large-scale producers (mainly wine and
cereal) and harmed the small, rural ones. Nouschi (1961, p. 603) explains that the latter were
particularly concerned with the high tariffs. For instance, the tariff by rail between Alger and
Constantine was 27 francs, while one paid by sea through Philippeville was 14.80 francs (out
of which 60 percent of the cost was getting from Constantine to Philippeville by rail). In
Constantine, a small cultivator paid 8.60 francs per ton at a low speed and 19.50 francs per ton
at a fast speed, while large producers benefited from fixed price tariffs for volumes from eight
to ten tonnes, paying 3.70 francs per tonne and 3.37, respectively. In addition, there was no
product differentiation so that using the railway was relatively more expensive for the small
cultivator engaged in cheap products such as barley or wheat. It is also argued that tariffs were
too high for large producers. As an example, (Lützelschwab, 2000, p. 190) describes the case
of the Compagnie genevoise des Colonies suisses, a farming enterprise dedicated to cereal in
the High Plains of Sétif. The company was negatively affected by the delay of the arrival of
33Belkacemi (1984, p. 291) based on the annual reports of ponts et chaussées engineers, argues that these
“criticized the short-comings of goods depots in terms of insufficient area covered by platforms and marshalling
yards, the shortages of equipment such as small cranes and of personnel.”
34Before the State had also provided subsidies for construction.
35There were some exceptions to this (for example, for the CEA) as in some cases the State did take into
consideration annual expenses, yet there was a minimum limit set above which it ceased financing exploitation
costs.
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the railway (after the 1870s);36 yet, once the railway arrived, the tariffs were relatively high
and restrained competition with foreign grains. Small producers were also discouraged by the
enhanced land values; the expansion of the railway pushed land prices upwards as European
speculators demanded more land concessions around the projected areas for the construction
of the railway. The value of a piece of land crossed by a line could vary significantly due to its
proximity to urban areas or the soil quality. For instance, the CEA paid on average 700 francs
per hectare between El-Guerrah–Batna, 310 between Batna and Biskra, and 1,320 for the tracks
between Bougie–Beni-Mançour (Belkacemi, 1984).
4.3 Data and Empirical Model
I study the impact of the railway on population densities using a propensity score method in a
diff-in-diff model between two time intervals: 1884-1892 and 1884-1897. The purpose of this
methodology is to look at the differences in the outcome variables between a treatment group,
formed by areas that gained railway access, and a control group, represented by the ones which
never gained access. The propensity score method allows reducing the potential bias caused by
covariates that could also determine the probability of gaining railway access.
Data Description
Although a significant number of lines were built in the 1870s, the darker lines in figure 4.3 show
the sections that opened to service between 1884 and 1892. The regions affected by the darker
lines are the ones analyzed in this study, allowing the examination of the impact of the railways
on the population density for the years 1892 and 1897. The units of observation, which I will
refer to as “areas” or “regions,” are mainly settlement centers and douars whose population data
is available for the relevant years and that did not experience any territorial changes between 1884
and 1897. The dependent variable is the population density per hectare, accounting separately for
the settler and the indigenous populations. This is in line with numerous authors that, in order to
measure the effect of the railway infrastructure, use the population density or urbanization levels
as a proxy for economic development and growth (Atack et al., 2010; Hornung, 2013; Jedwab
and Moradi, 2016; Gregory and Henneberg, 2010; Berger and Enflo, 2015). The treated variable
accounts for the distance to the nearest railway station: it takes the value of 1 if the distance
between the region’s centroid and the nearest railway station is lower than 20 km (D_<20km)
and 10 km (D_<10km) progressively, and 0 in the opposite case.
The years being analyzed coincide with the population data available in the TGdC (Tableau
Général ... des Communes) for the relevant years (see Appendix D for details). These statistics
were published by the General Government of Algeria (GGA). They provide information on
36The lack of communication infrastructure forced the company to rely on intermediaries/traders to trade its
products. Thus, when cereal yields were scarce, the barley was sold to the Kabylia populations and the rest to the
Saharan populations in the Southern regions.
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Figure 4.3: Selected regional sample: full and restricted, Constantine between 1884 and 1897
Source: CEPC (1883), CVC (1902), and CCO (1902). See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
population densities and cover both the civil and military territory.37 The General Governor was
in charge of providing yearly statistical information to the French Parliament on the colony’s
progress. He also indicated how the prefects in Algeria should adapt to the French data-collection
system (Kateb, 2004). However, Algeria was very different, in particular with regards to the
presence of nomadic populations.38 Thus, the applied census technique changed according to the
surveyed population category; namely, the populations in the civil territory and the ones located
in the settlement centers in the military territory completed a family questionnaire, while the
populations in the tribal areas within the military territory were inferred by counting the number
of tents (assuming that each tent hosted five to seven people). Hence, this study is limited to
the civil territory, and thus the results are less affected by the differences in the data-collection
methodology.
The data has a unique spatial detail that goes beyond the municipalities and is subdivided
37The 1884 volume reflects the state of the population situation on the 30th of September while the 1892 and
1897 volumes refer to the 1st of January.
38Griffin (1976) explains that in Algeria, in addition to the sedentary indigenous rural owner or fellah, there
were the semi-nomads and nomads. Among the semi-nomads, some moved continuously from one area to the next
depending on the pasture, while others changed from a summer camp to a winter camp. Yet these groups did not
move from their tribal area and thus, should not affect my analysis, as my unit of observation is the tribal unit. The
nomads, however, did leave their tribal areas: in the spring they moved from the southern regions in the Sahara to
the north and returned in October.
4.3. Data and Empirical Model 101
into settlement centers (centres), plots of land (fermes), tribal areas or fractions, and douars
(i.e., the tribal areas to which the sénatus-consulte had been applied). Given that the previous
chapters have focused on municipalities, it is interesting to study a different unit of observation.
Indeed, the territorial division in French Algeria reflected very diverse regions regarding both the
administrative organization and the population structure. As previously explained, the territory
was divided into three departments that were then subdivided into municipalities or communes
(i.e., communes de plein exercice (CPE), communes mixtes (CM), and communes indigènes (CI)).
This study exclusively covers the CPE and CM as these were the ones controlled by France in
the Northern part of Algeria during the years analyzed. The majority of settlers located in the
CPE, which were the municipalities under French rule and where the colonial administration was
elected. In the CM, on the other hand, the majority of the population was indigenous; these were
the municipalities where the colonial Administrateur was chosen by the general government
and were governed under Islamic law. The latter, which were projected to be future CPE, were
mainly tribal areas and douars, included military posts, and were regions with none (or very few)
settlers; only a few of them were beginning to engage in commercial or industrial activities.
It is within the type of data used that I can encounter two types of selection bias that affect the
diff-in-diff approach. On the one hand, the composition of each group might change throughout
the analyzed period; yet this is not a problem since all the regions included in the analysis cover
the same territorial areas between 1884 and 1897.39 On the other hand, the selected groups
might differ significantly between them leading to biased results. In other words, regions that
experienced railway access might differ from the ones that did not in ways that can differently
affect their trends in time without being uniquely explained by gaining the railway. Empirically,
this selection bias would require the assumption that the railroad arrival was a random event
so that, in absence of the treatment, both treated and control groups would have followed the
same trends in time. Although this assumption is not directly testable, it is possible to provide
robustness checks to the results by undertaking an instrumental variable approach or using
pre-treatment data to test for the parallel trend assumption (Atack and Margo, 2011; Atack
et al., 2010). However, given the limited data available, it is not possible to implement the
pre-treatment test. For this reason I first argue that gaining railway access was exogenous
to population growth, I then demonstrate that the regions that received the railway were not
relatively more or less disadvantaged in terms of population densities, I restrict the sample in
various ways to compare regions which should behave equally, control for termini points, apply
a propensity score matching technique, and I finally use an instrumental variable approach to
reinforce the results.
The sample selection leads to a bias which helps support the exogeneity assumption. The
39The results might be slightly affected by the displacement of the nomad population given that the 1884 TGdC
reports the population on September 30th and the 1892 and 1897 provide the information for the 1st of January.
However, I rely on the assumption that the nomadic population was not reported throughout the analyzed years.
Indeed, based on the research from Kateb (2004), the registration of civil status in the Sahara did not begin until
1901 and the nomads escaped registration.
102 Chapter 4. Build It and They Will Come?
reasoning is the following:
First, matching the data between 1884 and 1897 requires omitting the areas that experienced
boundary changes throughout the period. Hence, the sample selection was biased towards
non-attractive regions for settlement. This is because the attractive ones were continuously being
occupied and expanded, having the highest probability of experiencing territorial modifications
and, therefore, of not being included in the sample. This allows one to infer that population
pressure in these areas would not be a major force explaining the construction of the railway.
Indeed, within all the regions matched for both 1884 and 1897 for all Constantine, only 30
percent had at least one settlement point (i.e., towns, villages, settlement centers, villes, hamlets,
and individual plots), suggesting that the regions that could potentially affect the probability of
gaining rail access were only a low share.40
Second, the treatment sample is limited to areas that experienced railway access “relatively”
later in time during the colonial years. As explained in the previous section, the first railway line
was built in 1862 by CCFA and the rest was mostly constructed in the 1870s. The areas of track
taken into consideration in this analysis are Batna–Biskra, Souk-Ahrás–Duvivier, Souk-Ahrás to
Tunisia, Ouled-Rahmoun–Aïn Beïda, El Achir–Beni-Mançour, and Beni-Mançour–Bougie. The
Dictionnaire des Communes (DdC) in 1878, together with secondary literature, provide insights
as to why the railway would go to these termini points. Aïn Beïda was endowed with mineral
natural resources (such as silver, lead, antimony, iron, and natural salt resources) and extensive
forests. The El-Guerrah–Batna, Batna–Biskra, Ouhled-Rahmoun–Aïn-Beïda lines were “lignes
de pénétration of only mediocre economic value” but were of strategical military interest (see
prior section). The first two “penetrated the heart of the two most rebellious regions in the colony”
and the Souk-Ahrás–Tébessa line was to “secure the border to Tunisia” (Belkacemi, 1984, p.318).
Souk-Ahrás was basically located on the line projected to the Tunisian border. Additionally,
Belkacemi (1984) explains that the line concessions of Batna–Biskra, Souk-Ahrás–Tébessa, and
Beni-Mançour–Bougie were built as a response to equality considerations, namely achieving the
same infrastructure distribution throughout Algeria, rather than economic motives. For instance,
the construction of the Bougie and Beni-Mançour track, which was continuously delayed due
to indigenous resistance in the Kabylia, was finally completed as a response to the pressure
groups demanding equal terms. Hence, this example also supports the argument that the colonial
administration did not grant these concessions based on population density levels.
One might additionally argue that even though the reasons explaining the creation of the
posterior lines were exogenous to the settlement of population, it seems reasonable that the
railway companies in charge of building the infrastructure, by means of governments concessions,
ultimately obeyed the colonial administration’s goal of increasing and consolidating settlement.
Additionally, it is logical to suggest that it is within a company’s economic interest to run
through populated regions and increase traffic. Yet, as Belkacemi (1984) argues, although both
the companies and the administration shared the same interest, the former did not respond or
40From a total of 336 areas only 101 had a settlement point.
4.3. Data and Empirical Model 103
subordinate to the administration’s demands. As stated by Belkacemi (1984, p. 340-341), not
only did the “state did not have a free hand policy on colonial questions related to the railways”
over the companies, but it was the companies who many times influenced and pressured the
administration’s decisions on the location of settlement centers. In addition, as argued in the
prior section, the tariff structure set in Algeria did not provide incentives (in particular in the
remote areas) to increase the commercial value of railways, pushing the companies to increase
income by reducing costs (Belkacemi, 1984). Thus, although the first lines were built based on
economic and population considerations, the ones included in the sample were not dependent on
population – particularly as they passed through more rebellious regions– and even though the
colonial administration expected to expand settlement and secure those areas, the companies did
not respond to the administration’s demands.
In order to further overcome the potential bias because of the exogeneity assumption – i.e.
the railway was constructed in regions with a higher potential for population growth – I divide
the observations into a “full” and a “restricted” sample (see Figure 4.3). The full sample includes
all the observations with available data for 1884, 1892, and 1897, and with no boundary changes
throughout those years. The restricted sample includes only the regions that had few or no
settlers in 1884. By looking at the DdC in 1884 it is possible to see that the regions which were
“developed” from a settlement point of view (with a colonial school or church) in the full sample
were endowed with at least 50 settlers,41 and the regions with less that 30 settlers were mostly
used as caravan areas or remote military posts. Hence, I limit the restricted sample to areas with
less than 30 settlers in 1884.42 About 90 percent of these regions are douars and tribal areas that
were highly restricted to settlement, reinforcing the conclusion that the impact of the railway
in the latter was not induced by European presence or planned colonization centers. Moreover,
given that these regions do not appear to be colonization centers in the 1902 official colonization
map (COC), it is reasonable to assume that they were not projected settlements in 1884. Based
on the box plot in Figure C.4, I provide an additional test by limiting both the full and restricted
sample to the regions with the indigenous population density value below 2 in order to exclude
extreme outside values in the control group and increase comparability.
It is also necessary to test whether if, prior to the arrival of the railway, the regions that gained
access were relatively more advantaged (or disadvantaged) in terms of population densities in
comparison to the non-connected ones. First of all, the data shows very low or almost zero
correlations in 1884 between the indigenous and settler population density (in both the full
and restricted samples) and the dummy variable for the treatment (equal to 1 if the region
gained railway access and 0 if it did not).43 Additionally, with respect to the settler population,
41As an exception, only one hamlet (hameaux) with 66 settlers had a school.
42Which is almost equivalent to 0.0002 per hectare in 1884 and 0.0005 in 1897.
43In the restricted sample the correlation between the settler population density and the treated variable in 1884
at a distance below 20 km is -0.05 (N=206) and -0.02 (N=206) for the one below 10 km. For the full sample the
correlation is -0.02 (N=256) and 0.02 (N=256) respectively. The correlation in 1884 for the restricted sample
between the indigenous population density and the treated dummy at less than 20 km is 0.08 (N=206) and 0.18
(N=206) for the distance below 10 km. In the full sample, the correlations are 0.002 (N=256) and 0.04 (N=256)
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although Figure C.1 shows that the means of the non-connected regions are higher, a t-test on
their differences for the restricted and full samples in the year 1884 are not significant at a 1
percent confidence level.44 Furthermore, the box plot in Figure C.3 displays the variations in
the total settler population sample in 1884. It shows that the median is approximately zero
and that, despite numerous outliers, the highest value is of two settlers per hectare. Thus, it
seems reasonable to assume that the railway in the regions under study was not attracted by
a high settlement. With regard to the indigenous population, although the density is higher
in the treated sample, the differences in means are also insignificant (except for the restricted
sample at a distance below 10 km).45 Thus, the correlations and mean differences suggest that
the railway companies and the colonial administration in these locations were not based on
population pre-conditions. However, the data available does not permit an examination of the
pre-treatment trend, which would allow one to see whether the population growth rates were
significantly different. As a final check, I also exclude from the sample the termini point (that is,
population nuclei which were historic cities or endowed with natural resources).46
Methology and Results
The tables below show the baseline differences in means (and significance) accounting for both
the restricted and full sample and with and without the termini points. The Tables 4.1 and 4.2
show that, with regard to the settler population, the share of observations in the treated sample
range from 10 to 25 percent. The differences in means are negative and not significant for the
years 1884 and 1892 but the t-values are not far from their critical values. The significance
decreases for the period 1884 and 1897 and some values become positive. With respect to
the indigenous population, the results displayed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that the values are
consistently positive, insignificant for the period 1884 and 1892, and for the period 1884 and
1897 the t-values are near the critical values. Thus, the results from these tables suggest that
the effect of the railway was, in general, null for populations located in remote areas. However,
the near-significance level of some estimates – the negative effect on settler density between
1884 and 1892 and the positive effect on the indigenous population between 1884 and 1897 –
suggest that the results might become significant if the estimation methodology improves group
comparability.
The effect of gaining railway access on population density is estimated by applying a cross-
section regression by OLS for European and indigenous populations. The equation is the
following:
respectively.
44This result is consistent for the distance below 20 km and 10 km.
45But it is not significant at a 1 percent confidence level and the differences are not significant for the rest of
cases.
46However, given that the analysis is also restricted to the relatively remote areas that were not a priority for
railway construction, the number of termini points excluded from the sample is low.
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PopDensi,t = β0Raili + β1Dyeart + β2X
′
i,t + β3(DRaili,t ∗Dyeart) + i,t
The dependent variable is the population density for region i in year t, which can take the
values 1884, 1892, and 1897. The equations will be separately estimated for the settler and
indigenous population. The variable DRaili,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the region
i experienced railway access between 1884 and 1892 (or 1884 and 1897) and 0 if not. The
municipalities are divided into two subsamples depending on the proximity from the region’s
centroid to the nearest railway station (in a straight line): below 20 kilometers and below 10
kilometers. Dyeart is a dummy equal to 1 if the year is post-treatment (1892 or 1897) and 0 if
it is the pre-treatment year (1884). As the number of observations is limited for both samples,
particularly for the treatment group (see Tables 4.1 to 4.4), the number of control variables was
restricted in vector X to the average elevation of the area under study. This is because, based
on Algeria’s history, it seems an accurate exogenous variable that reflects the differences in the
geographic location and distribution of both populations: while settlers tended to settle on the
coastal plains, the indigenous populations were relatively concentrated in the hilly areas (in
particular, in the Kabylia region in the Eastern part of Constantine). In addition, it could have
affected the probability of gaining access given that the gradient determined the speed of trains
and increased fuel consumption and thus, was taken into consideration when building a line
(Belkacemi, 1984). Finally, the diff-in-diff estimate is β3.
Table 4.1: Base diff-in-diff: settler population density, Constantine 1884 and 1892
RESTRICTED SAMPLE FULL SAMPLE
No termini With termini No termini
N 1884 1892 1892-1884 (DD) N 1884 1892 1892-1884 (DD) N 1884 1892 1892-1884 (DD)
Distance from station < 20 km Distance from station <20 km Distance from station <20 km
Treatment 49 0.13 0.115 -0.015 64 0.017 0.019 0.002 61 0.011 0.011 0.000
Control 157 0.243 1.086 0.843 192 0.023 0.033 0.010 191 0.018 0.024 0.006
T-C -0.113 -0.97 -0.858 -0.006 -0.01 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006
(0.712) (0.005) (0.004)
Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km
Treatment 23 0.166 0.042 -0.124 37 0.027 0.030 0.003 34 0.018 0.018 0.000
Control 183 0.223 0.957 0.734 219 0.021 0.029 0.008 218 0.016 0.021 0.005
T-C -0.057 -0.915 -0.858 0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.614) (0.005) (0.003)
In addition this section implements a propensity score matching to assure comparability
between the groups by balancing them according to certain baseline characteristics (Stuart et al.,
2014; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Stuart, 2010). This methodology estimates the probability
of belonging to the treatment group in the baseline period using a multinomial logistic regression.
That is, it predicts the probability of gaining access to the railway given the average elevation.
It then assigns a weight to each observation based on the estimated probability, allowing the
matching of the areas with similar probabilities so that it is possible to compare them. In
other words, the treated areas are matched with the control sample areas that share similar
characteristics so that the parallel trend assumption between both groups is more realistic. Hence,
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Table 4.2: Base diff-in-diff: settler population density, Constantine 1884 and 1897
RESTRICTED SAMPLE FULL SAMPLE
No termini With termini No termini
N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD)
Distance from station < 20 km Distance from station <20 km Distance from station <20 km
Treatment 49 0.13 0.769 0.639 64 0.017 0.028 0.011 61 0.011 0.019 0.008
Control 157 0.243 1.261 1.018 192 0.023 0.036 0.013 191 0.018 0.026 0.008
T-C -0.113 -0.492 -0.379 -0.006 -0.01 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 0.000
(0.625) (0.009) (0.007)
Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km
Treatment 23 0.166 1.085 0.919 37 0.027 0.046 0.019 34 0.018 0.030 0.012
Control 183 0.223 1.152 0.929 219 0.021 0.032 0.011 218 0.016 0.023 0.007
T-C -0.057 -0.067 -0.01 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.005
(0.594) (0.011) (0.010)
Table 4.3: Base diff-in-diff: indigenous population density, Constantine 1884 and 1892
RESTRICTED SAMPLE FULL SAMPLE
No termini With termini No termini
N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD)
Distance from station < 20 km Distance from station <20 km Distance from station <20 km
Treatment 49 0.347 0.441 0.094 64 0.298 0.380 0.082 61 0.295 0.382 0.087
Control 157 0.286 0.350 0.064 192 0.295 0.361 0.066 191 0.287 0.350 0.063
T-C 0.061 0.091 0.030 0.003 0.019 0.016 0.008 0.032 0.024
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km
Treatment 23 0.166 1.085 0.919 37 0.027 0.046 0.019 34 0.018 0.030 0.012
Control 183 0.223 1.152 0.929 219 0.021 0.032 0.011 218 0.016 0.023 0.007
T-C -0.057 -0.067 -0.01 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.005
(0.594) (0.011) (0.010)
Table 4.4: Base diff-in-diff: indigenous population density, Constantine 1884 and 1897
RESTRICTED SAMPLE FULL SAMPLE
No termini With termini No termini
N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD) N 1884 1897 1897-1884 (DD)
Distance from station < 20 km Distance from station <20 km Distance from station <20 km
Treatment 49 0.347 0.478 0.131 64 0.298 0.420 0.122 61 0.295 0.412 0.117
Control 157 0.286 0.372 0.086 192 0.295 0.382 0.087 191 0.287 0.370 0.083
T-C 0.061 0.106 0.045 0.003 0.038 0.035 0.008 0.042 0.034
(0.043) (0.033) (0.033)
Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km Distance from station < 10 km
Treatment 23 0.457 0.616 0.159 37 0.336 0.471 0.135 34 0.336 0.463 0.127
Control 183 0.281 0.370 0.089 219 0.289 0.378 0.089 218 0.282 0.367 0.085
T-C 0.176 0.246 0.070 0.047 0.093 0.046 0.054 0.096 0.042
(0.046) (0.029) (0.030)
Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Source: TGdC (1884), TGdC (1892), and TGdC (1897). For detail see Appendix D.
by taking advantage of GIS software, the average elevation (elevation) is included to estimate
the propensity score.47 This methodology should provide consistent estimates of the treatment
effect if the bias is caused by the covariates included in the estimation.
47This methodology requires two assumptions regarding elevation: that of conditional independence (i.e., once
you control for elevation, the potential density of population is independent of gaining railway access) and the
common support (for each value of elevation the probability of being treated (or not) is positive).
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Table C.4 in the Appendix C shows that, within the areas in which no settlers were located
in 1884 (and thus in which there were no schools, churches, hospitals, etc.), the proximity to
a railway station had a negative but insignificant effect on the settler density levels. In the full
sample the value is null. Thus, increasing access in remote areas through the construction of the
railway was not effective in terms of increasing settler population. Table C.6 shows that, though
insignificant, the results change slightly if we broaden the year range up to 1897, becoming
positive (particularly in the full sample) as we reach the areas closest to the railway station.
Overall, the results suggest that gaining railway access in these remote regions had no effect on
the settlement population density.
With respect to indigenous population density for the years 1882 and 1892, Table C.5 reflects
that in both the restricted and full sample the effect of the railway increases as the region gets
nearer to the station, but it is not significant. The results shown in Table C.7 for the years 1884
and 1897 display higher values in general and, although all of them are not far from the t-values,
they are only significant in the full sample when the distance is below 10 km and if the termini
points are included. Thus, the results obtained show that the railway had a positive and significant
effect on the indigenous population only in the regions that already had settlers and were closer
to the railway station.
In addition to the propensity score matching technique, based on the box plots in Appendix
C (Figures C.3 and C.4), I drop the areas endowed with extreme outside values of indigenous
population density (I set the limit above the value of 2). This should increase the similarity
between the control and treatment groups. The main difference from the previous results is that
the settler population, as displayed in Table C.10, becomes significant in the full sample between
the years 1884 and 1897. The indigenous population, as shown in Tables C.9 and C.11, does
not seem to be affected by the construction of the railway and thus the prior results were likely
affected by the outside values. Hence, if the latter are excluded, the settlers were positively
affected by the infrastructure and the indigenous population was not.
As a final check and in line with authors such as Atack et al. (2010); Banerjee et al. (2012,?);
Berger and Enflo (2015), I carry out an instrumental variable approach. Although I have argued
that the railway infrastructure in the regions analyzed was built based on reasons exogenous to
population levels, there might be variables explaining the population density levels that could
have also affected the probability of gaining access to the railway. This is why it is necessary
to find an exogenous variable that predicts gaining railway access but that does not correlate to
indigenous and settler population density.
I created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the region has any natural resources or if it is a
strategic location, and equal to 0 in the opposite case. To do this I extracted the data from the
1878 Dictionnaire des Communes, Villes & Villages de l’Algérie (DCVVA), a report containing
information on the administrative condition, the geographic situation, and facilities such as the
number of schools, prisons, courts, gendarmeries, banks, etc.48 The variable is equal to 1 if it
48Occasionally, this process required interpretation of the data in order to complement some information. For
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has natural resources such as silver mines, antimony, iron, salt, cedar, oak forests, lead, and
16 thousand palm trees (in the case of El-Kantara). The dummy variable is also equal to 1 if
the region is of strategical relevance. For example, whether it has a primary fort such as the
one in Constantine, if the region was projected to be populated, if it was a military subdivision
(Batna and Sétif), a geographically strategic position (for instance, Biskra was an on the way
to the South and in the proximities of the Caïdat and an oasis), or relevant Arab markets for
commercial exchange.49 As Figure C.5 shows, I then drew straight lines linking each of them to
the nearest one or to the closest important port (i.e., Bône, Philippeville, and Bougie),50 avoiding
the mountainous regions (trying to capture the least costly and most feasible route).
As shown in the pair-wise correlation matrix in the Appendix C, the correlation between the
instrument and the population density levels is null, whereas it is high (above 50 percent) and
significant (at a 1 percent confidence level) with respect to the treatment variable (i.e., D<20km
and D<10 km). The results using the instrumental variable displayed in Tables C.12 and C.13
provide similar insights: gaining railway access in remote areas was ineffective with regards
to settlement expansion, particularly in the areas with no settlers in 1884 (and thus no colonial
infrastructure development). However, the results do show a positive and significant effect on
the indigenous population density. The full sample, which includes the settlement centers and
thus captures the regions with colonial agriculture, suggests that indigenous population growth
did respond to the infrastructure in the regions where demand for labor was higher. Thus, the
results suggest that the construction of railway lines allowed the demand for indigenous labor to
meet the supply more “easily.” However, this conclusion is hypothetical given that there is no
sub-municipal data on agricultural production. Nonetheless, if I relate the data at a municipal
level from the SA to the sub-municipal one used in this chapter it is possible to support the “labor
demand” hypothesis argued by Bennoune (2002); Coontz (1957); Ruedy (2005): the correlation,
conditional to the regions that gained access to the railway, between indigenous population
instance, in the case of Tébessa it was useful to look at the posterior 1903 DCVVA regarding natural resources
or military strategy. Additionally, sometimes names of locations appeared duplicated; for example, El-Ghedir, is
reported as a hamlet on the route between Bône and Souk-Ahrás and as a douar in the CM El-Arrouch.
49I include Sigus as it was on the route between Constantine and Aïn Beïda and was being populated prior to
the construction of the railway (Bône). Similarly, I include Sidi Mesrich, that was on the route between Bône and
Constantine and being populated. I also include a strategic passage that was key to the Alger-Constantine route
between mountains named Ports-de-Fer in Bibans. Tébessa is included as it was a gateway to the south and the
frontier with Tunisia, and in 1903 it was considered to have abundant water and plains and buildings constructed
before 72 AC. Souk Ahrás is included as it appears on the national projected route from Constantine to Tunisia
and is endowed with lead, copper, and zinc mines. I Include Bordj Bou Arreridj as it has a military post but also a
sandstone quarry of easy cut stone and is on the way between Sétif and Alger. I also include three Arab markets
which should capture important traditional exchange areas. I do not include military posts in remote areas that
are not on the way to any strategic location (such as Takitount or M’Sila). Nor do I include Tizi N’Bechar which,
despite being populated, is too remote and does not go to any strategic region.
50The main port in Constantine was Bône, followed by Philippeville and Bougie. These were built during French
occupation for military purposes and after the 1850s trade began to expand, particularly because of tariff changes. I
do not include the tertiary ports Djidjelli, Collo, Herbillon and La Calle. Additionally, even though some of these
tertiary ports were endowed with natural resources (near La Calle there was a rich lead mine and next to Collo there
was an important forest), they are not included given that transport by sea was cheaper than building a whole railway
line that would link them to the main ports.
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density (at a settlement center or douar level) and the indigenous wages per day (at a municipal
level) is negative and significant, and that with respect to the share of wine-cultivated hectares
over the total settler cultivated area is positive and significant.51
Finally, it is unclear whether the population changes brought in by the railway reflect increases
in natural growth rates as a response to the creation of newer economic activity, or if they are
simply accounting for the displacement of population. If the effect is partly explained by the
redistribution of economic activity across regions, then the coefficients obtained should be
overestimating the impact of the railway on population. Thus, following a similar methodology
as the one used by Berger (2016) and Redding and Turner (2014), I selected a baseline regression
– I chose the propensity score diff-in-diff model where the treated group are the regions below
10 km from the nearest railway station – and drop the nearby areas sequentially to see if the
coefficients change significantly. If part of the explanation is redistribution of population, then the
coefficients would decrease. This is because the regions experiencing the outward movement of
population are dropped from the control group decreasing the differential effect of the railway.52
The tables C.14 and C.15 display these results. With regards to the settler population, the size of
the coefficients shows a strong decrease only when the regions below 20 km are dropped in the
restricted sample.53 The indigenous population density decreases when the regions below 10
km are excluded but the coefficients do not change significantly. These results support that the
redistribution of population into the nearby regions also explains the observed changes.
4.4 Conclusions
There is extensive research that demonstrates that gaining railway access had a positive effect on
economic growth by allowing previously unconnected regions to gain competitive advantage
and integrate in the market economy. Yet few studies examine the regions that were unable to
do so. This chapter studies the effect of the railway infrastructure on population densities in
“remote” or “marginal” regions – that is, those not prioritized by the colonial administration and
that gained access during a “second wave” of construction in the 1880s – in the Constantine
region in French Algeria. To do this, I have used a diff-in-diff model on two time intervals
(1884-1892 and 1884-1897) and improved the accuracy of comparison between the treated and
the control groups by matching the observations based on a propensity score matching technique.
The results show that the railway effect was mainly insignificant. On the one hand, the settler
51At a distance lower than 10 km, the correlation is -0.29 with indigenous wages and 0.30 with the share of wine
over the total cultivated area. At a distance below 20 km, the correlation is -0.23 and 0.46 respectively.
52If there is redistribution, then there will be a stronger population difference between the treatment group (with
higher levels as it receives the population inflows) and the control group (with lower levels as it experiences the
outflows). But if we progressively drop from the control group the nearby regions that potentially experienced the
outflows, then the difference should decrease, while if there is no redistribution the coefficient is solely accounting
for natural growth.
53This result must be regarded with extreme caution as the number of settler in the restricted sample is extremely
low and thus the results are very vulnerable to changes.
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population density displayed negative values and did not benefit from the infrastructure. On
the other hand, the indigenous population, with consistently positive growth rates, responded
positively to the railway only in the regions nearest to the stations (at a distance of ten kilometers
or less) and where settlers were already located.
Overall, these results are consistent with the existing literature on Algerian railways. The
insignificant effects can mainly be explained by the high levels of and regional differences
in the prices of tariffs and their complex structures, which ultimately highlighted regional
inequalities within Constantine itself. The estimated size of the coefficients is likely inaccurate
due to the difficulty in measuring the populations in these areas during the colonial period,
and in particular the one regarding the indigenous population.54 However, the signs are in line
with the historiography. The negative effect with respect to the settler population confirms
the “crowding out” of the small rural settlers and the administration’s failure to consolidate
a small farm economy. Furthermore, as explained previously, the high and multiple tariffs
disadvantaged small producers. With respect to the indigenous population, the positive effect
is logical given that, as Good (1961) explains, after the critical years prior to 1872 in which
population decreased (caused by epidemics, drought, famine, and the Kabylia rebellion), growth
rates recovered and displayed continuous positive figures due to natural population growth.
According to some authors, such as Bennoune (2002) and Ruedy (2005), persistent growth rates
within an impoverished context (i.e., the cultivable land was expropriated and exhausted, the
tribal areas had been legally circumscribed, and the tax burden was extremely high) were only
feasible if the demand for labor was strong enough. These results support this view and show
that indigenous population growth was positively affected by the railway only in the regions
settled by Europeans and nearest to the railway stations.
54See Appendix D for more detail on coverage and data problems.
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Conclusion
This thesis uses newly collected agricultural data for the Constantine department in French
Algeria at the turn of the twentieth century to disentangle the mechanisms through which some
variables – commonly regarded as the “colonial origins” of land inequality within standard
economic history and development research – shape agrarian structures in settler economies. In
contrast to numerous studies that neglect within country differences in colonial land appropriation
and redistribution policies, this study relies upon these differences to understand the process of
settlement. By analyzing the regional variation in the timing of settlement, one can see more
clearly the mechanisms through which geography, factor endowments, and institutions interact
and shape rural economies.
Chapter 2 focuses on the institutional determinants of rural settlement. It examines the relation
between agricultural settler density – a variable that accounts for the French rural settlement
failure – and property size distribution at a municipal level. It argues that the institutional
restrictions on property size – which were particularly strict during the nineteenth century as a
result of the state-organized settlement policy – had a progressively weaker direct influence on
family farm settlement, ultimately allowing land amalgamation in the later settled (or frontier)
regions and thus help explain the crowding-out of small family settlers. In addition, the results
show that a higher density of road infrastructure, mostly built by colonial institutions, also played
an important role, having a positive effect on rural settlers and hindering land concentration.
Finally, although it is not possible to make any causality conclusions, the inclusion of indigenous
owners (as a proxy for indigenous agency) shows that the latter positively related to family farm
settlers. Overall, the results suggest that the institutional variables – channeled through land
policies and infrastructures – had the strongest effect on the outcome of rural settlement and land
concentration.
From a different perspective, Chapter 3 examines local endowments – that is, the relative
supply of production factors – to explain the higher presence of large ownership in the frontier
regions. It argues that settlers, in order to innovate and cultivate the more arid frontier regions,
needed to adopt labor intensive agricultural techniques. However, given the limited possibilities
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to reduce production costs in the frontier, the relative high labor-to-land ratios were essential
to participate in cash crop grain production. Thus, agricultural intensification in the frontier
ultimately depended on the colonial land expropriation policies that facilitated a labor surplus
and decreased restrictions on property size. In addition, the modern farming techniques required
a larger capital investment, including the purchase of land, buying and feeding draft animals,
agricultural machinery, seasonal labor, interests on capital, repairs and machinery depreciation,
which ultimately explains the lower small family farm settler density.
Following the conclusions in Chapter 2 suggesting that road infrastructure hindered land
concentration and positively affected rural settlers, Chapter 4 examines whether the railway –
the most significant colonial investment – had a also a positive effect on rural settlement in the
relatively remote and mostly tribal regions that were not prioritized by the colonial administration
and thus gained access only during a “second wave” of construction in the 1880s. In contrast to
numerous research finding that gaining rail access had a positive effect on population densities,
the results show that the effect was insignificant. This is in line with studies arguing that the
high and multiple tariffs in Constantine increased regional inequalities and disadvantaged small
producers. In addition, I find that the indigenous population, which consistently displayed
positive growth rates, was positively affected by the railway only in the regions nearest to the
stations (below ten kilometers) and where settlers were already located. This suggests that
the railway worked as a colonial instrument that facilitated labor surplus, having an effect on
indigenous populations only in the regions where the demand for labor was big enough.
The hypotheses provided in economic history on the transmission channels from colonial
legacies to long term growth and development tend to oversimplify reality. However, they allow
building more complex conceptual frameworks. This thesis provides a more detailed analysis as
to how institutions and factor endowments interacted in a settler economy. Chapter 2 focuses
directly on the land market policies introduced with colonialism. As Frankema (2010, p. 421)
explains, the “metropolitan institutions perspective” set forth by North et al. (2000) states that
colonial land distribution was mainly determined by “metropolitan objectives, preferences, and
traditions, rather than by local conditions.” Yet, the case of French Algeria shows that land market
policies had to adapt to Algeria’s land aridity and ultimately sacrifice the ideal of a small family
farm economy (by means of withdrawing regulations on property size). This highlights how
factor endowments affect structure of landholdings through institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff,
2002; Easterly, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Fenske, 2014). On the other hand, Chapter 3
shows how innovation in agricultural production helped overcome geographic constrains in the
frontier regions. Yet, in line with research linking agricultural intensification and the land-to-
labor ratio in pre-industrial societies (Boserup, 1965), innovation depended on indigenous labor
availability. The institutional land expropriation policies helped release this labor into the large
and extensive landholdings at the frontier. In addition, the results in the last chapter suggest that
the colonial railway facilitated indigenous labor in settlement centers. This demonstrates how
institutions altered the relative factor endowments, affecting modes of production and thus, land
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concentration and rural settlement.
This thesis has clearly some limitations which call for further research. To simplify the
analysis, it has only investigated one side of the settlement story – that of settlers – and neglected
the indigenous one; namely, the role of pre-colonial institutions and the participation of the
indigenous populations in the production process (Fenske, 2014; Frankema et al., 2014; Green,
2013). Therefore, the next step to fully comprehend settlement in Algeria is to examine the
role of indigenous agency. In addition, the time span of this study is very limited. Indeed, the
years analyzed belong to a period characterized by economic growth in the Maghreb region.
Angus Maddison, based on Samir Amin’s 1966 estimates, finds that Algerian GDP almost
doubled between 1880 and 1913 (Amin, 1966; Maddison, 2006). These positive figures are
given for all North African countries and are supported by alternative estimates provided by
researchers aiming to fill the gap regarding long-term GDP trends (Prados de la Escosura, 2012).
However, what the research has not made clear is the extent to which this marked increase in
economic growth during the colonial years went hand-in-hand with a growing land inequality.
Thus, the short-term framework of this thesis is a first step towards understanding how Algeria’s
land distribution before independence affected local capabilities in agriculture, commerce and
political governance, and how, after Independence, this conditioned through various channels the
local, regional and, ultimately, national development paths into the present.

Appendix A
Appendix: Chapter 2
Table A.1: Summary statistics in Chapter 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
EurAgricPop_ha 0.088 0.14 199
Creation 1867.24 15.386 200
IndexLC 3.692 1.213 197
AverPropSize (I) 46.45 22.524 197
AverPropSize (II) 155.277 284.57 197
ShareProp>41ha 0.423 0.314 197
GINI 0.254 0.194 197
RoadNetwork 1.992 1.487 200
ShortPthRW 3.918 3.312 196
CropSuit 6.121 1.464 200
Sett/Ind_84 0.215 0.392 200
DWine 0.820 0.385 200
DYear 0.5 0.501 200
DType 0.72 0.45 200
IndigOwnersDens 0.298 0.479 197
IndigOwnersShare 0.352 0.297 199
D_< 10ha 0.65 0.478 200
D_11< ha< 20 0.695 0.462 200
D_21< ha< 30 0.75 0.434 200
D_31< ha< 40 0.795 0.405 200
D_41< ha< 100 0.9 0.301 200
D_> 100ha 0.87 0.337 200
These values are for Constantine in the years 1904/05 and
1913/14. See Appendix D for detail on the construction
of variables and sources.
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Figure A.1: Box plot of the average property size (by year of settlement), Constantine in 1904/05 and
1913/14
AverPropSize(II) is the ratio between the number of European-owned hectares and the number
of European-owned properties. Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL.
See Appendix D for more detail on the construction on variables and sources.
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Table A.3: Number of settlers and year of creation of settlement centers in Constantine (Busson, 1898)
Before 1870 After 1870
Settlers Creation Source Settlers Creation Source
121 1853 Census between 1851 and 1888 151 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
153 1860 Census between 1851 and 1888 45 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
162 1862 Census between 1851 and 1888 79 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
136 1847 Census in 1851 244 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
71 1856 Census between 1851 and 1888 176 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
81 1856 Census between 1851 and 1888 346 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
108 1853 Census between 1851 and 1888 420 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
131 1853 Census between 1851 and 1888 274 1876 Census between 1851 and 1888
91 1856 Census between 1851 and 1888 217 1881 Census between 1851 and 1888
232 1855 Census between 1851 and 1888 18 1896 Reported at creation of center
486 1848 Census in 1851 112 1882 Census between 1851 and 1888
343 1862 Census between 1851 and 1888 64 1892 Reported at creation of center
316 1848 Census in 1851 151 1873 Census between 1851 and 1888
122 1847 Census in 1851 536 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
150 1845 Census in 1851 29 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
376 1848 Census in 1851 116 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
315 1848 Census in 1851 260 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
139 1847 Census in 1851 190 1880 Census between 1851 and 1888
89 1860 Census between 1851 and 1888 339 1885 Census between 1851 and 1888
39 1849 Census in 1851 171 1881 Census between 1851 and 1888
512 1848 Census in 1851 203 1875 Census between 1851 and 1888
115 1847 Census in 1851 69 1892 Reported at creation of center
350 1847 Census in 1851 128 1875 Census between 1851 and 1888
420 1847 Census in 1851 218 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
252 1844 Census in 1851 145 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
650 1841 Census in 1851 328 1870 Census between 1851 and 1888
108 1844 Census in 1851 56 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
46 1844 Census in 1851 163 1873 Census between 1851 and 1888
178 1844 Census in 1851 205 1873 Census between 1851 and 1888
67 1858 Census between 1851 and 1888 99 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
164 1854 Census between 1851 and 1888 104 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
195 1848 Census in 1851 216 1875 Census between 1851 and 1888
169 1852 Census between 1851 and 1888 67 1875 Census between 1851 and 1888
173 1845 Census in 1851 435 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
208 1848 Census in 1851 49 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
189 1850 Census in 1851 45 1883 Census between 1851 and 1888
196 1857 Census between 1851 and 1888 216 1884 Census between 1851 and 1888
151 1847 Census in 1851 115 1883 Census between 1851 and 1888
182 1856 Census between 1851 and 1888 85 1880 Census between 1851 and 1888
17 1859 Census between 1851 and 1888 171 1881 Census between 1851 and 1888
264 1859 Census between 1851 and 1888 311 1897 Reported at creation of center
164 1859 Census between 1851 and 1888 88 1887 Census between 1851 and 1888
60 1854 Census between 1851 and 1888 63 1887 Census between 1851 and 1888
97 1857 Census between 1851 and 1888 112 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
173 1863 Census between 1851 and 1888 218 1878 Census between 1851 and 1888
92 1865 Census between 1851 and 1888 221 1890 Reported at creation of center
87 1853 Census between 1851 and 1888 178 1887 Census between 1851 and 1888
83 1869 Census between 1851 and 1888 257 1890 Reported at creation of center
46 1853 Census between 1851 and 1888 240 1883 Census between 1851 and 1888
After 1870
212 1879 Census between 1851 and 1888 281 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
170 1887 Census between 1851 and 1888 429 1877 Census between 1851 and 1888
227 1894 Reported at creation of center 149 1882 Census between 1851 and 1888
199 1880 Census between 1851 and 1888 139 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
20 1895 Reported at creation of center 155 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
73 1873 Census between 1851 and 1888 62 1891 Reported at creation of center
56 1879 Census between 1851 and 1888 144 1878 Census between 1851 and 1888
89 1891 Reported at creation of center 404 1873 Census between 1851 and 1888
147 1891 Reported at creation of center 290 1872 Census between 1851 and 1888
305 1886 Census between 1851 and 1888 112 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888
52 1890 Reported at creation of center 162 1878 Census between 1851 and 1888
850 1874 Census between 1851 and 1888 324 1878 Census between 1851 and 1888
11 1880 Census between 1851 and 1888 165 1876 Census between 1851 and 1888
93 1887 Census between 1851 and 1888 92 1876 Census between 1851 and 1888
302 1889 Reported at creation of center 138 1886 Census between 1851 and 1888
212 1879 Census between 1851 and 1888
Source: Busson (1898). All values from centers created prior to 1851 correspond to the 1851 census. The values between 1851
and 1888 come from the: i. 1861 census if between 1851-1861, ii. 1871 census if between 61-71, iii. 1877 census if between
71-77, and iv. 1888 census if between 77-88.
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Table
A
.5:D
eterm
inants
ofE
uropean
A
griculturalPopulation,C
onstantine
in
1904/05
and
1913/14
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L
S
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O
L
S
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2SL
S
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Av erPropSize(I)
-0.014***
-0.034**
-0.013**
-0.034*
-0.013**
-0.034*
-0.013***
-0.032*
-0.013***
-0.033*
(0.003)
(0.016)
(0.004)
(0.018)
(0.004)
(0.018)
(0.002)
(0.018)
(0.003)
(0.018)
ShortPthR
W
-0.042
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-0.038
-0.021
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0.121
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0.121
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0.100**
0.140
0.134**
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(0.084)
(0.063)
(0.084)
(0.062)
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(0.044)
(0.086)
(0.065)
D
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-0.598
-0.691*
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-0.691*
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-0.694*
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-0.797**
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(0.410)
(0.369)
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0.001
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(0.107)
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(0.110)
(0.098)
(0.111)
(0.087)
(0.101)
(0.101)
(0.113)
D
Type
-0.230
-0.444*
-0.196
-0.444
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-0.465
-0.155
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-0.336
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D
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-0.124
-0.561**
-0.110
(0.133)
(0.354)
(0.132)
(0.401)
(0.137)
(0.410)
(0.139)
(0.431)
(0.152)
(0.418)
Sett/Ind_84
-0.340
-0.001
-0.374
-0.046
-0.049
0.294
-0.251
0.067
(0.434)
(0.405)
(0.444)
(0.374)
(0.315)
(0.302)
(0.419)
(0.411)
D
_K
-0.085
-0.118
(0.194)
(0.204)
O
w
ners/ha_I
0.479***
0.482***
(0.124)
(0.187)
ShareO
w
ners_I
0.393
0.371
(0.269)
(0.363)
C
onstant
-2.013**
-1.377
-2.056**
-1.377
-2.034**
-1.343
-2.397***
-1.746*
-2.294**
-1.634
(0.619)
(0.961)
(0.651)
(1.033)
(0.691)
(1.080)
(0.546)
(0.988)
(0.707)
(1.102)
N
193
193
193
193
193
193
191
191
193
193
R
2
0.34
0.23
0.35
0.23
0.35
0.23
0.39
0.28
0.36
0.25
R
2_A
0.31
0.19
0.32
0.19
0.31
0.18
0.35
0.24
0.32
0.21
*Significantat 10%
;
**significantat5%
;
***
significantat1%
.
C
luster-robuststandard
errors
in
parentheses.
O
LS
is
O
rdinary
L
eastSquares
and
2SL
S
is
Tw
o
Stage
L
east
Square.
AverP
ropSize(I)
is
the
variable
m
easuring
land
concentration.
D
_Aver>
100ha
is
a
dum
m
y
variable
equal
to
1
if
the
average
property
size
per
m
unicipality
is
above
100
hectares
(calculated
from
a
differentsource
than
thatused
for
AverP
ropSize(I)).In
2SL
S
the
AverP
ropSize(I)
is
instrum
ented
w
ith
C
reation.
D
ependentvariable
is
in
logarithm
s.
Source:
SA
(1904/05,1913/14),B
usson
(1898),A
N
O
M
-iR
E
L
,and
G
IS
databases.
See
A
ppendix
D
form
ore
detailon
the
construction
ofvariables
and
sources.
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Table
A
.7:D
eterm
inants
ofE
uropean
agriculturalpopulation,C
onstantine
in
1904/05
and
1913/14
D
ependentvariable:E
uropean
agriculturalpopulation
perhectare
(E
urA
grPop/ha_i,t)
O
L
S
(1a)
2SL
S
(1b)
O
L
S
(2a)
2SL
S
(2b)
O
L
S
(3a)
2SL
S
(3b)
O
L
S
(4a)
2SL
S
(4b)
O
L
S
(5a)
2SL
S
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SharePr op>41ha
-1.468***
-2.851**
-1.443***
-2.945*
-1.454***
-2.975*
-1.427***
-2.767
-1.401***
-2.867
(0.252)
(1.451)
(0.301)
(1.754)
(0.313)
(1.793)
(0.203)
(1.773)
(0.288)
(1.814)
ShortPthR
W
-0.050
-0.038
-0.048
-0.039
-0.047
-0.037
-0.042
-0.035
-0.046
-0.038
(0.038)
(0.033)
(0.039)
(0.035)
(0.038)
(0.034)
(0.031)
(0.025)
(0.038)
(0.035)
C
ropSuit
0.091
0.134
0.082
0.144
0.082
0.145
0.142
0.195*
0.078
0.140
(0.081)
(0.098)
(0.079)
(0.116)
(0.079)
(0.117)
(0.074)
(0.113)
(0.079)
(0.119)
R
oadN
etw
ork
0.167*
0.128*
0.168*
0.125*
0.170*
0.129*
0.129**
0.093
0.171*
0.129
(0.071)
(0.070)
(0.070)
(0.075)
(0.070)
(0.076)
(0.046)
(0.065)
(0.072)
(0.081)
D
W
ine
-0.779
-0.972
-0.767
-0.991
-0.771
-0.999
-0.896
-1.092*
-0.717
-0.950
(0.523)
(0.599)
(0.529)
(0.652)
(0.524)
(0.650)
(0.493)
(0.634)
(0.539)
(0.688)
D
Y
ear
-0.011
0.038
-0.012
0.041
-0.011
0.043
-0.025
0.026
-0.036
0.024
(0.083)
(0.123)
(0.082)
(0.133)
(0.084)
(0.137)
(0.077)
(0.133)
(0.088)
(0.146)
D
Type
-0.297
-0.389*
-0.276
-0.410
-0.294
-0.443
-0.230
-0.350
-0.146
-0.320
(0.183)
(0.233)
(0.185)
(0.271)
(0.203)
(0.313)
(0.164)
(0.236)
(0.223)
(0.345)
Sett/Ind_84
-0.225
0.179
-0.266
0.109
0.129
0.506
-0.124
0.232
(0.420)
(0.577)
(0.439)
(0.517)
(0.258)
(0.450)
(0.389)
(0.558)
D
_K
-0.106
-0.188
(0.215)
(0.296)
O
w
ners/ha_I
0.561***
0.546***
(0.112)
(0.192)
ShareO
w
ners_I
0.474*
0.312
(0.236)
(0.407)
C
onstant
-2.185***
-1.631
-2.210***
-1.583
-2.182**
-1.528
-2.565***
-1.986*
-2.498***
-1.794
(0.530)
(1.058)
(0.564)
(1.196)
(0.599)
(1.266)
(0.475)
(1.177)
(0.612)
(1.362)
N
193
193
193
193
193
193
191
191
193
193
R
2
0.29
0.14
0.29
0.12
0.29
0.12
0.34
0.21
0.31
0.14
R
2_A
0.26
0.11
0.26
0.08
0.26
0.07
0.31
0.17
0.27
0.10
*Significantat 10%
;**significantat5%
;***
significantat1%
.
C
luster-robuststandard
errors
in
parentheses.
O
LS
is
O
rdinary
L
eastSquares
and
2SL
S
is
Tw
o
Stage
L
eastSquare.
ShareP
rop>
41ha_E
is
the
variable
m
easuring
land
concentration.
In
2SL
S
the
ShareP
rop>
41ha_E
is
instrum
ented
w
ith
C
reation.
D
ependentvariable
is
in
logarithm
s.Source:SA
(1904/05,1913/14),B
usson
(1898),A
N
O
M
-iR
E
L
,and
G
IS
databases.See
A
ppendix
D
form
ore
detailon
the
construction
ofvariables
and
sources.
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Table B.1: Summary statistics in Chapter 3
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
IndexLC_E 46.452 22.524 8.214 100 197
Creation 1867.244 15.386 1843 1916 200
ShareProp<10ha_E 0.198 0.251 0 0.929 197
ShareProp>41ha_E 0.423 0.314 0 1 197
ShareCereal_E 0.763 0.359 0 4.14 199
ShareWine_E 0.112 0.26 0 3.1 199
AreaCereal_E 2220.09 2876.014 0 17900 199
AreaWine_E 139.151 291.509 0 1898 199
LandPrice_E 180.728 313.915 3 2500 151
Wage/day_I 1.771 0.404 0.155 3 181
MachPrice_E 8918.596 4489.63 300 20000 136
Lab/day_I 0.044 0.116 0.003 1.237 184
Land/Labor 8.347 14.6 0.03 107.625 185
LabScarc_I 1.145 3.937 0 47.2 184
D_Year 0.5 0.501 0 1 200
Mach/ha_E 0.003 0.011 0 0.143 198
Tresh/ha_E 0.004 0.016 0 0.167 193
Harv/ha_E 0.004 0.006 0 0.032 194
FrPlow/ha_E 0.06 0.079 0 0.828 196
Instr/ha_E 0.178 0.19 0.011 1.69 195
Moderniz_E 0.044 0.114 -0.856 0.828 197
These values are for Constantine in the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. See Appendix
D for detail on the construction of variables and sources.
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Table
B
.2:Pair-w
ise
correlation
m
atrix
in
C
hapter3
V
ariables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(1) Inde xL
C
_E
1.00
(2)C
reation
0.39
1.00
(0.00)
(3)ShareProp<10ha_E
-0.75
-0.41
1.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(4)ShareProp>41ha_E
0.96
0.33
-0.60
1.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(5)ShareC
eralA
rea_E
0.29
0.22
-0.28
0.23
1.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(6)ShareW
ineA
rea_E
-0.03
0.00
0.04
-0.02
0.27
1.00
(0.65)
(0.97)
(0.55)
(0.79)
(0.00)
(7)A
rea_C
er(ha)_E
0.25
0.23
-0.20
0.22
0.28
-0.24
1.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(8)A
rea_W
ine(ha)_E
-0.13
-0.15
0.15
-0.10
-0.32
0.31
-0.05
1.00
(0.07)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.17)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.51)
(9)L
andPrice_E
-0.19
-0.22
0.35
-0.15
-0.13
0.02
-0.02
0.18
1.00
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.81)
(0.82)
(0.03)
(10)W
age/day_I
-0.08
-0.22
0.12
-0.11
0.06
-0.06
0.07
-0.06
0.12
1.00
(0.29)
(0.00)
(0.10)
(0.16)
(0.43)
(0.39)
(0.38)
(0.46)
(0.15)
(11)M
ach/ha_E
0.22
0.17
-0.28
0.15
0.23
-0.15
0.33
-0.16
-0.08
0.05
1.00
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(0.00)
(0.06)
(0.46)
(0.55)
(12)L
/day_I
-0.03
0.09
-0.01
-0.04
0.03
-0.04
0.06
-0.07
0.06
-0.11
-0.03
1.00
(0.74)
(0.24)
(0.94)
(0.64)
(0.72)
(0.60)
(0.44)
(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.15)
(0.76)
(13)L
and/L
abour
0.01
-0.19
-0.05
-0.02
-0.00
-0.09
0.14
0.10
0.03
0.05
0.14
-0.07
1.00
(0.94)
(0.01)
(0.46)
(0.78)
(1.00)
(0.20)
(0.07)
(0.17)
(0.73)
(0.55)
(0.11)
(0.37)
(14)L
abScarc_I
-0.13
-0.19
0.10
-0.11
-0.18
0.20
-0.12
0.45
0.07
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.29
1.00
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.19)
(0.13)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.11)
(0.00)
(0.39)
(0.74)
(0.55)
(0.55)
(0.00)
(15)D
Y
ear
0.05
0.00
-0.02
0.05
0.02
-0.12
0.11
-0.04
0.03
0.20
0.05
-0.13
0.03
-0.01
1.00
(0.52)
(1.00)
(0.81)
(0.46)
(0.79)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.53)
(0.70)
(0.01)
(0.58)
(0.09)
(0.73)
(0.92)
(16)M
ac/ha_E
-0.18
-0.17
0.28
-0.14
-0.16
-0.01
-0.08
0.04
0.58
0.15
-0.16
-0.05
-0.03
-0.03
0.09
1.00
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.94)
(0.29)
(0.58)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.50)
(0.69)
(0.69)
(0.20)
(17)Tresh/ha_E
-0.22
-0.21
0.30
-0.16
-0.34
0.18
-0.12
-0.01
0.07
0.00
-0.08
0.02
-0.08
0.06
-0.04
0.12
1.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.88)
(0.38)
(1.00)
(0.35)
(0.78)
(0.31)
(0.46)
(0.61)
(0.11)
(18)H
arv/ha_E
-0.08
-0.27
0.09
-0.06
-0.08
0.05
0.00
0.19
0.23
0.08
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Figure B.1: Winter cereal yields (quintals per hectare), Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
Winter cereal yields include soft wheat, hard wheat, rye, barley, and oats covering the cultivated area cor-
responding to the 1904/05 agricultural season. The data is classified according to quantiles (equal count).
Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898), ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on the
construction of variables and sources.
Figure B.2: Indigenous wages per day, Constantine in 1904/05
The data is classified according to quantiles (equal count). Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898),
ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on the construction of variables and sources.
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Figure B.3: Indigenous labor per day, Constantine in 1904/05 and 1913/14
The data is classified according to quantiles (equal count). Source: SA (1904/05, 1913/14), Busson (1898),
ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on the construction of variables and sources.
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Table C.1: Summary statistics in Chapter 4
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Settler density 0.03 0.18 0 2.71 768
Indigenous density 0.35 0.47 0 5.89 768
Dummy< 10km 0.14 0.35 0 1 768
Dummy< 20km 0.25 0.43 0 1 768
Elevation 602.6 412.1 0 1,638 768
Instrumental variable 0.11 0.31 0 1 768
These values are for Constantine in the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 (full
sample). See Appendix D for detail on the construction of variables and
sources.
Table C.2: Pair-wise correlation matrix in Chapter 4
Variables Settden Indden D< 10km D< 20km Elev IV
Settler density 1.00
Indigenous density 0.68 1.00
(0.00)
Dummy< 10km 0.01 0.05 1.00
(0.70) (0.15)
Dummy< 20km -0.02 0.02 0.71 1.00
(0.54) (0.62) (0.00)
Elevation -0.13 -0.20 0.11 0.20 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Instrumental variable 0.12 0.07 0.73 0.54 0.10 1.00
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
These values are for Constantine in the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 (full sample). Stan-
dard deviation in parentheses. See Appendix D for detail on the construction of variables
and sources.
Table C.3: Summary statistics of elevation and t-test mean difference between treated and control groups
Restricted sample Full Sample
<20 km <10 km <20 km <10 km
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Control 157 566.52 183 597.20 192 554.09 219 583.71
(32.89) (29.99) (29.49) (27.37)
Treated 49 800.84 23 821.61 64 748.20 37 714.54
(57.27) (102.18) (49.10) (73.06)
Mean Difference -234.32 -224.41 -194.11 -130.83
(66.05)*** (106.49)** (57.28)*** (-130.83)*
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. The unit of observation are the
sub-municipal areas such as settlement centers and douars. Results are shown for unequal variances although significance level
is robust under equal variance assumption. Source: CGIAR Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 3 from California Institute of
Technology.
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Figure C.1: Mean and confidence intervals of settler population density (by treated and control groups) in
year 1884
Source: Tableau Général des Communes (1884).
Figure C.2: Mean and confidence intervals of indigenous population density (by treated and control
groups) in year 1884
Source: Tableau Général des Communes (1884).
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Figure C.3: Box plot of settler population density (by treated and control groups) in year 1884
X-axis: control group is labeled 0 and treated group is 1. Source: TGdC (1884).
Figure C.4: Box plot of indigenous population density (by treated and control groups) in year 1884
X-axis: control group is labeled 0 and treated group is 1. Source: TGdC (1884).
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FigureC.5:MapofrailwayinstrumentallinesinConstantine
Source:FordetailonsourcesandconstructionofinstrumentalvariableseethemethodologysectioninChapter4.
FigureC.6:PictureoftherailwayinFrenchAlgeria
Source:Harter(2005,p.243)
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Appendix D
Appendix: General
D.1 Main Sources
• The sources for the historic maps mostly cited in the text are:
– CEPC (1876): Carte des Étapes de la province de Constantine (1876), scale 1/400,000. It
is available online in the digital library Gallica from the Bibliothèque nationale de France,
retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40683086f.
– CEPC (1883): Carte des Étapes de la province de Constantine (1883), scale 1/1,000,000. It
is available online in the digital library Gallica from the Bibliothèque nationale de France,
retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40727576d.
– CCO (1902): Carte de la colonisation officielle, Algérie (1902), scale 1:800 000. It is
available online in the digital library Gallica from the Bibliothèque nationale de France,
retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40710721s.
– CVC (1902): Carte des voies de communication. Département de Constantine (1902), scale
1/400.000. It is not available for download online; thus, I purchased it through the website
https://www.delcampe.net.
– CCOA (1919): Carte la colonisation officielle en Algérie (1919), scale 1/1.500.000. It is
available online in the digital library Gallica from the Bibliothèque nationale de France,
retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40719148b.
– CLA (1939, 1949): Carte des Limites Administratives, Departement de Constantine (1939,
1949). They are not available for download online; thus, I purchased them through the
website https://www.delcampe.net.
– CVC (1955): Voies de Communication. Departement de Constantine (1955). It is not
available for download online; thus, I purchased it through the website https://www.
delcampe.net.
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• Other sources frequently cited in the text are:
– SA (1904/05, 1913/14): Statistique Agricole: État Recapitulatif collected by the Gouverne-
ment Général de l’Algérie, Direction de l’Agriculture, de la Colonisation, du Commerce et
de l’Industrie, Service de la Statistique Générale. These statistics are located in ANOM and
provide agricultural information for Constantine mainly for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14.
The location in the archives are: Campagne annuelles 93/1H/59/1,2,3, Campagne annuelles
93/1H/60, Campagne annuelles 93/1H/61/1-9, and Campagne annuelles 93/1H/62.
– TGdC (1884, 1892, 1897, 1902): Tableau Général ... des communes de plein exercice, mixtes
et indigènes des trois provinces (territoire civil et territoire militaire): avec indication du
chiffre de la population et de la superficie. Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie, Direction
Générale des affaires civiles et financières. This source is available online in the Gallica digital
library from the Bibliothèque nationale de France, retrieved from http://gallica.
bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39214483r/date&rk=42918;4. There are four years
available : 1884, 1892, 1897, and 1902. It provides information on the municipal population
density and area covered based on the nationality and type of settlement (i.e., settlement
centers, portions of land, douars, and tribal areas).
– DdC (1878): The Dictionnaire des communes, villes et villages de l’Algérie... : précédé
d’une introduction sur l’Algérie/ par Achille Fillias . This source is available online in the
Gallica digital library from the Bibliothèque nationale de France, retrieved from http://
gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k104479b/f2.image. There in only one
volume available for 1878. It reports general information such as the type of settlement,
the administrative circumscription, the presence of markets, justice de paix, banks, schools,
postal services, churches, natural resources, train stations, etc.
– ASF (several years): The Annuaire Statistique de la France from the Ministère de l’agriculture
et du commerce, Service de la statistique générale de France, Direction de la statistique
générale. This source is available online in the Gallica digital library from the Bibliothèque
nationale de France, retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/
cb343503965. After the 1900s the volume is called Annuaire Statistique from the Min-
istère du commerce, de l’industrie, des postes et télégraphes, Office du travail, Statistique
générale de la France and it is also available online in Gallica digital library from the
Bibliothèque nationale de France, retrieved from http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:
/12148/cb34350395t.
– ANOM and ANOM-iREL: ANOM are the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer and ANOM-
iREL are the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer-Instruments de Recherche en Ligne. The
colonial archives are located in Aix-en-Provence and the online information is retrieved from
http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/geo.php?ir=.
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D.2 Variable Description
• EurAgricPop/ha is the rural settler population per hectare; more specifically, it is the total number of
European laborers, sharecroppers, tenants, and owners divided by the total number of cultivated and non-
cultivated European-owned hectares. The population data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the
year 1904/05) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913-1914) in the folder on La population agricole
par catégories et par nationalités résidant dans la commune in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in
Aix-en-Provence.
• Creation (or average year of settlement) is the average year of creation of the settlement centers in a
municipality. The information was collected from different sources. The webpage ANOM-iREL allows to
search for historic settlements based on their colonial administrative name. The ANOM-iREL search engine
shows the current geographic location of settlement points and, occasionally, it also provides information on
administrative changes regarding names, territorial boundaries, year of establishment, type of municipality
(CPE, CM, and CI), etc. In addition, this information has been complemented with Busson (1898), the
available TGdC (for instance, the latter provides the ordennance dates of territorial enlargementes), and the
Atlas Administratif de l’Algérie 1830-1960. I have also obtained information from. Sometimes, it has been
necessary to make a judgment call; for instance, the settlement center Randon was created/established in
1868 but populated in 1874, thus I kept the latter as it reflects more accurately the moment of settlement and
land concessions. I have not included in the sample the settlement year of military posts (as they did not
imply land distribution) and, when available, I have included what was classified as the “projected” year of
settlement.
• IndexLC_E is the European land concentration index. It is a weighted index ranging from 1 (if there are only
properties below 10 hectares) up to 6 (if there are only properties above 100 hectares) for each municipality.
To construct it, I first assigned values to each property size category: the value of 1 to properties below 10
hectares, 2 for properties between 11 and 20 hectares, 3 for properties between 21 and 30, 4 to 31-40, 5 to
41-100 and 6 to properties above 100 hectares. To obtain an index that ranges from 1 to 6, I then multiplied
each value by its corresponding share over the total number of properties. The sources are FR CAOM
93/1H60 (for the year 1904/05) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Le nombre des
propriétés agricoles particuliéres; Leur repartition d’aprés leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires
in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable ShareProp>41ha (or average size of large properties) is the share of European properties above
41 hectares over the total number of properties per municipality. The data was obtained from FR CAOM
93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Nombre des
propriétés agricoles particuliéres. Répartition d’après leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in
ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• AverPropSize(I) (also called Average size per property) is the European average property size in hectares per
municipality. The mean value for each group category was assigned: 5 to properties below 10 hectares, 15
for the properties between 11 and 20 hectares, 25 to the ones between 21 and 30, 35 to 31-40, to 41-100
and 100 to the number of properties above 100 hectares. It was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for
the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Le nombre des propriétés
agricoles particuliéres; Leur repartition d’aprés leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in ANOM
in Aix-en-Provence. Given that this variable requires establishing an upper size limit to the properties above
100 hectares, I created dummy variables (D_Aver>100ha and D_Aver>500ha) for the municipalities which,
according to a different source, were clearly endowed with very large properties (see Figure A.1). The data
for the latter was obtained from the area data in FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM
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93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire -Répartition des parties cultivées et non
cultivées entre les differentes catégories des propriétaires.
• AverPropSize(II) is the European average property size in hectares calculated from a different source of
AverPropSize(I). I directly divide the number of all European-owned rural properties by the number of
properties. However, the numerator and denominator come from different sources and thus it is questionable
whether this variable is accurate. The source for the number of all European-owned rural properties comes
from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder
Superficie du territoire -Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes catégories
des propriétaires and the source for the number of properties was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for
the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Le nombre des propriétés
agricoles particuliéres; Leur repartition d’aprés leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in ANOM
in Aix-en-Provence.
• GINI index is a variable measuring the property size distribution per municipality. To construct it, I assigned
the average size for each property size category: for properties below 10 hectares the average size is 5, for
the category 11-20 it is 15, for 21-30 it is 25, for 31-40 it is 35, for 41-100 is 70.5, and for the category above
100 I assumed 100 hectares. However, as explained in Chapter 2, this variable is not appropriate to measure
land concentration given that, if all properties are bigger than 100 hectares ina given municipality, then it
would reflect perfect equality and neglect the relevance of large size ownership. The source is FR CAOM
93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Le nombre des
propriétés agricoles particuliéres; Leur repartition d’aprés leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires
in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable ShareProp<10ha_E is the share of European properties below 10 hectares for the years
1904/05 and 1913/14 per municipality. It is the number of European properties below 10 hectares over
the total number of European-owned properties. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for
the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder on Nombre des propriétés
agricoles particuliéres. Répartition d’après leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in ANOM in
Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable ShareProp>100ha_E is the share of European properties greater than 100 hectares for the
years 1904/05 and 1913/14 per municipality. It is the number of European properties above 100 hectares
over the total number of European-owned properties. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60
(for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Nombre des propriétés
agricoles particuliéres. Répartition d’après leur étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in ANOM in
Aix-en-Provence. From the same folders I also calculated the average size of large properties dividing
the number of European properties above 100 hectares divided by the total number of European-owned
properties.
• RoadNetwork is the road infrastructure density; that is, the ratio between the length of roads (in meters)
and the municipality area (in hectares). The roads included are Routes Nationales, Chemins de Grande
Communication, and Chemins d’Intérêt Commun. The length of the road network for each municipality was
calculated using the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection (ESRI: 102022). In order to digitize the old
roads, I georeferenced the historic 1902 Carte de Voies de Communication transports map to the current
road infrastructure (available at the Digital Chart of the World GIS dataset. The roads classified as en lacune
in the 1902 map are not included.
• Railway network (ShortPthRW) is the total distance in hours adding: i. the average distance between the
municipality’s settlement points and the nearest station (assuming a walking speed of 5 km per hour)) and, ii.
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the distance between the station and the nearest port following the shortest railway line route (assuming a
railway speed of 24 km per hour). The data was obtained from webpage DIVA-GIS or geo-community, for
which the original source is the Digital Chart of the World. To adapt the current railway lines to the historic
ones, I overlaid the 1902 map Voies de Communication to the current railway lines. I created three different
variables per municipality: railway station density (number of stations over municipality area), railway line
density (length of railway lines over municipality area), and average distance to nearest port. To calculate
the latter, I first averaged the distance in kilometers between each centres or fermes de colonisation and its
respective nearest station. Then I added to the latter the distance in kilometers from the railway station to
the nearest port. A judgment call was needed to select which was the nearest port; for instance, when the
distance from two different ports to the same station was not significantly different, I selected the route that
went to the most important port. When no railway was needed to arrive to the port, then I only include the
traveling time between the settler town and the port. I used GIS software and the Africa Albers Equal Area
Conic projection (ESRI: 102022).
• Sett/Ind_84 is the ratio settler to indigenous population in 1884 aggregated at a municipality level. The
data was obtained from the TGdC for the year 1884.1The settlers are proxied by the French population and
the indigenous are proxied by Indigènes musulmans. The source provides the information disaggregated
at a sub-municipal level (such as villages or tribal areas). Spatial grids containing the demographical
information on the covered regions were spatially joined into the communes, calculating the weighted
averages according to the area. The neglected sub-municipalities in the calculation are relatively remote
tribal areas that experienced too many territorial changes prohibiting the aggregation into communes.
• The Owners/ha_I (or IndigOwnersDens) is the number of indigenous owners divided by the area of all
cultivated and non-cultivated properties.2 It was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903-1904
)and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913-1914) in the folder La population agricole par catégories et
par nationalités résidant dans la commune.
• The ShareOwners_I (or IndigOwnersShare) is the number of indigenous owners divided by the total
indigenous rural population. It was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903-1904 ) and
FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913-1914) in the folder La population agricole par catégories et par
nationalités résidant dans la commune.
• Light density at night was obtained from NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center in the Global DMSP-
OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series 1992-2013 (Version 4) (https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/download.html). As
described in the webpage, it contains “the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting,
including gas flares. Ephemeral events, such as fires have been discarded. Then the background noise
was identified and replaced with values of zero. Data values range from 1-63. Areas with zero cloud-free
observations are represented by the value 255.” I averaged the light density values corresponding to 30 arc
second grids for each municipality obtained.
• CropSuit (or Crop Suitability) is the crop suitability index (class) for low input level rain-fed wheat from
IIASA/FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones. The highest value is 9 while the lowest suitability value is
1.3 The model used to build this index considers the average climate for the period 1961 and 1990 and,
as IIASA/FAO explain, it accounts for wheat cultivation under subsistence production without necessarily
being oriented towards markets, labor intensive techniques, and no nutrients, chemicals or disease control,
1.
2I also calculated the number of owners per cultivated area and results are almost identical.
3For convenience, the order has been modified so that 1 stands for lowest suitability and 9 for highest (1 is 8, 2
is 7, 3 is 6, 4 is 5, 5 is 4, 6 is 3, 7 is 2 and 8 is 1).
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and minimum conservation measures. I used GIS software to measure this suitability within the colonization
areas drawn in the historic maps. Thus, I first calculated the area (in hectares) for the settlement centers
(using Albers equal-area conic projection) and then calculated the weighted average suitability within the
area of each colonization center. The source is IIASA/FAO, 2010. Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ
v3.0). IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria and FAO, Rome, Italy.
• DWine is a dummy measuring whether there are suitable hectares for wine cultivation in a colonization
center. This variable was built following wine suitability criteria considering pH, rainfall, frost free period,
and slope.4 Given its high correlation with wheat suitability (CropSuit variable) and non-exclusion (i.e.,
the land suitable for wine was also appropriate for wheat), I only include the dummy variable in the model.
The value is 1 when more than 20 percent of the total colonization area is suitable and zero if less. Several
variables must be taken into consideration to measure land suitability to viticulture such as the length of
the frost free period, extreme minimum winter temperatures, and growing degree days (Chen, 2011). The
criteria used for suitability are the following: i. the areas must comply with more than 500 mm of average
annual rainfall within a year;5 ii, the frost free period (baseline period 1961-1990 ) – i.e., the number of
days throughout the year with low risk of early and late frosts (days with average temperature of 10◦C)6 – is
above 200 days allowing grapes to ripe; iii. the pH must be below 8 given that suitability in water for vine
growing ranges between 5.5 and 7 or 8 (above 8 usually creates nutritional problems);7 iv. the steepness,
which affects internal soil drainage, must be lower than 45 (although it is not recommended above 15.8;
finally, drainage is not included due to lack of variation across the regions under study.9
• The variable ShareWine_E (or share of wine) is the number of European cultivated hectares devoted to
viticulture over the total European cultivated area for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 per municipality. The
data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year
1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les
differentes catégories des proprietáires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable ShareCereal_E (or share of cereal) is the number of the cereal-cultivated hectares by Europeans
over the total area cultivated by Europeans for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 per municipality. The data was
obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14)
in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes
catégories des proprietéires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable AreaCereal_E is the total cereal-cultivated area by Europeans in hectares for the years 1904/05
and 1913/14 per municipality. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and
FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties
cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes catégories des proprietáires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
4Mainly based on research by White (2010) and Chen (2011).
5Most literature argues that at least 690 millimeters (27 in) of rainfall are necessary to produce grapes for wine,
yet the boundary set in this paper is lower to avoid being too strict.
6It is the same as the length of the “temperature growing period” (number of days in year when average daily
temperature is above 10◦C)
7The data for pH was the mean estimator obtained from ISRIC for 80 cm depth.
8GIS provided the data in square meters and it was divided by 10 thousand. The projection is AEAA. The data
was obtained from Fischer et al. (2008) found in the databases provided by FAO with IIASA, ISRIC-World Soil
Information, Institute of Soil Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences (ISSCAS), and the Joint Research Centre of
the European Commission (JRC).
9They all appear under no drainage constraints with the exception of a small region in the north east with
moderate constraints.
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• The variable AreaWine_E is the total viticulture-cultivated area by Europeans per municipality in hectares
for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04)
and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties
cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes catégories des proprietáires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable LandPrice_E is the average land value of one hectare of non-cleared land for Europeans per
municipality. The data is also available for cleared land and tenancy rates. It was obtained from FR CAOM
93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du
territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes catégories des proprietáires
in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable W/day_I measures the agricultural wages paid to the indigenous population divided by the
corresponding total amount of days worked for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 per municipality. The data
was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year
1913/14) in the folder on Ouvriers, Journées Agricoles-Salaires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable MachPrice is the value in francs of a steam tractor per municipality for the years 1904/05 and
1913/14. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61
(for the year 1913/14) in the folder Matériel agricole in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Lab/day_I is the number of agricultural indigenous laborers employed divided by the total
number of days worked per municipality for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively. The data was
obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in
the folder Ouvriers, Journées Agricoles-Salaires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Land/Labor (or also Land/Labor (I) is the annual number of European-owned cultivated
hectares over the total number of indigenous laborers employed in the agricultural seasons per municipality
for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively. The labor data comes from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year
1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Ouvriers, Journées Agricoles-Salaires
and the area data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61
(for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées
entre les differentes catégories des proprietáires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence. The variable Land/Labor (II)
is the number of European-owned cultivated hectares in large landholdings (above 40 hectares) over the total
number of indigenous laborers employed in the agricultural seasons per municipality for the years 1904/05
and 1913/14. To calculate the large landholding area, I subtracted to the total European cultivated area the
product between the mean value for each group category below 40 hectares (that is, 5 to properties below
10 hectares, 15 for the properties between 11 and 20 hectares, 25 to the ones between 21 and 30, and 35 to
31-40) and the number of hectares corresponding to each category. The data for the number of properties per
size category was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the
year 1913/14) in the folder Le nombre des propriétés agricoles particuliéres; Leur repartition d’aprés leur
étendue et la nationalité des propriétaires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence. The total cultivated data comes
from the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les differentes
catégories des proprietáires and the labor data comes from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and
FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Ouvriers, Journées Agricoles-Salaires.
• Several variables are used to measure mechanization density per European-owned cultivated hectares per
municipality for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively: (i) number of tractors (Mach/ha_E), (ii) number
of threshers (Tresh/ha_E), number of mechanical reaper or harvester (Harv/ha_E), (iv) number of French
plows (FrPlow/ha_E), v. other tools that include (i),(ii), (iii), and (iv) plus viticulture-specific instruments.
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In addition I include a modernization indicator that is the ratio between French plows used by Europeans and
indigenous plows used by Europeans. All variables with the exception of modernization (vi) are per thousand.
The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the
year 1913/14) in the folder Matériel agricole in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable YcerW/ha_E or Wheat Production per cultivated hectares is the winter cereal (grain) quintals
per European-owned cultivated hectares. Winter Cereals include soft wheat, hard wheat, rye, barley, oats.
The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and 93/1H/61/1-9 (for the year
1913/14) in the folder Céréales et les produits alimentaires autres que les céréales. Blé tendre, blé dur, seigle,
orge, avoine, mais, bechna (sorgho), millet. in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable ShareModeEurop_E (or Share Cultivated Á la Mode Européenne) are the number of hectares
cultivated á la mode européenne by both indigenous and Europeans (including Israelites) over the total
number hectares cultivated (by Europeans and indigenous) per municipality for the years 1904/05 and
1913/14 respectively. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 ) and FR
CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire - Répartition des parties cultivées
et non cultivées entre les differentes catégories des proprietáires in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in
Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Wheat cultivated area per settler is the total cereal-cultivated Europeans-owned hectares divided
by the total rural settler population per municipality for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively. The
data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year
1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire - Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les
differentes catégories des proprietáires in ANOM in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Wheat cultivated area per property is the total European-owned, cereal-cultivated hectares
divided by the total rural settler population per municipality for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively.
The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04) and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the
year 1913/14) in the folder Superficie du territoire-Répartition des parties cultivées et non cultivées entre les
differentes catégories des proprietáires. I also calculated the Wheat cultivated area per property that is the
total European-owned, cereal-cultivated hectares divided by the total number of properties per municipality
for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively.
• The variable Oxen per hectare is the total number of oxen divided by the owned hectares for the years
1904/05 and 1913/14 respectively. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04)
and FR CAOM 93/1H61 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Animaux de ferme in the Archives Nationales
d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence. I have calculated it for both the settler and the indigenous population.
• The variable Laborers/ha_I or Indigenous Laborer per Hectare is the number of agricultural indigenous
laborers employed divided by the total European-owned number of hectares cultivated in a municipality for
the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year 1903/04 )
and 93/1H/61/1-9 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Population agricole par categories et par nationalités
résidant dans la commune in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Sharecropper/ha_I or Indigenous Sharecropper per hectare is the number of agricultural
indigenous sharecroppers divided by the total European and indigenous-owned number cultivated hectares
in a municipality for the years 1904/05 and 1913/14. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for
the year 1903/04 ) and 93/1H/61/1-9 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Population agricole par categories
et par nationalités résidant dans la commune in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
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• The IndAgricPop/hasuit or indigenous rural population per hectare is the total number of the rural indigenous
population (laborers, sharecroppers, tenants, and owners) divided by the total number of hectares with a crop
suitability index above 4 (or medium level) for low input level rain-fed wheat. See the description for the
Crop suitability variable in this Appendix. The data was obtained from FR CAOM 93/1H60 (for the year
1903/04 ) and 93/1H/61/1-9 (for the year 1913/14) in the folder Population agricole par categories et par
nationalités résidant dans la commune in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
• The variable Indden or indigenous density is the indigenous municipal population per hectare. In the TGdC
it is classified as ‘Sujets Français, Arabes, Kabyles, M’zabites et israélites du M’zab’ located in the civil
territory. I divided the total population per the corresponding area in hectares from the same source. The
source is the TGdC for the years 1884, 1892, and 1897.
• The variable Settden or settler density is the settler municipal population under the category ‘Français’ in the
civil territory.10 It is divided by the corresponding area in hectares from the same source. It does not include
the naturalized Israelites. The source is the TGdC for the years 1884, 1892, and 1897.
• Dummy< 10km is a dummy variable equal to one if the centroid within the unit of observation (i.e., mainly
settlement centers and douars) is located at a distance below 10 km from the nearest train station.
• Dummy< 20km is a dummy variable equal to one if the centroid within the unit of observation (i.e., mainly
settlement centers and douars) is located at a distance below 20 km from the nearest train station.
• Elevation (or Elev) is the average elevation for each unit of observation (that is, settlement center, douar, etc.)
and was calculated using GIS software. It is available online at a 3 arc second in http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org.
The source is the CGIAR-CSI (2006), NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM).
10The French population represents always the largest share of the total European population.
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D.3 Maps and Images
Figure D.1: Colonial administrative boundaries in Constantine overlapped to current aerial image
The aerial image has been obtained from GIS software (Bing Aerial). Source: CEPC (1883), CVC (1902), Busson (1898), and
ANOM-iREL. See Appendix D for more detail on sources and construction of spatial dataset.
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Figure D.2: Example of a part Constantine’s digitized map
Source: Statistique Agricole : État Recapitulatif, by the Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie, Direction de l’Agriculture, de la
Colonisation, du Commerce et de l’Industrie, Service de la Statistique Générale
Figure D.3: Zoom-in Constantine’s digitized map: douars from 1863 sénatus-consulte
Source: Statistique Agricole : État Recapitulatif, by the Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie, Direction de l’Agriculture, de la
Colonisation, du Commerce et de l’Industrie, Service de la Statistique Générale
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D.4 Trade and Population
This section presents the methodology used to construct the price index and the export basket
used in Chapter 1 in Figure 1.3, 1.5, and 1.7. It additionally explains the procedure implemented
to estimate the long term series for the settler and indigenous population, allowing to express
values in per capita terms (in Figure 1.5).
Price Index and Real Exports
The price index is a weighted index whose components are balanced according to the prices
of their outstanding shares within total exports. I multiplied the current annual weight of each
selected export (over their total aggregated value) and by its corresponding price (constant prices
relative to 1902 (1902=1)). The price data is not directly available from the Algerian statistical
sources (or at least not up to my knowledge). For this reason I use the French prices available in
the ASF (Annuaire Statistique de la France),11 Clark (2004), Sauerbeck (1886), and Mitchell
(1988). Given that commercial trade in Algeria specialized in a limited number of products,
the price index includes only the prices for wine, wheat (grain and flour), and livestock (sheep
and cattle), which should reflect a representative Algerian export basket. I used the French
agricultural wholesale prices (in francs) after 1857.12 The price for wheat flour (francs per
kilogram) is used to proxy for cereals.13 With regard to wine prices (francs per hectolitre), I used
Mitchell’s (1992) data.14 For livestock I selected sheep and cattle prices (in francs per kilogram)
reported in ASF (1935).
Cereal and livestock exports (in francs) were obtained from the annual ASF and the wine
exports from Mitchell (1994). The data from the ASF required aggregating categories to build a
homogeneous time series, in addition to minor corrections and interpolations.15 However, given
that the trade data in this thesis is only used to provide a general and descriptive overview, I am
not giving further detail on the categorization and methodology used to build the time series.
Still, it is relevant to mention that there are some potential compilation errors; for example, as
Girault (1916, p. 255) explains, the recorded statistical mismatching between Algeria and French
11Which comes originally from the Tableau du commerce de la France, Direction Générale des Douanes. I
mostly relied on the 1930, 1935, and 1966 French yearbooks.
12The official sources also provide retail prices (consumer) and, occasionally, it is possible to infer prices from
the general commerce data using the official exported values in francs and quantities. The figures used are the
import values after the evaluation of the Valuation Commission
13The wheat flour prices show the highest correlations with all the other types of cereal.
14Using Mitchell (1988) as opposed to the data from the ASF does not make a difference since both series hold
an above 90 percent correlation between 1865 and 1935.
15The export data reported in the ASF has continuous nomenclature changes and sometimes the values refer to
special commerce (which is the one that enters in circulation in the country), while others it refers to general trade.
In some years, the export values to France are reported separately from the exports to other countries, whereas in
other occasions they are aggregated. Additionally, regarding the calculated weights for each product, since part
of the data was obtained from Mitchell (1994) (wine and total exports) and the rest from the ASF, the sum of the
weights is not perfect (accounting always below or equal to one hundred percent). Thus, the weights have been
adjusted to add one.
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customs in some years could be of “ten francs per hectoliter in Algeria and fifteen francs per
hectoliter in France.” These differences often relate to the valuation system in each country (i.e.,
official values and actual values) and might be biased depending on fiscal interests instead of
statistical ones (due to lobbies or other factors) (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2013).16 Thus, it is
to keep in mind that the real export series constructed in this section are approximations that are
a first step towards the creation of a more detailed and accurate long term series.
Population Series
This section estimates an annual population series for Algeria between 1872 and 1936. It
primarily focuses on the improvement of the indigenous population estimates given that the
European population in colonial Algeria (including information on vital rates and civil status) is
found to be sufficiently covered and precise after the 1870s (Kateb, 2001, p. 246). The results
show that population was approximately 4 million in 1872 and that the initial growth rates ranged
around 0.25 percent, thus standing between Manning’s (2010) estimates and the reported census
observations. Moreover, results stand against the constant 1 percent growth rate applied by
Frankema and Jerven (2014) between the 1850s and 1906, finding that the latter was reached in
the 1890s.
Current State of Research
Only few authors have estimated the annual population time series for Algeria (Frankema and Jerven,
2014; Manning, 2010; Fargues, 1986). Improving Algerian estimates ameliorates overall African datasets;
for instance, regarding North Africa, the most recent estimates provided by Frankema and Jerven (2014)
assume that the population growth rates in Algeria can be equally applied to Tunisia and Morocco. Thus,
reconstructing the Algerian series contributes to the general debate on African population trends and
long-term economic growth and development. Although there is a general consensus that censuses tend to
underestimate population in Algeria, there is disagreement on the corrections to be made. Patrick Manning
questions the World Bank’s conventional estimates, while Frankema and Jerven find that Manning’s
results overestimate population and underestimate growth. Graph D.4 provides an idea of the current
disagreement on Algerian population figures and displays the results obtained in this section (in graph
Pt_Census_VR_Corrected_LM). The series Pt-Frankema-Jerven presents the estimates from Frankema
and Jerven (2014), Pt_Manning reflects the ones from Manning (2010), and Pt_Tot_Fargues shows the
estimates from Fargues (1986). The series reflect significant differences; for instance, Manning’s initial
values surpass Frankema and Jerven’s by almost a 50 percent in 1880n while Frankema and Jerven’s are
above the census observations (shown in series Pt_Census_VR) by almost 50 percent in 1872. Although
the estimates built in this section (Pt_Census_VR_Corrected_LM) are not far from Frankema and Jerven’s,
they position between the latter and Manning’s values.
16The Algerian commerce data reported in the French statistical yearbooks shows that until 1890 the values are
official and, afterwards, they are actual (in contrast to the actual values reported in France).
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Figure D.4: Total population estimates, French Algeria 1872-1936
Source: Frankema and Jerven (2014), Manning (2010), Fargues (1986), and see text for more detail.
To estimate and infer population backwards in time it is necessary to select a departure or benchmark
year. Frankema and Jerven (2014) use the 1901 census given that, according to them, it is “the first
[census] that covers the 20th century boundaries of Algeria, including the Southern parts of the country.”17
They rely on Fargues (1986) to determine census reliability; however, they neglect additional sources
that argue that the 1906 census is more accurate given that its administrative boundaries are significantly
different to those reported in 1901 (Bernard, 1908) and that the census-counting was finally centralized
(Kateb, 1998, 2004).
There is also disagreement with respect to the total initial population values and growth rates. The
1872 census reports that Muslim population was 2.1 million approximately and that it accounted for
almost 90 percent of the total population. As Good (1961) explains, only after the 1870s it experienced a
continuous positive growth explained by its natural increase. However, there is no consensus on the real
figures for this period. Good (1961) and Yacono (1993) show that the Muslim population in the 1870s was
still below 2.5 million and only after 1886 the 3 million figure was surpassed, thus leading to an annual
growth rate above 3 percent between 1872 and 1876. In contrast, Frankema and Jerven (2014) show that
the 1872 total population had already reached 3.5 million; hence, this means that the Muslim population
averaged at least 3 million (as it accounted for almost 90 percent of the total population), thus leading to
an annual growth rate of around 1 percent.
With regards to the 1872 Muslim population figures, it seems logical to expect a higher value than the
one reported in the 1872 census, and thus, a growth rate below 3 percent. Indeed Kateb (2001, p. 119)
17They point out the existence of “more or less pre-1950 figures” and question Manning’s assumption regarding
the accuracy of the 1950 conventional benchmark. By way of illustration, the authors – based on the Kenya, Nigeria
and the Gold Coast – find that the 1950 estimate for total Africa should be adjusted upwards in 20 millions.
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Table D.1: Population density in square kilometres (rough estimates): S. Africa, S. Rhodesia, Kenya, and
N. Algeria
S. Africa S. Rhodesia Kenya N. Algeria
1800 1962 1900 1962 1900 1960 1830 1954
Pop. density 1.2 15 1.3 8.5 6.9-9.4 14.5 13.8-18.4 39.5
Pop./ Cult.Area 1.9 2.2 22.9-28.6 40.0-50.0
Source: Lützelschwab (2000, p. 10)
argues that any demography expert would deny the 3.8 percent rate inferred for the 1870s from the 1872
and 1876 censuses following a 10 years demographic crisis. This period, particularly severe between 1861
and 1872, is described by Yacono (1993, p. 169) as les années terribles as a result of epidemics (two
of cholera, one of typhus, and one of smallpox), drought, famine, and a major rebellion in the Kabylia
region. In fact, Good (1961) shows that the municipal Muslim inter-census growth rates turned negative in
1861 and reached a -3.7 percent value between 1866 and 1872. Hence, such a strong negative impact on
population should gradually recover, thus not allowing for such an immediate high growth rate.18 On the
other side, a uniform 1 percent growth rate between 1856 and 1901 such as the one applied by Frankema
and Jerven (2014) is not plausible either since the negative shock impeded a steady growth throughout
all years. This 1 percent value is a proxy used by Frankema and Jerven (2014) that corresponds to the
lowest growth rate figures found in Indonesia and the Philippines.19 The authors argue that South Asian
growth rates, reflected by land abundant “open land frontiers,” work as better proxies in contrast to the
densely populated Indian proxy used by (Manning, 2010).20 Nonetheless, by the 1870s the frontier and
arable land were quasi-exhausted in Algeria (see Chapter 3) and population densities were relatively high
(see Table D.1).21 As an illustration, in the sample used by Acemoglu et al. (2002) in their “Reversal of
Fortune” paper,22 Algeria (together with India, Morocco, and Egypt) is one of the 14 countries (out of a
total of 91) exceeding the mean value with regards to the total population relative to arable land,23 while
Indonesia and Philippines are situated below the average (although the former is near the average). Thus,
it seems logical to expect total values below the ones provided by Manning (2010) but higher than those
used by Frankema and Jerven (2014).
18Furthermore, even if the population did recover by 1869 and achieve 3.7 percent growth rate between 1872
and 1876, this recovery was interrupted by the 1871 Kabylia conflict (Yacono, 1993).
19Adjusted with additional information on fertility, mortality and marriages.
20Frankema and Jerven (2014) also stand against the assumption taken by Manning (2010) that allows using
Indian growth rates as proxies for African growth. Given that there is no evidence supporting the similarity between
Indian and African conditions (such as labor-to-land ratio), they argue that the growth rates from tropical areas
should not be applied to non-tropical regions such as North Africa and South Africa. In their opinion, the African
growth rates are not lower than the Indian ones, arguing against Manning’s claim “that growth-impeding factors in
Africa have been much more severe than in India” (p. 21). As explained by Frankema and Jerven (2014),
Instead of applying “modified” Indian growth rates (Manning, 2010) we derive growth rates for North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia,
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Spanish Sahara) from the available population censuses of the two most populous countries in
the region, Egypt and Algeria. We adopt Egypt as the standard for Libya, and Algeria as the standard for Tunisia, Morocco
and Spanish Sahara. We take the first reasonably complete population count as a starting point for backward projections,
based on a higher default growth rate (one percent). We end up with a total population estimate for North Africa in 1850 that
is ca. 48 percent lower than Manning’s estimate (12.8 versus 24.6 million).
21Within Northern Algeria, which covered about 210,000 square kilometers, it was estimated that the cultivable
share was around 28 percent in 1917 (58,600 square kilometers) (Ageron, 1968).
22Based on McEvedy et al. (1978).
23Population density is the logarithm of the total population divided by total arable land.
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Census Data and Population in Algeria
In order to measure population levels and growth rates from census data, it is important to consider
whether the numbers are accurately reported and, if possible, to infer growth rates from at least two
reliable censuses that allow for comparison (Frankema and Jerven, 2014).24 This part follows research
undertaken by demographers such as Kamel Kateb, Philippe Fargues, Dorothy Good, and Mahfoud
Biraben, and also relies on the 1948 census (as it includes an overview of all the prior censuses) and
several ASF ,25 to estimate both the indigenous and settler population between 1872 and First World War.
Since the late 1850s, Algeria has published censuses every five years; more specifically, nineteen
between 1830 and 1962.26 Although the census-taking dates followed the same dates as those applied in
France, the methodology was criticized as it did not adjust to Algerian local features, leading to numerous
counting mistakes (particularly because of nomadic population). Prior to the 1900s, the total population
series – complemented with natural growth rates – built from quinquennial censuses shows strong changes
in levels prior to 1906 that are entirely explained by the Muslim population figures (see Figure D.5).
Kateb (2004) explains that, despite numerous initiatives undertaken by the French administration in the
1870s to improve the demographic statistics (such as the creation of a statistical body separated from
the government), the counting of the Muslim population encountered several problems. For instance, in
the military areas the indigenous population was inferred by counting the number of tents and assuming
that each was occupied from five to seven people. In addition, the census-taking time-span lasted several
months, leading to double counting and omissions errors.27 The accuracy of comparison between census
improves significantly between 1901 and 1936 as area boundaries are finally established and the census-
taking techniques adapt better to local Algerian characteristics (Kateb, 1998, 2004). Indeed, the 1948
census states that any study analyzing the long-term trends of Muslim population must not rely on data
collected before 1901 or 1906.28 However, as Bernard (1908) explains, the 1901 and 1906 censuses hold
strong differences given that the latter increased the territorial coverage and thus experienced significant
administrative changes. Thus, although these changes covered scarcely populated areas, the 1906 census
is more accurate in terms of comparison with the 1948 census. In addition, it is when census-counting is
centralized and a Service de la Statistique Génerale was in charge of collecting and gathering information
for the whole territory and publish them regularly in the Statistique Générale de l’Algérie (or SGA)
24It is crucial to answer the following question posed by Frankema and Jerven (2014, p. 8): “when does the
demographic recording become sufficiently valid to yield reliable level estimates and sufficiently consistent to yield
reliable annual growth rates?”
25The ASF contain a special section on Algeria. It includes a portion of the census data but it is not as complete
as the original census. Regarding censuses from the Gallica webpage, I downloaded the statistics from the SGA,
containing the annex of different Algerian census information (although incomplete). I have also been working with
the 1948 and 1954 (volume 2 and 3) censuses which are available at the INE in Madrid.
26The first population follow up was undertaken by the military administration after 1836, but was limited to
Europeans in the occupied cities. However, some estimates for indigenous population were elaborated in 1844, 1856
and 1866 but these were restricted to Algerian populations located within the regions under military administration
(Kateb, 1998). In 1856 both indigenous and settlers are finally reported in the territory under military and civil
administration (Kateb, 2004). The collected data allow to account for different groups – usually reported as
Europeans, Muslims, and Israelites – and their territorial distribution.
27Improving in 1886 when the jour fix system (one day elaboration) was implemented (Except for the CI and
CM). However, it was very inaccurate as it frequently relied on illiterate population to undertake the counting
(Kateb, 1998).
28Only after 1906 the census data is also provided at a sub-municipal level in centres, douars, sections, etc.
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(Kateb, 2004). This is why this section uses the 1906 census to infer population backwards.
To estimate population I first correct the indigenous population series and then aggregate both groups
to obtain total population.29 More specifically, I correct the indigenous natural growth rates between 1872
and 1906 and use the latter to infer the population backwards from 1906. The final series that appears
in Figure D.4 (called Pt_Census_VR_Corrected_LM) shows that the initial total population growth rate
ranged around 0.25 percent and that the initial population was approximately 4 million in 1872, thus
standing between Manning’s (2010) estimates and Frankema and Jerven’s estimates.
Table D.2 provides the descriptive statistics about total population, births, deaths, and migration.30
Graph D.6 shows the difference between the corrected natural growth series (NG) – that is, total births
minus total deaths – before 1906 and the reported one by censuses. Graph D.7 shows the Muslim
population corrected growth rates and Frankema-Jerven’s (2014) total population growth rate.31 What
follows explains both the corrections in the indigenous birth and death rates, and potential bias in the data
used.
With respect to indigenous total births, the series reported in censuses has 47 observations starting in
1879.32 I first calculated an Interpolated series by geometrically interpolating the missing observations
between the available years and 1879. To go backwards up to 1872, I assigned to 1872 and 1876 the
same birth rate (25.67) as the one reported in the 1881 census, and then interpolated the missing years.
After this, given that it has been proven that censuses are significantly underestimated, I calculated a
Corrected series. According to Kateb (2001) and Biraben (1969), prior to the 1880s there are only a few
vital rate estimates that are considered to be reliable. These are for the year 1876 and are based on a small
sample of 145 municipalities, representing approximately 1,100,438 inhabitants (almost 45 percent of
the Muslim population).33 Thus, I apply this value (37.3 per thousand inhabitants) to 1876, leading to a
45 percent higher number of births than the one inferred from census observations. Given that Biraben’s
(1969) corrected birth rate series begins in 1876 (one value for each census), I also assigned the 37.3 value
to 1872 and interpolated the missing values in-between. Following this, I adjusted the rest of the series
prior to 1906 applying Biraben’s (1969) improved birth rates that takes into consideration registration
omission (based on Breil (1954)).34 However, his corrections are not available for 1881 and 1886. Thus, I
corrected these missing birth rates by adjusting the average underestimation (i.e., the mean difference
29I proxy the settler group with the census-reported non-Muslim group and the indigenous one by the Muslim
group.
30In the original series, European and Israelites births and deaths are available from 1873 to 1937 with six
missing observations, while Muslim births and deaths, from 1879 to 1936, have twelve missing observations.
31Notes on vital rates. Between 1872 and 1878 the military deaths have been subtracted from data, but after 1879
they are separately counted from the death data, so it is possible to exclude them. Thus, I have excluded them from
the series. Stillbirths are more complicated to measure due to data lack of data. For Muslim and non-Muslim births,
it has been possible to account for stillbirths and exclude them from the series (except for the period 1873-1875
where they are included both in births and deaths series) and they have also been excluded from the death series.
32Between 1872 and 1936 there are 11 missing observations. The value in 1880 is the average between 1879-
1881, 1885 is the average between 1885 and 1887. Stillbirths (mortnés et mort avants la déclaration de naissance)
are excluded.
33Still, it is also found to be underestimated (Kateb, 2004). However, it is considered to be reliable due to a
decree issued in 1875 that penalized omission or late submission of birth and death declarations according to the
Code Pénal (Biraben, 1969, p. 713).
34The values after 1900 are also underestimated after 1900 but this section only corrects the ones before 1900.
According to the authors, between 1891 and 1913 the underestimation averages 25 percent and then, up to 1921, it
increases to 34 percent (Kateb, 2001).
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between Biraben’s birth rates and the census ones) to its corresponding census birth rate value (obtaining
a 35.03 in 1881 and a 35.07 in 1886). Finally, I completed the Corrected series for the years prior to 1906
by adjusting the Interpolated series to the corrected birth rates.
The total deaths series must be tackled with more care (Negadi et al., 1974). According to Kateb
(2001), there is no consensus on the deviations from real values. Although a majority of authors, such as
Vallin (1975) or Biraben (1969), find that mortality figures are underestimated, others, like Fargues (1986),
find that the reported figures are overestimated, hiding an “endogenous” early demographic transition as a
result of improved indigenous standards of living (e.g., better infrastructures and vaccines). The death
series used in this section has 47 observations starting in 1879.35 To infer the years before 1906, I first
assigned the 32.9 per thousand rate obtained from the 1876 estimation of 145 municipalities (as explained
in the paragraph above) to the years 1876 and 1872 and geometrically interpolated the missing values.
Based on Negadi et al. (1974), the 1881, 1886, 1891, and 1896 total deaths figures are calculated assuming
that mortality underestimation was around 35 percent between 1891 and 1935. I then interpolated the
missing values. Finally, the 1901 mortality rate is obtained from Negadi et al. (1974) (and similar to
Kateb’s (2001) 33.3 value).36
Figure D.5: Total indigenous and settler population,37 French Algeria 1872-1936
Source: Résultats statistiques du dénombrement de la population effectué le 31 octobre 1948. For further detail on sources see
Appendix D. .
35With 11 missing observations after 1879. Stillbirths are excluded after 1894, the problem is that data prior to
1894 for Muslims is very scarce and does not clarify if stillbirths are included. The raw data shows no decreasing
tendency but it does show a propensity to stabilize. The three observations corresponding to 1880, 1882 and 1885
are averages to their respective three surrounding years.
36In addition, Kateb (2001) calculates some estimates for the mortality rates, resulting in 33.5 per thousand for
the years between 1901-1904, 31.7 per thousand for the years between 1905-1909, and 27.8 per thousand for the
following five years. He applies the Brass methodology which is an estimation technique used in demography.
37The settler category is proxied by the non-Muslim group while the indigenous population is proxied by the
reported Muslim category. See section on terminology in the Introduction for more detail.
D.4. Trade and Population 157
Table D.2: Summary statistics in Appendix D
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Total Census Population 4,781,641 1,460,073 13
Total Census Muslim Population 4,096,594 1,230,242 13
Muslims Births 129,480 35,575 47
Muslims Deaths 90,933 14,417 47
Muslim Stillbirths 1,503 328 44
Total Census non-Muslim Population 636,374 207,733 14
European and Israelites Births 18,555.10 2,866 58
European and Israelites Deaths 12,750 1,283 58
Stillbirths_Eur & Isr 703 92 50
Total Census Population “Corrected” 4,511,507 646,039 65
Source: Annual Annuaire Statistique de la France (ASF), see text for more detail.
However, despite these corrections, the population figures must be regarded with caution as Algerian
census periodicity and regularity responded to colonial policy priorities: that is, establishing a settlement
colony by increasing French population. The French demographical statistical body was influenced by
the colonial policy whose initial aim, aside from tax purposes, was to inform the métropole about the
progress of colonization and prove that settlement was successful (Kateb, 2004). Thus, the European
numbers were many times inflated; for example, the 1931 and 1936 censuses were exaggerated because
of the naturalizations (granting French nationality) undertaken by the French government to decrease
concerns over the fall in French numbers (Kateb, 1998).38 Indeed, this was a regular behavior across
colonizing countries; for instance, Frankema and Jerven (2014) explain that French West Africa and
French Equatorial Africa inflated numbers for fiscal and commercial interests towards Paris. In addition,
as Fetter (1987) argues for the Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland , the population is often
under-counted as respondents avoided colonial officers and administrators due to tax collection. Thus,
while indigenous populations were clearly underestimated in census counting mostly because of nomadic
populations or tax incentives, the settler population was often inflated.
38The Sénatus-Consulte of 14th of July 1865 was the first legal procedure granting French citizenship to
foreigners having completed three years of residence in Algeria. The second procedure was applied in 1889 giving
automatically citizenship to children with foreign parents who were born within Algerian borders and did not reject
it. The Jewish population was granted French citizenship with the Crémieux decree in 1870 (Kateb, 1998).
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Figure D.6: Natural population growth rates, French Algeria 1872-1914
Source: Annual Annuaire Statistique de la France (ASF), see text for more detail.
Figure D.7: Muslim and total population growth, Algeria 1872-1914
Source: Annual Annuaire Statistique de la France (ASF), see text for more detail.
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D.5 Spatial Aggregation and Changes in Administrative
Names
Figure D.8: Aggregating current municipalities into 1949 boundaries in Constantine
The final dataset does not include areas such as Khenchela or Tébessa (the two big municipalites in the South-Eastern part) since
their boundaries changed significantly between 1902 and 1939/49. Source: Carte des Limites Administratives, Departement
de Constantine, Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie (1939, 1949). For GIS current administrative boundaries I used Global
Administrative Areas (2012). GADM database of Global Administrative Areas, version 2.0. [online] URL: www.gadm.org.
See Appendix D for more detail on sources.
This section provides a detailed description on the aggregation of the current municipalities in order to
construct the old municipalities included in the dataset. For example, in Constantine, the old municipality
named Aïn Beïda_pe is a commune de plein exercice (with the extension “_pe”) and is formed by part of
present Fkirina and a portion of current Aïn Beïda, while Aïn M’Lila_m is a commune mixte (with the
extension “_m”) is formed by a portion of the current Aïn Beïda, a part of Oued Seguen, and 12 current
municipalities.
Constantine. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Constantine_pe: Constantine. Aïn Abid_pe: part of
Ain Abid. Aïn Beïda_pe: part of Fkirina and part of Ain Beida. Aïn Kerma_pe: Boudjeriou Messaoud. Aïn
Smara_pe: part of Ain Semara. Aïn Tinn_pe: part of Sidi Khelifa, part of Ain Mellouk, and Ain Tine. Bizot_pe:
Beni Hamidene and Didush Murad. Condé Smendou_pe: Zighoud Youcef and part of Ouled Hebbaba. Grarem_pe:
part of Grarem Gouga,Hamala, and part of Cheraga. Guettar El Aiech_pe: part of Constantine and part of El Khroub.
Hamma_pe: Hamma Bouziane. El Khroub_pe: part of El Khroub and Ben Badis. Mila_pe: part of Zeghaia, part
of Sidi Khelifa, Mila, and part of Ahmed Rachedi. Oued Athmenia_pe: part of Teleghma, part of Chelghoum
Laid, and part of Oued Seguen. Oued Seguin_pe: part of Teleghma, part of Ain Semara, and part of Oued Seguen.
Oued Zenati_pe: Ain Rekada, Oued Zenati, Ras El Agba, part of Bordj Sebbat, and part of Tamlouka. Ouled
Rahmoun_pe: Ouled Rahmoune. Renier_pe: part of Ain Makhlouf. Rouffach_pe: Ibn Ziad. Sidi Merouane_pe: part
of Cheraga and Sidi Merouane. Tébessa_pe: part of Boulhaf Dyr, part of El Kouif, and part of Tebessa. Zeraia_pe:
part of Zeghaia and Oued Endja. COMMUNES MIXTES- Aïn M’lila_m: part of Ain Abid, Ain El Kercha, Ain
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M’Lila, El Amiria, Hanchir Toumghani, Ouled Gacem, Ouled Hamla, Sigous, Souk Naamane, Ain El Fakroun, part
of Oued Seguen, El Fedjoudj Boughrara Saoudi, El Harmilia, and Ouled Zaoui. Chateaudun du Rummel_m: part
of Teleghma, Benyahia Abderrahmane, part of Chelghoum Laid, part of Oued Athmenia, part of Tadjenanet, El
Mechira, Bir Chouhada, Ouled Khelouf, and part of Ain Mellouk. In the map there is a commune de plein exercice
named Chateaudun du Rummel (which was created the 15th of October 1921 ), but in the period under study it
was still classified as commune mixte. Hence, the commune de plein exercice in the map is included within the
commune mixte area. El Milia_m: Bouraoui Belhadef, El Ancer, El Milia, Ghebala, Kheir Oued Adjoul, Ouled
Rabah, Ouled Yahia Khadrouche, Settara, Sidi Marouf, and part of Grarem Gouga. Fedj M’zala_m: part of Ahmed
Rachedi, Ain Beida Harriche, Amirat Arres, Bouhatem, Derradji Bousselah, Elayadi Barbes, Ferdjioua, Minar
Zarza, Rouached, Tassadane Haddada, Terrai Bainnane, Tessala Lamtai, Tiberguent, Yahia Beniguecha, part of
Bellaa, Djemila, Tachouda, and part of Ain Mellouk. Meskiana_m: Ain Touila, Belala, Bhir El Chergui, El Dhaala,
El Djazia, El Rahia, Meskiana, Oued Nini, part of El Ouinet, part of Berriche, part of Fkirina, and Zorg. Morsott_m:
Ain Zerga, Bekkaria, Bir Dheb, Boukhadra, El Meridj, Hammamet, Morsot, Ouenza, part of El Ouinet, part of
Boulhaf Dyr, and part of El Kouif. The commune mixte of Morsott (created the 29th of December 1884 ) was
previously known as the commune mixte of Tébessa. This study maintains the name Morsott. Oum el Bouaghi_m:
Ksar El Sbihi, Ain Zitoun, Oum El Bouaghi, part of Berriche, Ain Bebouche, Ain El Diss, part of Ain Beida, part
of Tamlouka, and part of Fkirina. Sedrata_m: Bir Bouhouche, Khemissa, M’Daourouche, Oued Kebrit, Oum El
Adhaim, Ragouba, Safel El Ouiden, Sedrata, Terraguelt, and Zouabi. Tébessa_m: Bedjene, Bir El Ater, Chrea, El
Houidjbet, El Malabiodh, El Mezeraa, El Ogla, Ferkane, Negrine, Ogla Melha, Oum Ali, Safsaf El Ouesra, Stah
Guentis, Thelidjene, Bir Mokadem, Gourigueur, and part of Tebessa.
Creation date according to Tableau général des communes 1902- Constantine_pe: 26th of April 1854; Aïn
Abid_pe: 25th of August 1885; Aïn Beïïda_pe: 10th of December; Aïn Kerma_pe: 28th of July 1885; Aïn Smara_pe:
8th of October 1869; Aïn Tinn_pe: 23rd of November1880; Bizot_pe: 10th of August 1868; Condé Smendou_pe:
22nd of August 1861; Grarem_pe: 9th of April 1888; Guettar El Aiech_pe: 5th of December 1877; Hamma_pe:
10th of December 1866; El Khroub_pe: 28th of March 1863; Mila_pe: 23rd November 1880; Oued Athmenia_pe:
10th of December 1868; Oued Seguin_pe: 8th of March 1874; Oued Zenati_pe: 10th of December 1868 and 3rd of
February 1896; Ouled Rahmoun_pe: 8th of October 1869; Renier_pe: 3rd of February 1896; Rouffach_pe: 7th of
March 1874; Sidi Merouane_pe: 23rd of November 1880; Tébessa_pe: 4th of December 1880; Zeraia_pe: 23rd of
November 1880; Aïn M’lila_m: 28th of November 1874; Chateaudun du Rummel_m: 7th of November 1874; El
Milia_m: 25th of August 1880; Fedj M’zala_m: 1er of December 1880; Meskiana_m: 21st of December 1880;
Morsott_m: 29th of December 1884; Oum el Bouaghi_m: 21st of December 1880; Sedrata_m: 21st of December
1880.
Batna. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Batna_pe: part of Tazoult, part of Batna, and Fesdis; Biskra_pe:
Biskra; Lambèse_pe: part of Tazoult; Khenchela_pe: The commune de plein exercice of Khenchela appears the
20th of March 1911; hence, in this study it is included within the commune mixte of Khenchela. COMMUNES
MIXTES- Aïn el Ksar_m: Ain Yagout, Boulhilat, Boumia, Chemora, Djerma, El Madher, Lazrou, Ouled Fadhel,
Seriana, Timgad, and part of Ouyoun El Assafir; Aïn Touta_m: Ain Touta, Beni Foudala El Hakania, Maafa, Oued
Chaaba, Ouled Aouf, Tilatou, Ain Zaatout, Branis, Djamora, El Kentara, El Ouitaya, and part of Batna; Aurés_m:
Arris, Bouzina, Chir, Foum Toub, Ghessira, Ichmoul, Inoughissen, Kimmel, Larbaa, Menaa, Oued Taga, part of
Ouyoun El Assafir, T Kout, part of Tazoult, Teniet El Abed, Tighanimine, Tigharghar, M_Ziraa, Mechouneche;
Khenchela_m: Babar, Baghai, Bouhmama, Chechar, Chelia, Djellal, El Mahmal, El Oueldja, Kais, Khirane, M’Sara,
M’Toussa, Ouled Rechache, Remila, Tamza, Taouzianat, Yabous, Khenguet Sidi Nadji, El Hamma, Ensigha and
Khenchela; Ouled Soltan_m: the 5th of October 1907 the lands of the commune mixte Ouled Soltan were distributed
among the commune mixtes of Aïn Touta, Barika and Belezma. For this reason it will only be included in the
sample if comparing time changes; Belezma_m: part of Ain Azel, Ain Djasser, El Hassi, Guiga, Hidoussa, Ksar
Bellezma, Lemsane, Merouana, Oued El Ma, Ouled Sellem, Ras El Aioun, Rehbat, Talkhamt, Taxlent, and Zanet El
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Beida; The commune mixte of Belezma was originated the 27th of September 1904 from territories belonging to the
communes mixte Aïn El Ksar, d’Aïn Touta, and Ouled Soltan; So it is not possible to account for this municipality to
analyze time variation; Barika_m: Ain Khadra, Belaiba, Berhoum, Dehahna, Magra, Azil Abdelkader (Metkouak),
Barika, Bitam, Boumegueur, Djezzar, Gosbat, M’Doukal, N’Gaous, Ouled Ammar, Ouled Si Slimane, Sefiane, and
Seggana. It was created the 5th of October 1907 parts of the commune indigène of Barika and parts of the commune
mixte Ouled Soltan.
Creation date and ‘type’ according to Tableau général des communes 1902- Batna_pe: 18th of February 1860;
Biskra_pe: 22nd of May 1878 and the 2nd of August 1892; Lambèse_pe: 8th of October 1869; Aïn el Ksar_m: 29th
of December 1884; Aïn Touta_m: 29th of December 1884; Aurés_m: 18th of December 1886. The dataset contains
two additional communes mixtes created during the period under study: Ouled Soltan and Belezma. Barika_m: 5th
of October 1907.
Bône. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Bône_pe: Annaba and part of El Bouni; Aïn Mokra_pe: part
of Berrahal, part of Oued El Aneb, and part of Treat; Barral_pe: part of Chihani; Bugeaud_pe: part of Seraidi;
Duvivier_pe: part of Oued Fragha, part of Bouchekouf, and part of Medjaz Sfa; Duzerville_pe: Sidi Amar, part of
Chorfa, El Hadjar, and part of Chebaita Mokhtar; Herbillon_pe: part of Chetaibi, and part of El Marsa; La Calle_pe:
part of El Kala and part of Souarekh; Mondovi_pe: part of Chebaita Mokhtar and Drean; Morris_pe: part of Ben
M’Hidi and Zerizer; Nechmeya_pe: Nechemaya; Penthièvre_pe: Ain El Berda; Randon_pe: Echatt, Besbes, and
part of El Bouni; Randon_pe: Echatt, Besbes, and part of El Bouni. COMMUNES MIXTES- Beni salah_m: Beni
Salah (previously known as the commune mixte of Zerizer) was suppressed the 26th of January 1909 so this study
aggregates the data of Beni Salah to the data of the commune mixte of Edough assuming that the map already
includes the Beni Salah within Edough; Edough_m: part of El Marsa, part of Berrahal, part of Chetaibi, part of
Oued El Aneb, part of El Bouni, part of Seraidi, part of Treat, part of Chetaibi, and Ben Azzouz //part of Chorfa and
El Eulma//part of Oued Fragha, Ain Ben Beida, and part of Bouchekouf//Hammam Ben Salah, Ben M’Hidi, part of
Medjaz Sfa, part of Chihani, part of Bouchekouf, part of Oued Fragha, Asfour, and Chefia; La Calle_m: Ain El
Assel, Ain Kerma, Berrihane, Bougous, Bouteldja, El Aioun, part of El Kala, El Tarf, Lac Des Oiseaux, Raml Souk,
Zitouna, part of Souarekh, Oued Zitoun, part of Ouled Driss, and Bouhadjar.
Creation date according to Tableau général des communes 1902- Bône_pe: 31st of January 1848; Aïn
Mokra_pe: 10th of December 1868; Barral_pe: 7th of November 1870; Bugeaud_pe: 22nd of August 1861;
Duvivier_pe: 22nd of August 1861; Duzerville_pe: 22nd of August 1861; Herbillon_pe: 10th of December 1869
and 3rd of September 1889; La Calle_pe: 31st of December 1836; Mondovi_pe: 22nd August 1861; Morris_pe:
22nd of May 1885; Nechmeya_pe: 7th of November 1870; Penthièvre_pe: 22nd of August 1861 and 4th of
September 1891; Randon_pe: 10th of December 1868; Beni salah_m: 13th of April 1876; Edough_m: 29th of
December 1884; La Calle_m: 29th of December 1884.
Bougie. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Bougie_pe: part of Bejaia; Akbou_pe: part of Akbou;
Chekfa_pe: part of Chekfa; Djidjelli_pe: part of Jijel; Duquesne_pe: part of el Aouana, part of Jijel, and Kouas; El
Kseur_pe: part of El Kseur, part of Tinedbar, and part of Ifelain Ilmathen; Oued Amizour_pe: part of Amizour, part
of Smaoun, and part of Timezrit; Strasbourg_pe: part of Emir Abdelkader. COMMUNES MIXTES- Akbou_m:
part of current Akbou, Chellata, Ighrem, Beni-Mellikeche, Bouhamza, Tamokra, Amalou , part of Sidi Said, part of
Boudjellil, part of Ait R’Zine, part of Tazmalt, Ighil-Ali, Ouzzelaguen, part of Seddouk, and Tazmalt. Seddouk,
which appears in the historical administrative organization in the 1949 map and not in the historical dataset, was
a population centre (centre de population) created in 1872 and became a commune de plein exercice the 12th of
August 1928. Tazmalt was created in 1872 and became a commune de plein exercice the 10th of July 1925. Hence,
making a judgement call, it will be included within the commune mixte of Akbou; Guergour_m: Ain-Legradj,
Beni-Mouhli, Beni-Ouartilane, Beni Chebana, Bougaa, Bousselam, Draa-Kebila, Hammam Guergour, Harbil,
Maouaklane, Tala-Ifacene, Benimaouche, part of Draa El Caid, part of Bouandas, Ain-Legradj, Guenzet Tassameurt,
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part of Ain Roua, and part of Beni Oussine; Oued Marsa_m: part of current Babor, Melbou, Tamridjet, Aokas,
Souk El Tenine, Ait-Smail, Boukhlifa, Taskriout, Tichy, Tizi-N’Berber, Kendira, Ait-Tizi, Ait Naoual Mezada,
part of Darguina, and Bouandas; Soummam_m: Adekar, Beni Dejllil, Beni K’Sila, Berbacha, El Kseur, Feraoun,
Oued Ghir, Tala Hamza, Taourit Ighil, Toudja, part of Bejaia, part of Timezrit, part of Smaoun, Amizour, Akfadou,
Chemini, Souk Oufella, part of Ifelain Ilmathen, part of Tinebdar, part of Sidi Said, and Tifra; Taher_m: Bordj
Tahar, Boussif Ouled Askeur, Chahna, Djemaa Beni Habibi, El Kennar Nouchfi, Sidi Abdelaziz, part of Chekfa, part
of Oudjana, part of Emir Abdelkader, and part of Emir Abdelkader; Djidjelli_m: Boudria Beniyadjis, Djemila, El
Aouana, Erraguene, Selma Benziada, Texenna, Djidjelli and Oudjana. The commune mixte Tababort appears in the
historical 1949 map but not in the dataset. This is because in 1906 the commune mixte Tababort is named Djidjelli
(the 5th of October 1906). Therefore, in this paper, the 1904 commune Tababort will be changed to Djidjelli to
homogeneise the dataset. Creation date according to Tableau général des communes 1902- Bougie_pe: 17th of
June 1854; Akbou_pe: 20th of March 1883; Chekfa_pe: 30th of January 1897; Djidjelli_pe: 18th of February 1860;
Duquesne_pe: 25th of February 1879; El Kseur_pe: 1st of December 1879; Oued Amizour_pe: 23rd of July 1878;
Strasbourg_pe: 29th of March 1880; Akbou_m: 1st of December 1880; Guergour_m: 1st of December 1880; Oued
Marsa_m: 25 of August 1880; Soummam_m: 25th of August 1880; Taher_m: 25th of August 1880; Djidjelli_m:
(Tababort_m): 25th of August 1880.
Guelma. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Guelma_pe: part of Ben Djerrah, part of Belkheir, part of
Medjaz Ammar, and Guelma; Clauzel_pe: part of Ben Djerrah, Hammam Debagh, part of Houari Boumediene, part
of Medjaz Ammar, and part of Selaoua Announa; Enchir Saïd_pe: Bouati Mahmoud; Enchir Saïd after the 29th
of January 1921 is named Galliéni, which is the commune that appears in the map. This study will maintain the
name of Enchir Saïd for that same commune; Guelaa Bou Sba_pe: Kalaat Bousbaa; Heliopolis_pe: Helliopolis;
Kellermann_pe: El Fedjoudj and part of Medjaz Ammar; Millesimo_pe: part of Belkheir; Petit_pe: Boumahra
Ahmed and part of Djebala El Khemissi; Souk Ahras_pe: Souk Ahras. COMMUNE MIXTES- Oued Cherf_m:
part of Bordj Sebbat, part of Bou Hamdane, part of Ain Makhlouf, Ain Larbi, part of Houari Boumediene, part of
Selaoua Announa, part of Ben Djerrah, Ain Soltane, part of Khezzara, part of Ain Sandel; Séfia_m: Beni Mezline,
Bou Hachana, Dahouara, Hammam N’Bail, part of Khezzara, Oued Cheham, Hanencha, Machroha, part of Djebala
El Khemissi, part of Ain Sandel, part of Bouchekouf, part of Medjaz Sfa, and part of Ouled Driss; Souk Ahras_m:
Ain Zana, Drea, Haddada, Khedara, Merahna, Ouled Moumen, Sidi Fredj, Taoura, Tiffech, Zaarouria, Ouillen,
and part of Ouled Driss; Creation date according to Tableau général des communes 1902- Guelma_pe: 17th of
June 1854; Clauzel_pe: 18th of March 1874; Enchir Saïd_pe: 10th of December 1868 and 23rd of February 1887;
Guelaa Bou Sba_pe: 5th of July 1875; Heliopolis_pe: 10th of December 1868; Kellermann_pe: 12th of July 1886;
Millesimo_pe: 10th of July 1868; Petit_pe: 15th of March 1877; Souk Ahras_pe: 22nd of August 1861; Oued
Cherf_m: 5th of April and 16th of September 1876; Séfia_m: 1er of December 1880; Souk Ahras_m: 29th of
December 1884.
Sétif. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Sétif_pe: part of Mezloug, part of Ain Arnat, and Setif; Aïn
Abessa_pe: Aïn Abessa and part of Ain Arnat; Aïn Roua_pe: part of Aïn Roua; Aïn Taghrout_pe: part of Ain
Taghrout, part of Ain Tesra, part of Bir Kasdali, and part of Tixter. Aïn Taghrout became a commune de plein
exercice in 1880 but expanded in 1907. Still, comparing the area in the 1902 Tableau (134.97 km2) with the one
corresponding to 1939/49 (around 170km2), it is possible to see that the difference is not very significant. Therefore,
despite the expansion, this paper sticks to the 1939/49 boundaries; Bordj Bou Arréridj_pe: part of Bordj Bou
Arreridj and Hasnaoua; Coligny_pe: part of Ain Arnat, part of Mezloug, and part of Tixter; El Ouricia_pe: El
Ouricia; Saint Arnaud_pe: part of Beni Fouda, part of El Eulma, and part of Guelta Zerka; Tocqueville_pe: part
of Ras El Oued. It became a commune de plein exercice the 16th of March 1912. Tocqueville (centre and farms)
was located in 1902 in the commune mixte Rhira (by Arrêté gouvernemental the 7th of March 1881) so it will be
aggregated in the latter. COMMUNES MIXTES- Bibans_m: Bordj Zemoura, Colla, Djaafra, El M’Hir, El Main,
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Haraza, Mansoura, Medjana, Ouled Dahmane, Ouled Sidi Brahim, Tafreg, Teniet En Nasr, El Achir, Tesmart, part
of Bendaoud, part of El Achir, part of Sidi Embarek, part of Bir Kasdali, and part of Khelil; Eulma_m: Bazer-Sakra,
Beidha Bordj, Bir-El-Arch, El Oueldja, Guidjel, Hammam Soukhna, Ouled Saber, Taya, Telaa, part of El Eulma, part
of Guelta Zerka, part of Beni Fouda, part of Bellaa, and part of Tadjenanet; Maadid_m: part of Ain Tesra, Belimour,
Bordj Ghdir, El Ach, part of El Achir, El Anseur, El Hamadia, Ghilassa, Ksour, Rabta, part of Sidi Embarek, part
of Bordj Bou Arreridj , Maadid, Taglait, part of Ras El Oued, and part of M’Sila// Part of Ain Taghrout, part of
Khelil, part of Ain Arnat, and part of Beni Oussine; M’Sila_m: part of Bendaoud, part of M’Sila, Beni Ilmane,
Hammam Dalaa, M’Tarfa, Ouanougha, Ouled Derradj, Ouled Madhi, Ouled Mansour, Soumaa, Tarmount, Ouled
Addi Guebala, Khoubana, M’Cif, and Maarif; Rhira_m: Boutaleb, Hamma, Ouled Si Ahmed, Ouled Tebben, Rosfa,
Salah Bey, Ain Oulmane, Bir Haddada, Guellal, Ksar El Abtal, Ain Lahdjar, part of Ain Azel. Both Colbert (plein
exercice) and Ampère (plein exercice), which appear in the map, are not included in the dataset; Colbert became a
commune de plein exercice the 8th of April of 1932 and Ampère the 12th of April 1922. Both are included in the
commune mixte Rhira; Takitount_m: Ain-Sebt, Ain El Kebira, Amoucha, Beni-Aziz, Dehamcha, Maaouia, Oued El
Barad, Ouled Addouane, Serdj-El-Ghoul, Tizi N’Bechar, part of Darguina, part of Babor, part of Draa El Caid, and
Kherrata. What in the map appears to be Kerrata (commune de plein exercice) in the dataset it is included within the
commune mixte of Takitount since it was declared commune de plein exercice the 15th of January 1949. Creation
date according to Tableau général des communes 1902- 17th of June 1854; Aïn Abessa_pe: 25th of February 1879;
Aïn Roua_pe: 10th of November 1880; Aïn Taghrout_pe: 27th of December 1880; Bordj Bou Arréridj_pe: 3rd of
September 1870; Coligny_pe: 22nd of August 1861 and 25 of February 1899; El Ouricia_pe: 28th of March 1863;
Saint Arnaud_pe: 10th of December 1868; Tocqueville_pe: Became a commune de plein exercice the 16th of March
1912; Bibans_m: 1st of December 1880; Eulma_m: 7th of November 1874; Maadid_m: 7th of November 1874;
M’Sila_m: 29th of September 1884; Rhira_m: 7th of March 1881; Takitount_m: 25th of August 1880 and 19th of
February 1902.
Philippeville. COMMUNES DE PLEIN EXERCICE- Philippeville_pe: Skikda, Filfila, Hamadi Krouma,
Beni Bechir, part of El Hadaiek and part of Ain Zouit; Col des Oliviers_pe: Ain Bouziane; Collo_pe: Collo;
El Harrouch_pe: El Harrouch; Gastonville_pe: Salah Bouchaour; Gastu_pe: part of Ain Charchar and part of
Bekkouche Lakhdar; Jemmapes_pe: part of Azzaba; Robertville_pe: Sidi Mezghiche and Emjez Edchich; Saint
Charles_pe: Ramdane Djamel; Stora_pe: part of Ain Zouit and part of Skikda; COMMUNES MIXTES- Attia_m:
it was attached to the commune mixte of Collo the 16th of December 1905; therefore it is aggregated to the
latter; Collo_m: Ain Kechra, Beni Oulbane, Beni Zid, Bin El Ouiden, Bouchetata, Cheraia, part of El Hadaiek,
Kanoua, Kerkera, Kheng Maoun, Oued Zhour, Ouldja Boulbalout, Ouled Attia, Oum Toub, Tamalous, and Zitouna;
Jemmapes_m: part of Ain Charchar, Djendel Saadi Mohamed, part of Azzaba, Zerdeza, El Ghedir, Es Sebt, part of
Bekkouche Lakhdar, Roknia, part of Ouled Hebbaba, and part of Bou Hamdane; Creation date according to Tableau
général des communes 1902- Philippeville_pe: 31 of January 1848; Col des Oliviers_pe: 15th of December 1870
and 26th of October 1894; Collo_pe: 5th of November 1880; El Harrouch_pe: 22nd of August 1861; Gastonville_pe:
28th of August 1861; Gastu_pe: 10th of December 1868 and 27th of February 1887; Jemmapes_pe: 31st of
December 1856; Robertville_pe: 22nd of August 1861; Saint Charles_pe: 22 of August 1861 and 13th of March
1895; Stora_pe: 15th of December 1870 and 29th of September 1879; Attia_m: 25th of August 1880; Collo_m:
25th of August 1880; Jemmapes_m: 13th of October 1874 and 30th of March 1895.
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